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Prefae
This prefae tells the story of how I beame a PhD-student and desribes my time at
Tilburg University. If this is not your up of tea, I reommend the Introdution as a
starting point. For the Duth readers there is a summary at the end (Samenvatting).
At the age of six my parents already told me that I would beome a dotor. At
that time I `learned', as all Duth six-year-olds, to write italis. This style of writing
has the disadvantage that it takes a while to write a sentene. Hene, like most
physiians, I `perfeted' my style to a quik, but sadly almost ineligible handwriting.
Sine I already met this term for studying mediine, my parents thought that this
profession suited me. Alas, as this dissertation suggests, it was not to be, but I
have to admit that my parents were right in some respet as many members of this
department are notorious for their handwriting.
Anyway, bak to the start of my aademi areer. In my seond year of studying
at the university I beame a student-assistant giving tutorials to students. My
thanks to Marieke, Ruud, and Susan, for making me a better teaher. At the same
time I disovered that I liked Game Theory and Combinatorial Optimisation. Before
the start of the bahelor thesis season I went to Peter as I wanted to do a thesis
in game theory. Peter, assisted by Ruud and Edwin, supervised me on the The
nuleon revisited of whih some results an be found in Chapter 8. Just before the
master thesis season I visited Peter again. This time Peter and Herbert supervised
me on sequening games. Unfortunately, I suddenly had to teah a ourse and I
utterly failed the assignment. The teahing, however, made me onsider teahing
at the university as a profession. Therefore I needed to do a PhD and to inrease
my hanes I started a researh master. However, I still had to do a master thesis.
Surprisingly, Peter was willing to give me another shot, this time with John replaing
Herbert. At the time I was nishing work on Computational aspets of the per
apita nuleolus, I was reruited by Goos and René to beome their PhD-student
for the Dinalog 4C4D projet. The topi of this position at Tilburg University was to
v
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researh ooperation between transportation ompanies. Immediately at the start,
the projet reeived its rst setbak. The goal was to start researh on day one,
but we made a wrong assumption, namely, I still had to nish the researh master.
Instead of swithing to ourses that left time for researh, I stubbornly deided
to stik with the hallenging LNMB-PhD ourses. This left me with just enough
time and energy for teahing and interviews with the transportation ompanies. My
thanks to the ompanies and their employees for their time and their valuable input.
During the rst projet of my PhD, I, together with Hans, John, and Peter,
solved the onjeture of my master thesis. This resulted in the researh master
thesis Computation of the per apita nuleolus in bankrupty setting. The results
of the two master theses an be found in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. By this time,
I had ome to realize that I did not like the researh for the projet while I knew
that I liked game theory. At some point I even wanted to quit and swith to game
theory. A swith was not possible, whih atually turned out well. Goos, René, and
I, with a lot of help from Peter, found researh whih tted both the projet and my
interests. I atually quite enjoyed thinking about methods to nd solutions for the
stylized planning of transportation ompanies and programming them. The results
of the researh of our projet an be found in Chapters 2-5. I would like to thank
my o-authors Goos, Hans, John, Peter, René, and Ruud, for their many orretions
to avoid sloppiness and to make my work more readable (getting rid of the infamous
`Sybren-sentenes'). Furthermore, they also slowed me down or pushed me ahead
when needed. They also supported me in my private life, even though it provided
setbaks in our researh. They supported me when I got married and planned a long
vaation when researh-wise it was not the smartest move, and above all, granted
me a leave for two months when it was needed due to unexpeted irumstanes. I
would also like to thank my ommittee members Arantza, Bernhard, Henk, Joaquim,
Maro, and Tom, for their serious eorts in improving my dissertation.
During my areer I also met a lot of olleagues who indiretly inuened my
dissertation. Let me begin with my roommates, rst Aida, then Uwe, and nally
Xingang. Thank you for the short intermezzos during work and making the oe
a nie plae. Then there are the neighbors and the lunh-group members, Mario,
Marleen, Marieke, Nik, Niels, Stefan, and many more. Thank you for the disus-
sions during the lunhes we had together. And nally let me thank the ones who
answered all questions or redireted me to the right plae: the seretaries Anja,
Heidi, Korine, and Lenie.
Prefae vii
Life is not only about work, and the support from my olleagues was magnied
by the support I got in my personal life from my friends and family. First of all, I
would like to express my gratitude to my parents Tom and Karin for their support
and love, even though the path I took seemed to lead me away from their joke
that I would beome a physiian. My brothers for all their support and the good
times we had. They were also so kind to agree to be my 'meerkats' (also known as
paranymphs). My good friends Art-Jan, Joost, Joost, and Osar, for all the fun we
had. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my lovely wife Susan, who I
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1.1 Cooperation between transportation ompanies
This dissertation disusses ooperation between transportation ompanies. In-
reased restritions and wishes imposed by ustomers and governments, together
with inreased ompetition, dereased the prot margins of transportation ompa-
nies (Dahl and Derigs (2011); Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013)). This has
fored transportation ompanies to work more eiently. One way to ahieve this
is by ooperating with other transportation ompanies.
In the rst part (Chapters 2-5), we investigate priing based ooperation stru-
tures, whih are based on real-world ooperations. In this struture, ompanies
typially outsoure the delivery of ertain orders to eah other if the other ompany
an exeute this delivery more eiently. Outsouring is not the only option for
ooperation. For example, a higher level of ooperation an be ahieved when the
ompanies have a joint planning and delivery of orders. Transportation ompanies
an also ooperate spei on other aspets, for example, the purhase of truks
and equipments, truk fuel or maintenane ontrats. In the seond part of this dis-
sertation (Chapters 6-8), we analyze how we an alloate, in theory, the additional
gains when ompanies are involved in a higher level of ooperation. Or, in the most
extreme ase, partiipate in a entral planning struture. This is not only appliable
in the transportation industry, but also in other industries.
The reason why ompanies ooperate on deliveries is illustrated by Figure 1.1.
The goal of the ompany in Figure 1.1 is to deliver all the orders, denoted by the
small letters a− h, suh that the osts are minimized. Eah route should start and
end at the depot, denoted by D.
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Figure 1.1: Example of the delivery of orders.
Suppose that the optimal way of delivering the orders onsists of three routes
(DabcD, DdefD and DghD) whih are shown in Figure 1.1. In this example there
is a large dierene between the length of the dierent routes (11, 32 and 26). The
delivery of the orders that lie further away from the depot is more ostly than de-
livery of orders that lie lose. In order to derease the osts, the ompany might
onsider ooperating with another ompany whih has a depot loser to these far
away orders. The ooperation does not only derease the osts, but also has ad-
ditional benets. For example, there will be fewer truk movements in the region
of the outsoured orders, whih is espeially important for urban areas given their
fous on emission redution. Various transport ooperations in the Netherlands,
for example TransMission, Netwerk-Benelux, Teamtrans and Distri-XL, agree on a
prie for whih members aept to deliver orders for eah other. Based on this prie,
eah individual ompany deides whether it delivers an order itself or outsoures it.
The deision is made by omparing the outsoure osts with the routing osts. We
all the problem of deiding whih orders to outsoure and whih routes to drive
the Vehile Routing Problem with Order outsouring. This problem was introdued
by Chu (2005), while Hall and Raer (1995) were the rst to deide whih orders to
outsoure. The following example illustrates the deisions that have to be made in
the Vehile Routing Problem with Order outsouring.
Example 1.1.1 Consider a ompany with the same eight orders, a−h, as in Figure
1.1. Figure 1.2 desribes all the relevant distanes between the orders. To deliver

























Figure 1.2: The distanes between the orders.
the orders, the ompany has three truks. Eah truk has apaity 44, the xed
osts for using a truk are 12, and the variable osts per unit distane traveled are
1. The demand of the orders and the outsoure osts of the full orders are given in
Table 1.1. Note that the outsoure osts of an order equals 4 plus the orresponding
demand.
Order a b  d e f g h
Demand size 10 12 8 12 8 14 12 15
Outsoure osts 14 16 12 16 12 18 16 19
Table 1.1: Charateristis of the orders.
The ompany has to deide whih orders to outsoure and on the routing of the
remaining orders. For example, the ompany an deide to outsoure all orders
whih osts 123 in outsoure osts. Another example is to deliver all the orders as
presented in Figure 1.1. Route DabcD has a demand of 10 + 12 + 8 = 30 and the
orresponding osts are 12 + (3 + 2 + 2 + 4) = 23. Similarly, DdefD has a demand
of 12 + 8 + 14 = 34 and osts 12 + (10 + 3 + 7 + 12) = 44. Finally, DghD has
a demand of 12 + 15 = 27 and osts 12 + (12 + 4 + 10) = 38. So, the total osts
are 23 + 44 + 38 = 105. However, for eah route we do not only have the osts for
delivering the orders, but also the osts when outsouring the orders. The outsoure
osts are 14 + 16 + 12 = 42, 16 + 12 + 18 = 46 and 16 + 19 = 35, for route DabcD,
DdefD and DghD, respetively. A omparison between the outsoure osts and the
routing osts shows that it is heaper to outsoure the orders in route DghD than to
deliver them. Note that it might be that it is heaper to outsoure a part of a route
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instead of the omplete route. In fat it an be shown that the optimal solution
is to outsoure orders g and h, with osts 35, and to deliver the other orders, with
osts 23 + 44 = 67. Consequently, the total osts equal 67 + 35 = 102. ⊳
In the seond part of this dissertation, we analyze one of the most important
reasons why ooperations fail. When ompanies fully ooperate on the atual joint
planning and the joint delivery of orders, it is neessary to alloate the additional
prots obtained by ooperating. The mistrust of the ompanies on this alloation
has made many ooperations fail (Cruijssen et al. (2007)). Cooperative game theory
addresses how to alloate the additional prots in a fair way. The following example
illustrates the alloation issue with full ooperation on the delivery of orders between
two ompanies.
Example 1.1.2 Consider two transportation ompanies, ompany X and Y . Com-
pany X has the same harateristis as in example 1.1.1, while ompany Y has 6
orders, k− p. For simpliity, the depot of ompany Y is at the same loation as the
depot of ompany X . Company Y has 2 truks with the same apaity and ost
harateristis as the truks of the ompany X . The demand of all orders is given
in Table 1.2.
Order a b  d e f g h k l m n o p
Demand size 10 12 8 12 8 14 12 15 14 10 8 10 16 17
Table 1.2: Charateristis of the orders.
In Figure 1.3, the two optimal individual solutions for the two ompanies (without
ooperating and without the possibility of outsouring) are provided.































Figure 1.3: The separate delivery of orders.
The orresponding osts are 105 and 72 for the ompany X and Y , respetively,
using a total of 5 routes. However, the ompanies only need 4 routes when they
jointly plan and jointly deliver the orders. The four optimal routes when the om-






























Figure 1.4: The joint delivery of orders.
The osts for delivering the orders when fully ooperating are 24 (route DabckD),
37 (route DlmdeD), 38 (route DnfoD), and 40 (route DpghD). So the total osts
when the ompanies jointly plan and deliver are 139 while the total osts when the
ompanies do not ooperate are 105 + 72 = 177. The osts in this example are as
follows:
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tion
S {X} {Y } {X,Y }
c(S) 105 72 139
The question is how the osts, 139, an be fairly divided over the ompanies.
One way to divide the osts is to use ooperative game theory. The game theoreti
solution onept studied in Chapter 7, the per apita nuleolus (Grotte (1970)),
assigns 86 to ompany X and 53 to ompany Y . Another option is to use the solu-





to ompany X and Y , respetively. ⊳
1.2 Overview
In the rst part of this dissertation (Chapters 2-5), we investigate (priing based)
ooperation strutures between transportation ompanies with the fous on the de-
livery of orders. Chapter 2 disusses several ooperation strutures for transporta-
tion ompanies in the ontext of opportunities and impediments for ooperating. An
important opportunity is the reinforement of the market position while an impor-
tant impediment is the alloation of the joint gains (Dahl and Derigs (2011)). The
two types of ooperation strutures for transportation ompanies that are studied
in the literature are entral planning (Dai and Chen (2012)), where all the deisions
are made by one ompany, and aution based (Berger and Bierwirth (2010)), where
ompanies put undesired orders up for aution on whih the others an plae a bid.
We analyze a new ooperation struture, whih is the priing based struture and is
often used in pratie. In the priing based struture ompanies form a oalition and
they outsoure orders to eah other within this oalition for given outsoure osts
per order. These outsoure osts onsist of the fee that the other ompany reeives
for the delivery plus the osts for the inter-depot transport. One of the most impor-
tant deisions here is what the fee and the inter-depot osts of an order should be.
However, the ompanies remain independent and deide themselves whih orders
they outsoure. This implies that, in order to be able to determine the outsoure
osts that satisfy the preferenes of the oalition, we need to know whih orders the
ompanies outsoure given the outsoure osts. We researh two dierent methods
that deide whih orders to outsoure, heuristis in Chapter 3 and estimations in
Chapter 4. The ompanies do not know whih orders will be outsoured to them
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when they have to make the deision whih orders to outsoure. Hene, we do not
onsider the orders that will be outsoured to the ompany when deiding whih
orders to outsoure.
Chapter 3 disusses heuristis that deide whih orders to outsoure. Given the
outsoure osts, these heuristis try to nd a set of orders to outsoure together
with routes for the remaining orders suh that the total osts are minimized. We
onstrut three large neighborhood searh heuristis for the Vehile Routing Problem
with Order outsouring. We nd that the test instanes used in the literature are
not meeting the real-life harateristis and, therefore, we introdue new instanes.
The omputational results show that our heuristis perform better than the existing
heuristis in the literature.
Chapter 4 also disusses whih orders to outsoure. However, instead of heuris-
tis, estimations are used to determine a set of orders to outsoure. The osts for
delivering an order are estimated. Based on these estimations it is deided whether
or not an order is outsoured. We present a new type of estimation together with
a new method to selet whih orders to outsoure. Computational results show
that our estimation method has better results than the existing estimations in the
literature.
In Chapter 5, we fous on determining the outsoure osts that minimize the
total osts of the oalition. The outsoure osts depend on ertain fators, for ex-
ample the demand of an order. The parameters of these fators are determined
using Kriging (Forrester et al. (2008)). Kriging is a general method to nd the best
parameter onguration of a given problem. Using the results of several dierent
parameter ongurations, Kriging reates a model that approximates the outomes
of all parameter ongurations. Iteratively, the most promising parameter ongu-
ration is alulated, using the heuristis in Chapter 3, and the approximation model
is updated. We dene a ooperation test instane for whih we apply the priing
based struture. The omputational results show, for this test instane, that the
priing based struture leads to a ost redution of 14% ompared to the ase in
whih the ompanies do not ooperate.
In Chapter 2, we nd that one of the most important impediments for ooperation
strutures, also in transportation, is how to alloate the additional gains. Chapter
6 starts with a summary of several alloation methods disussed in the literature
on ooperation in logistis. Many of these methods use the ooperative transferable
utility game model as a basis. The seond part of this dissertation (Chapters 6-8)
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fousses on two alloation methods, the per apita nuleolus (Grotte (1970)) and
the proportionate nuleolus. These two alloations are both variants of the nule-
olus (Shmeidler (1969)). The nuleolus minimizes the maximal dissatisfation of
oalitions over all alloations, where the dissatisfation of a oalition in a given al-
loation is expressed as the dierene between the worth of the oalition and what
is alloated to it. The per apita nuleolus minimizes the maximal dissatisfation
per player of a oalition. In other words, for the per apita nuleolus the dissatis-
fation is shared over the players in the oalition while the nuleolus is interested
in the dissatisfation of the oalition as a whole. The proportionate nuleolus is a
new onept (in the spirit of the nuleon (Faigle et al. (1998)) whih maximizes
the relative satisfation over all alloations, where the relative satisfation given a
spei alloation is expressed as the ratio between the joint payo that the oali-
tion reeives aording to this alloation and the worth of the oalition. Chapter
7 haraterizes the per apita nuleolus of bankrupty games. Finally, Chapter 8
analyzes the proportionate nuleolus.
Chapter 2
Cooperation strutures in logistis
2.1 Introdution
Cooperation strutures between ompanies is a researh eld on its own (f. Tjemkes
et al. (2012)). We fous on ooperation strutures in logistis. There exist several
papers in the literature on this topi, both theoretial as well as ase studies. In
Setion 2.2, we disuss the reasons why transportation ompanies ooperate (op-
portunities) as well as the obstales (impediments). Many of these opportunities
and impediments also hold for other setors. Setion 2.3 disusses the dierent o-
operation strutures in the literature and we briey introdue a new struture, the
priing based struture. In Setion 2.4, we disuss the priing based struture more
in depth.
2.2 Opportunities and impediments
Generally speaking, there are three reasons for ompanies to ooperate: reinfore the
market position, redue osts, and inrease the servie level. Reinforing the market
position (Krajewska and Kopfer (2006); Dahl and Derigs (2011); Wang and Kopfer
(2011)) is the main reason and the other two reasons an be viewed as ways to ahieve
a reinforement of the market position. From these two subreasons, the one whih
is quoted most is ost redution (Cruijssen et al. (2007); Bloos and Kopfer (2009);
Özener et al. (2011); Wang and Kopfer (2011)). Several ase studies in the literature
show that the possible savings lie between 5 − 25% (Verdonk et al. (2013)). Note
that these numbers highly depend on the harateristis of the ompanies and the
ooperation struture. The nal reason mentioned in the literature is servie level
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improvement (Cruijssen et al. (2007); Bloos and Kopfer (2009)). The opportunities,
the ones from the literature together with the ones we found during our interviews
with transportation ompanies (see Appendix A), are presented in Table 2.1.
Opportunities Authors
Reinfore market position Krajewska and Kopfer (2006); Dahl and Derigs
(2011); Appendix A
Cost redution Cruijssen et al. (2007); Bloos and Kopfer (2009);
Özener et al. (2011); Wang and Kopfer (2011);
Appendix A
Improved servie Cruijssen et al. (2007); Bloos and Kopfer (2009);
Appendix A
Table 2.1: The opportunities of logisti ooperations.
Naturally, there are also impediments for the suess of a ooperation struture.
We divide the impediments into two types. The rst type onsists of the imped-
iments onerning the seletion of potential partners. The seletion impediments
ited the most are the unwillingness to dislose information (Berger and Bierwirth
(2010); Özener et al. (2011); Wang and Kopfer (2014); Appendix A), doubts whether
there atually exist any potential for savings (Cruijssen et al. (2006); Dahl and De-
rigs (2011); Appendix A), and the lak of trust in eah other (Dahl and Derigs
(2011); Özener et al. (2011); Appendix A). A new impediment is the lak of respet
and vision. Some ompanies do not want that other ompanies also benet from the
ooperation and some ompanies rather lose money than transforming their busi-
ness. A more omplete list of the seletion impediments an be found in Table 2.2.
For an explanation of the other impediments we refer to their respetive papers.
The seond type of impediments onerns the operational impediments and the
most ited one is how to share the benets (Cruijssen et al. (2007); Lui et al. (2010);
Dai and Chen (2012)). A new impediment is order disrimination. Orders should
be delivered without dierentiation between initial ustomers and those adopted
from oalition partners, but some ompanies give their own ustomers a preferential
treatment. A more omplete list of the seletion impediments an be found in Table
2.3. For an explanation of the other impediments we refer to their respetive papers.




Berger and Bierwirth (2010); Özener et al.
(2011); Wang and Kopfer (2014); Appendix
A
Low potential for savings Cruijssen et al. (2006); Dahl and Derigs
(2011); Appendix A
Bad geographial fous Cruijssen et al. (2006); Appendix A
Lak of trust Dahl and Derigs (2011); Özener et al.
(2011); Appendix A
Low liquidity/ solvability Cruijssen et al. (2006); Appendix A
Lak of respet and vision Appendix A
Opportunisti behavior Wang and Kopfer (2011); Appendix A
Loss of lients to partners Cruijssen et al. (2007); Appendix A




Krajewska and Kopfer (2006); Cruijssen et al.
(2007); Lui et al. (2010); Dahl and Derigs (2011);
Dai and Chen (2012); Appendix A
Determining savings Dahl and Derigs (2011); Wang and Kopfer
(2011); Appendix A
Communiation Dahl and Derigs (2011)
Inreasing omplexity Frisk et al. (2010); Özener et al. (2011)
ICT Dahl and Derigs (2011); Appendix A
Balaning of the workload Cruijssen et al. (2007); Appendix A
Order disrimination Appendix A
Table 2.3: The operational impediments of logisti ooperations.
2.3 Cooperation strutures for transportation om-
panies
Verdonk et al. (2013) state in a reent survey of ooperation strutures in logistis
that Seleting an appropriate ollaboration approah (ooperation struture) may
be based on the type and amount of information organisations are willing to share
with their partners, their experiene with ertain solution methods and so on.
However, nowhere in their survey do they state how muh information is shared in
eah ooperation struture or the amount of independene left for the ompanies.
There are two main ooperation strutures in the literature. One is entral planning
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(Krajewska et al. (2008); Lui et al. (2010); Dai and Chen (2012)) whih is presented
in Setion 2.3.1. In this struture, all information is shared and all deisions are
made by a entral planner. In Setion 2.3.2, we disuss the seond main struture,
the aution based struture. This ooperation struture uses autions to determine
whih ompany will deliver whih order (Shönberger (2005); Dai and Chen (2011)).
Not all information is shared. However, more than the minimum is shared, where
the minimum is to share the neessary information to the ompany that will deliver
the order. In Setion 2.3.3, we introdue a struture whih is used in pratie and
only shares the minimum required information.
2.3.1 Central planning struture
In the entral planning struture all ompanies operate as one. A planning ompany,
whih ould be an independent ompany or a member of the ooperation, uses
all the ustomers requests and all the resoures, for example truks, to generate
an `optimal' plan. This plan is then exeuted by all the ompanies. The entral
planning struture implies that the ompanies have to share all their data with the
planning ompany and the ompanies do not have any deision freedom left with
respet to whih orders to outsoure or aept. This is often not a problem sine the
ompanies either ooperate on something that is not there ore business, examples
of this are furniture produers who ooperate on the shipping of the furniture (Audy
et al. (2011)), or timber industry on the transportation of logs (Frisk et al. (2010)),
or the ompanies are prot enters (subsidiaries) of a larger ompany (Krajewska
et al. (2008); Dai and Chen (2012)). The planning ompany an theoretially
present the plan with the best gains. However, generating a good plan beomes
more diult if the size of the problem is larger. Clearly, the size of the ooperative
plan is muh larger than the individual problems of eah ompany. Furthermore,
the entral planning ompany may not have the speialized knowledge of the loal
ompanies. This struture is not for ompanies who do not want to share their
information or who want to make their own deisions. Furthermore, the additional
gains still need to be divided fairly over the ompanies. This division is essential and
a way to divide the gains is by using an alloation from ooperative game theory,
whih is the topi of Chapters 6-8.
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2.3.2 Aution based struture
In the aution based struture eah ompany rst deides whih orders it does not
want to deliver with its own eet. The undesired orders of all ompanies are put
up for aution. Then, eah ompany bids on (bundles) of orders. For example,
Berger and Bierwirth (2010) aution o the undesired orders, one by one, using
a seond prie sealed bid aution, whih is also known as the Vikrey Aution
(Vikrey (1961)). In the seond prie sealed bid aution, eah ompany plaes a
losed bid and the winner pays the seond highest prie. It is well known that the
optimal strategy in a Vikrey Aution is to bid your true value for the autioned
item, whih is a desired property. However, due to the omplexity of the vehile
routing problem, a ompany does not know in general its true value for a request.
Furthermore, "eonomi eieny is enhaned if bidders are allowed to bid diretly
on ombinations of dierent assets instead of bidding only on individual items"
(De Vries and Vohra (2003)), whih is espeially true in vehile routing problems.
Autions whih inorporate bidding on ombinations are ombinatorial autions
and are used by many papers (Shönberger (2005); Krajewska and Kopfer (2006);
Gujo et al. (2007); Shwind et al. (2009); Berger and Bierwirth (2010); Wang and
Kopfer (2014)). However, ombinatorial autions give rise to the following problems.
Similar as in the entral planning, a planning ompany, whih ould be a omputer, is
needed that determines whih ompany gets whih orders. Furthermore, the bid, or
the additional gains ompared to the bids on the individual orders, has to be divided
over the orders. In general, a ombinatorial aution does not have the truth-telling
inentive. The Generalized Vikrey Aution (Makie-Mason and Varian (1994)) has
the truth-telling property, but it requires a high omputational eort (Berger and
Bierwirth (2010)). This is due to the winner determination problem, also known as
the ombinatorial aution problem (De Vries and Vohra (2003)). The ombinatorial
aution problem determines whih ompany wins whih orders, but that is diult
to ompute. In order to redue the omplexity of ombinatorial autions, some of the
undesired requests are bundled by the ompanies or the autioneer and autioned as
one (Shwind et al. (2009)). A slightly dierent approah is taken by Dai and Chen
(2011), who propose a prie-setting-based aution. In this aution, the autioneer,
whih is the ompany who owns the undesired order, states a prie for whih it
wants to outsoure the order (or a set of orders) and the other ompanies determine
whether or not they aept this prie. The prie is inreased if no ompany is willing
to deliver the order for this prie and dereased if multiple ompanies are willing
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to deliver the order. The aution is stopped when there is exatly one ompany
that is willing to deliver the order for the urrent prie. Similar as in the entral
planning struture, the additional gains need to be divided over the ompanies when
a ombinatorial aution is used. This division is the topi of Chapters 6-8.
2.3.3 Priing based struture
The priing based struture has been in use for several deades by transportation
ompanies in the Netherlands, examples are the allianes TransMission, Teamtrans,
Netwerk Benelux and Distri-XL. The members of the alliane agree upon a priing
mehanism whih speies the osts for outsouring an order to the other members.
These outsoure osts onsist of the fee that the other ompany desires for the
delivery of the order together with the osts for transporting the order between the
depots. Together with the priing mehanism, the ompanies agree upon a home-
region for eah ompany. Eah ompany is obliged to deliver the outsoured orders
that lie in its home-region. Naturally, these outsoured orders need to be transhipped
between the depots. This inter-depot transport is planned by the alliane. Eah
member deides on its own, and solely based on its own requests and the outsoure
osts, whih orders to outsoure. After this deision, the outsoured orders are
transshipped and eah ompany plans the routing of its own orders that it did
not outsoure together with the orders that are outsoured to the ompany. The
outsoure osts are a ritial fator for the gains. Outsoure osts whih are too high
will result in not outsouring orders whih ould be more eiently delivered by the
other ompany, while outsoure osts whih are too low will result in outsouring
orders whih ould be more eiently delivered by the ompany. To the best of our
knowledge there are no papers on the order outsouring struture. However, there
are two papers that work with proposals, but these papers assume that all the data
is shared to a planning ompany. Dahl and Derigs (2011) and Özener et al. (2011)
investigate a struture where the planning ompany generates proposals whih the
ompanies aept or rejet. One of the main ndings is that a wrong reward sheme
results in the failure of the ooperation struture. We will disuss the priing based
struture in depth in Setion 2.4.
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2.3.4 Comparison between the strutures
We distinguish between four important harateristis of the three dierent stru-
tures, namely, information sharing, deision freedom, omputational omplexity,
and dependeny on the deision who delivers whih order. In the entral planning
struture all the information is shared to a planning ompany while in the priing
based struture only the information of the orders that are outsoured is shared.
Moreover, in the priing based struture the order information is only shared with
the ompany that atually delivers the orders. The autioning struture shares more
information than the priing based struture sine all ompanies know the undesired
orders. Furthermore, it might be that some undesired orders are not autioned o.
Due to these reasons, we set the amount of information shared to high, low, and
medium, for the entral planning, aution, and priing based, respetively. The
seond harateristi is deision freedom. The ompanies have no freedom in the
entral planning struture as opposed to the autioning struture where the om-
panies an hoose whih orders to put up for aution and whih orders to bid on.
Note that there is no guarantee that the orders are autioned o and there is no
guarantee that the ompany wins the orders on whih it bids. In the priing based
struture the ompanies have the freedom to deide whih orders to outsoure (and
a guarantee that these orders are indeed outsoured) but they have the obligation
to deliver the orders outsoured to them. Therefore, the deision freedom is low,
high, and medium, for the entral planning, aution, and priing based struture,
respetively. The daily planning omplexity diers for all strutures. In the priing
based struture ompanies need to determine, without any knowledge of the orders
from other ompanies, whih orders to outsoure. After the transshipment, eah
ompany plans its total routing. The priing mehanism is determined for a long
period as well as the inter-depot transport whih is adjusted when neessary after
the outsouring is determined. The details of the inter-depot transport and the
assignment of the inter-depot osts to the orders are disussed in Chapter 5. The
ompanies in the aution based struture need to deide whih orders to outsoure,
on whih to bid, the winner determination problem needs to be solved, and nally
whih routes to drive. In the entral planning struture the planning ompany needs
to determine all at one who delivers whih orders, the inter-depot transportation,
and the routes. The size of the problem in the entral planning struture is muh
larger than the problem of a ompany in the outsouring of orders, whih, together
with the dependene of the inter-depot transport planning and the deision whih
16 Chapter 2. Cooperation strutures in logistis
ompany delivers whih orders, makes the entral planning more diult to solve
than the outsouring of orders. Similarly, the two additional problems, determining
a bid on all the orders and the winner determination problem, makes that the om-
putational omplexity of the aution based struture is in between the other two.
The nal harateristi is dependeny in the deision proess. For the priing based
struture there is no dependeny in the deisions whih orders to outsoure, sine
there is no information on the orders from the other ompanies. Furthermore, there
are no daily deisions on whih orders to deliver additionally. However, for both the
aution based struture as well as the entral planning struture the deision whih
orders to outsoure and whih to deliver are highly dependent on the orders of the
other ompanies. Therefore, the deision dependeny is high, high, and low, for the









Central planning high low high high
Aution based medium high medium high
Priing based low medium low low
Table 2.4: Comparison of the dierent ooperation types.
Naturally, the entral planning struture has the advantage that it (theoretially)
an obtain the highest gain. However, depending on the instane and the heuristis
used, it is possible that a heuristi for the other struture nds better solutions
than a heuristi for the entral planning (Wang and Kopfer (2014)). The aution
based struture obtains 78% (Berger and Bierwirth (2010)) of the gains that the
entral planning struture would obtain, while the proposal method obtains 98%
(Berger and Bierwirth (2010)). It is important to keep in mind that these results
should be onsidered with some are. Due to the nature of the problems we are
fored to use heuristis rather than exat methods to nd solutions. Furthermore,
the results depend on the (type) of instane, espeially due to the optimization on
sets of instanes.
For the remainder of the rst part of this dissertation (Setion 2.4 - Chapter 5),
we fous on the priing based struture. The priing based struture sores best
on both information sharing and omputation omplexity, whih are two important
impediments.
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2.4 Priing based struture
Companies want to redue their joint operational osts by eiently delivering orders
for eah other. However, it is important for the ompanies to remain as indepen-
dent as possible. The ompanies prefer that they hoose themselves whih orders to
outsoure. Furthermore, they are relutant to share their daily operational informa-
tion. Examples of ooperations that satisfy these onstraints are the Duth allianes
whih operate as follows. The members deide on an outsoure priing sheme for
whih ompanies an outsoure orders to eah other. This priing sheme onsists
of the fee that the ompany that delivers this order reeives together with the inter-
depot osts of this order. Together with this sheme, the members agree upon a
home-region for eah ompany. Eah ompany is obliged to deliver the outsoured
orders that lie in its home-region. Finally, the members will plan entrally the inter-
depot transportation. The goal of the members is to nd the priing sheme whih
minimizes the joint total osts, where the total osts of a ompany are its routing,
inter-depot and outsoure osts minus the fee that it reeives. This is formally de-
ned as follows. Let N be the set of ompanies, let p(.) be the priing sheme,
whih denotes a funtion, and let Costsi(p(.)) be the total osts of ompany i ∈ N






Note that the osts depend on whih orders are outsoured by the ompanies, but
what the ompanies outsoure depends in turn on the priing mehanism. There-
fore, we start by disussing several methods for a ompany to determine what to
outsoure. For these methods we assume, for the time being, that the priing sheme
p(.) is xed and known. In other words, the ompanies know in advane the out-
soure osts of eah order. In Chapter 5, we disuss how to nd the priing sheme
p(.) suh that the joint operational osts are minimized. However, we rst disuss
the daily operational deisions that eah ompany has to make.
Daily planning for eah ompany:
Given the outsoure osts for eah order, deide whih orders to outsoure (with-
out knowledge of the orders of other ompanies).
(The outsoured orders are transshipped.)
Create a routing whih delivers both the orders that the ompany did not out-
soure and the orders outsoured to the ompany.
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When determining whih orders to outsoure, eah ompany makes a trade-o
between the osts of delivering an order with its own eet and outsouring it to the
other member, responsible for the region where this order is loated. The problem
whih orders to outsoure and whih orders to deliver an be modelled as the Vehile
Routing Problem with Order outsouring (VRPO). Note that the orders of the other
ompanies are not known when the ompany deides whih orders to outsoure, this
inludes the orders that will be outsoured to the ompany. Let {0, 1, ..., n} be the set
of orders where 0 stands for the depot. Eah order i ∈ {0, ..., n} has pre-determined
outsoure osts pi, whih is inurred when this order is outsoured, a demand qi,
and a loation. The distane from the loation of order i to the loation of order j
is given by dij . The ompany has m, for simpliity, idential truks with apaity
Q, xed osts per day F for using the truk, and variable osts v per distane unit
that the truk drives. Let Ω = {1, ..., |Ω|} be the set of all feasible routes. Set ai(r)
equal to one if route r ∈ Ω delivers order i ∈ {1, ..., n} and zero otherwise and let
c(r) denote the total ost of route r. The deision variables are xr where xr = 1



















ai(r)xr ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (2.2)
∑
r∈Ω
xr ≤ m (2.3)
xr ∈ {0, 1} ∀ r ∈ Ω (2.4)
The restrition that at most m truks are driven, (2.3), and the integer restritions,
(2.4) are the same as in the lassial vehile routing problem (VRP) (see the VRP
model at the end of this setion, (2.8) and (2.9)). The rst dierene is in (2.2) (see
(2.7)), whih states that eah order is delivered at most one instead of exatly one.
The seond dierene is a onsequene of the rst and is in the objetive funtion,
(2.1) (see (2.6)). Where in the VRP eah order has to be delivered, there is now the
option not to deliver an order and inur the ost of outsouring the order, in other
words, a penalty. Hene, the objetive funtion, (2.1), minimizes the total routing
osts and the outsoure osts.
The VRPO, whih reently reeived muh attention in the literature, is intro-
dued as the Vehile Routing Problem with Private Fleet and Common Carrier
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(VRPPC) by Chu (2005), although the problem whih orders to outsoure, without
routing the others, was already introdued by Hall and Raer (1995). Chu (2005)
introdued the VRPO with a heterogenous eet, but this is omitted in the model
for larity. Boldu et al. (2008) showed that the VRPO an be rewritten as a
Heterogenous VRP. Extensions of the VRPO are: the private eet should serve
a predetermined amount (or ratio) of the total demand (Tang and Wang (2006);
Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013)); that eah private eet vehile an be used
at most tmax time units (Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013); Stenger, Vigo, Enz,
and Shwind (2013)); dealing with multiple own depots (Stenger, Vigo, Enz, and
Shwind (2013); Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013)); non-linear osts and a a-
paity restrition for the ommon arrier (Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013));
and hiring truks and drivers (Wang et al. (2014)).
A mathematial equivalent problem of the VRPO is the Capaitated Protable
Tour Problem (CPTP) introdued by Arhetti et al. (2009). In the CPTP, eah
order has a reward zi whih is olleted when this order is visited by a private eet
vehile, while in the VRPO an outsoure ost pi is inurred when an order is assigned
to be outsoured. The CPTP has the same onstraints as the VRPO (equation (2.2)












The two problems are equivalent sine taking zi = pi will yield the same solution and
the solution value an be reovered by the relation V RPO = −CPTP +
∑n
i=1 zi,
where V RPO and CPTP represent the optimal value of the respetive problem.
Closely related problems to the CPTP are the Team Orienteering Problem (Boussier
et al. (2007)), whih has as objetive to maximize the rewards olleted together
with a restrition on the tour length. The single-truk variant of the CPTP without
apaity onstraint is the Traveling Salesman problem with Prots (Feillet et al.
(2005)). Problems losely related to the VRPO are to outsoure omplete routes
instead of orders (Moon et al. (2012)), and the Hot Rolling Sheduling Problems
(Tang and Wang (2006); Tang et al. (2009)), whih have several additional restri-
tions regarding the prodution of slabs. For a broader overview of these dierent
problems we refer to Arhetti et al. (2014). Example 2.4.1 illustrates the VRPO.
Example 2.4.1 Consider a ompany with four orders, a− d, and a depot D. The
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demand of the orders and the outsoure osts of the full orders are given in Table
2.5.
Order a b  d
Demand size 11 11 19 20
Outsoure osts 10 10 20 14
Table 2.5: Charateristis of the orders.
To deliver the orders, the ompany has two truks. Eah truk has apaity
44, xed osts for using the truk are 12, and the variable osts per unit distane










Figure 2.1: The distanes between the orders.
This is a small example and all the 16 dierent solutions are enumerated in Table
2.6. The rst olumn states whih orders are delivered and the seond olumn states
the amount of routes together with the best routing. The distane is inferred from
the routing, whih is an optimization problem, and the outsoure osts from the
orders that are not delivered. The total osts is the sum of the routing osts and
the outsoure osts. In this example, there are many solutions that are worse than
outsouring all orders and only three solutions are better than delivering all orders.
The best solution is to use one route whih delivers the orders a, b, and c, and
outsoures the largest order, d. ⊳
There are three dierent methods to determine whih orders to outsoure. The
rst method is to solve the VRPO to optimality by for example a branh-and-prie
algorithm (Arhetti et al. (2013)). This branh-and-prie algorithm will, if nees-
sary, visit all possibilities and will provide a guaranteed optimal solution. However,
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Orders delivered Routes Distane Outsoure osts Total osts
∅ 0 0 54 54
{a} 1 {DaD} 8 44 64
{b} 1 {DbD} 8 44 64
{} 1 {DD} 14 34 60
{d} 1 {DdD} 8 40 60
{a,b} 1 {DabD} 11 34 57
{a,} 1 {DaD} 16 24 52
{a,d} 1 {DadD} 13 30 55
{b,} 1 {DbD} 15 24 51
{b,d} 1 {DbdD} 11 30 53
{,d} 1 {DdD} 16 20 48
{a,b,} 1 {DabD} 17 14 43
{a,b,d} 1 {DabdD} 14 20 46
{a,,d} 2 {DaD}, {DdD} 24 10 58
{b,,d} 2 {DbD}, {DdD} 23 10 57
{a,b,,d} 2 {DabD}, {DdD} 25 0 49
Table 2.6: All the solutions.
it is time-onsuming and is not suited for the size of instanes in whih we are
interested. The seond method is to use heuristis of whih there are several avail-
able in the literature for the VRPO: Loal Searh heuristis (Chu (2005); Boldu
et al. (2007)); Tabu Searhes (Cté and Potvin (2009); Potvin and Naud (2011)),
Large Neighborhood Searhes (Boldu et al. (2008); Arhetti et al. (2009); Stenger,
Shneider, and Goeke (2013); Stenger, Vigo, Enz, and Shwind (2013)); and nally
evolutionary (Kratia et al. (2012); Vidal et al. (2015)). Heuristis an not guar-
antee that the solution they nd is optimal, but they are apable to nd solutions
for large instanes and they are relatively less time onsuming. We will disuss
our heuristis in more detail in Chapter 3. The nal method is to use estimations
to make a trade-o between outsouring and delivering an order (Hall and Raer
(1995); Baghuis (2014)). The estimation method estimates the total osts that are
assigned to an order, without atually onstruting routes. Estimations take the
least time to determine what to outsoure but they are less aurate. In Chapter 4,
we will disuss estimations in depth.
The rst deision for eah ompany is to deide whih orders to outsoure. The
seond deision is to deide on a routing for all its urrent orders, whih are the
orders that the ompany did not outsoure together with the orders outsoured to
the ompany. This an be modeled as a lassial vehile routing problem, whih has
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ai(r)xr = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (2.7)
∑
r∈Ω
xr ≤ m (2.8)
xr ∈ {0, 1} ∀ r ∈ Ω (2.9)
Sine all orders need to be delivered, (2.7), the objetive funtion is to minimize
the total routing osts, (2.6). Note that the heuristis for the VRPO an also nd
solutions for the VRP by setting the outsoure osts high for eah order. For an
overview of other solution methods for the VRP and its variants, we refer to Vidal
et al. (2012). The priing sheme automatially divides the gains over the ompanies
sine eah ompany has outsoure osts, reeives fees, and has routing osts.
Chapter 3
Heuristis for the VRP with Order
outsouring
3.1 Introdution
This hapter, whih is based on Huijink, Kant, and Peeters (2014), introdues several
heuristis for the Vehile Routing Problem with Order outsouring (VRPO). In the
VRPO eah order reeives an individual osts for whih the order an be outsoured.
The objetive of the VRPO is to nd the set of orders to outsoure together with
routes for the orders that are not outsoured suh that the total osts are as small
as possible. Due to the harateristis of the VRPO it is hard to nd the optimal
solution for reasonable sized instanes. One method to generate solutions, although
without guarantee that these are optimal, is to use heuristis. In Setion 3.2, we
disuss the main ideas behind the heuristis proposed for the VRPO. For a broader
overview of heuristis for the lassial vehile routing problem and several of its
extensions we refer to Vidal et al. (2012).
Our ultimate goal is to nd the best priing sheme (see Setion 2.4), whih im-
plies that we need a heuristi whih nds good solutions irrespetive of the hara-
teristis of the instane. It should nd good solutions whatever the outsoure osts
are, and without the need for optimizing the heuristi on spei harateristis.
The best heuristi known by us in the literature for the VRPO with a homogenous
eet, a geneti searh heuristi, will not perform well when many orders are out-
soured (Vidal et al. (2015)). Therefore, we have deided not to use this heuristi.
Furthermore, the large neighborhood searh heuristis for the VRPO have only one
neighborhood struture and they have worse results than the tabu searh heuristis.
Preliminary testing showed that a simulated annealing approah (see Vidal et al.
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(2012)) as well as a tabu searh heuristi did not deliver promising results. Sine
we need a heuristi whih performs well regardless of the harateristis, we have
hosen for large neighborhood searh heuristis that have several dierent neighbor-
hood strutures and use tabu searh as a loal improvement heuristi. We introdue
several neighborhood strutures in Setion 3.3. In Setion 3.4, we show that the
instanes ommonly used in the literature have as harateristi that orders are un-
neessarily outsoured. In other words, the pries are high and the orders are only
outsoured sine there is not enough apaity to deliver them. To amend this, we
propose modiations of the original outsoure osts. We show in Setion 3.5 that
our large neighborhood heuristis are urrently the best heuristis for the VRPO, if
tested on the original instanes. Furthermore, we show that the dierent neighbor-
hoods are important when there are many dierent priing shemes. The onlusions
and reommendations are presented in Setion 3.6.
3.2 Heuristis: an overview
The rst heuristis developed for the VRPO are improvement heuristis (Chu (2005);
Boldu et al. (2007)). Improvement heuristis onsist of two phases, a onstrution
phase whih reates a solution, and an improvement phase, whih improves the
solution reated in the onstrution phase. The basis of an improvement heuristi
is presented in Algorithm 3.2.1.
Algorithm 3.2.1 Improvement heuristis
Setup phase
Generate an initial solution
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until there is no improvement available
Searh the neighborhood for the best improvement and implement it
How to generate an initial solution and what the neighborhood should be are im-
portant parts of the improvement heuristi. Many heuristis for the VRPO have the
following struture: First, it selets whih orders to deliver (hene, not outsoured)
and then uses a onstrution method for omposing routes for these seleted orders.
The seletion is based on the outsoure osts and the demand of the orders. The
orders that have the lowest ratio of its outsoure osts divided by its demand will be
3.2. Heuristis: an overview 25
outsoured until the remaining orders will not have a total demand more than the
available apaity. This implies that there will be no orders outsoured when there
is enough apaity available for all the orders. After the seletion, the heuristis
use the well-known Clarke and Wright savings algorithm, whih is a onstrution
heuristi for the lassial vehile routing problem. The Clarke and Wright savings
algorithm starts by assigning eah order to the routes suh that eah route has ex-
atly one order. Then, the savings algorithm merges greedily, where greedy implies
that the best merges is hosen at eah step, until there is no feasible merger left.
An exemplary neighborhood for improvement heuristis is the neighborhood on-
sisting of all the 1−shift moves and 1−swap moves. The 1−shift move shifts one
order from one route to another, in other words one order is removed from a route
and inserted into another route. The 1−swap move swaps two orders from dier-
ent routes. The 1−shift and 1−swap moves are illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Finally, the best move is the move whih will result in the least additional osts.
A move is an improvement if the additional osts are negative. The improvement
heuristi will stop searhing when the best move is not an improvement. In other
words, it ends in a loal optimum. Often an instane has multiple loal optima and



































Figure 3.1: Example of the 1−shift move.
The tabu searh heuristi is an extension of the improvement heuristi and it is
able to esape loal optima. As opposed to the improvement heuristi, the tabu
searh allows deteriorations of the solution and to avoid immediate returning to the
previous solution it makes some moves tabu, whih means that it temporarily forbids
some moves. There are two tabu searh heuristis for the VRPO (Cté and Potvin


































Figure 3.2: Example of the 1−swap move.
(2009); Potvin and Naud (2011)). The basis of a tabu searh is shown in Algorithm
3.2.2.
Algorithm 3.2.2 Tabu searh heuristis
Setup phase
Generate an initial solution
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
1: Searh the neighborhood for the best move that is not tabu
2: Implement it and update the tabu-list
Similar as in the improvement heuristi there are deisions on whih initial solu-
tion and whih neighborhood to use. However, there are more deisions to be made
in a tabu searh heuristi. These deisions are: Whih moves are forbidden after a
move is implemented and for how long? When should the heuristi stop and nally,
what to do if a move that would improve the solution to be better than the urrently
best solution is tabu?
The tabu searh heuristi esapes the loal optimum using many small steps.
Another way to esape a loal optimum is to jump to another solution. This is the
idea behind the large neighborhood searh heuristi, of whih there are several for
the VRPO (Boldu et al. (2008); Arhetti et al. (2009); Stenger, Shneider, and
Goeke (2013); Stenger, Vigo, Enz, and Shwind (2013)). The large neighborhood
searh uses one of the previous two heuristis to improve the solution after the jump.
By using ruin-and-repair moves instead of many small steps, the large neighborhood
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searh heuristi is able to visit more dierent solutions. Algorithm 3.2.3 shows the
basis of the large neighborhood searh heuristi.
Algorithm 3.2.3 Large neighborhood searh heuristis
Setup phase
Generate an initial solution
Improve the solution (using the improvement phase of the improvement or tabu
searh heuristi)
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
1: Ruin (and repair) the solution
2: Improve the solution
3: Deide to aept the new solution or revert to the solution before the ruin
step
Additional deisions, ompared to the previous heuristis, are how to ruin and
repair the solution, and when to aept the solution. The goal is to visit new
solutions, whih implies that the solution after the ruin-and-repair move should not
be too similar to the previous solution. On the other hand, moving too far from the
previous solution an destroy parts of the solution whih were good. We will disuss
large neighborhood searh heuristis in depth in Setion 3.3.
The nal type of heuristis that are used for the VRPO are evolutionary al-
gorithms, more speially, geneti heuristis (Kratia et al. (2012); Vidal et al.
(2015)). The largest dierenes are that the geneti heuristi starts with multiple
solutions and uses these solutions to breed new ones instead of working with one
solution. The basis of the geneti heuristi is presented in Algorithm 3.2.4.
Algorithm 3.2.4 Geneti searh heuristis
Setup phase
Generate initial solutions
Improve the solutions (using the improvement phase of the improvement or tabu
searh heuristi)
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
1: Selet a set of solutions and disard the others
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2: Generate new solutions from this set of solutions
3: Improve the new solutions and add (part of them) to the solutions
As before, one of the deisions is whih initial solutions to use. Another deision
is how to selet the set of solutions, the so alled survivors, whih riterion should
be used? From these survivors, new solutions are generated, whih are alled the
ospring. Again, the goal is to reate solutions whih take the good parts from
several older solutions.
3.3 New large neighborhood searh heuristis
There exist two large neighborhood searh heuristis for the VRPO. However, eah
of these heuristis only use one type of ruin-and-repair move. We present in this
setion three new large neighborhood searh heuristis. Two of these new heuristis
nd better solutions than the two large neighborhood searhes from the literature.
Instead of using only one type of ruin-and-repair move (neighborhood), we use many
dierent types of moves. The ideas of the new heuristis and the moves are presented
in this setion, while the details an be found in Appendix B.1. For eah move we
disuss whether it an also be used for other vehile routing problems. For the
moves we make a distintion between driven routes, whih are routes that have less
delivery osts than outsoure osts of the orders in the route, and andidate routes,
whih are routes that have larger delivery osts than outsoure osts of the orders in
the route. In the same vein, we make a distintion between delivered orders, whih
are the orders that are in the driven routes, and outsoured orders, whih are the
orders that are in andidate routes or are not in any route.
3.3.1 Initial solution
Many heuristis for the VRPO use a method to selet whih orders to deliver and
then use the lassial savings or insertion algorithm. We use the protable insertion
method, whih is the following adaptation of the insertion method: The lassial
insertion method iteratively inserts the undelivered order with the least insertion
osts, where the insertion osts are the additional osts for delivering the order.
However, in the VRPO it ould be that this order should be outsoured. Hene,
the adaptation uses the prot of an order, whih is the outsoure osts minus the
insertion osts divided by the demand of the order. In the lassial least insertion,
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the rst order of a route is the order that lies the furthest from the depot. Again,
it ould be that this order should be outsoured. Therefore, we take the order with
the highest prot as the rst order.
3.3.2 Ruin-and-repair moves from the literature
The rst type of ruin-and-repair move is the remove-and-insert move from Arhetti
et al. (2007). The move starts with randomly seleting a number of delivered orders
and removes them from the driven routes. Then, the remaining outsoured orders,
but not the ones whih were just removed, are randomly seleted until the total
outsoure osts of these seleted outsoured orders is equal to the outsoure osts
of the removed delivered orders. The seleted outsoured orders are inserted into
the driven routes suh that the infeasibility, whih is the square of the amount of
demand more than the available apaity of the route, and the insertion distane
is minimized. The usage of orders that are outsoured in this move imply that it
an only be used in vehile routing problems where not all orders are delivered,
for example the VRPO or TOP. Figure 3.3 illustrates the remove-and-insert move,
where the dots represent the orders that are delivered, the squares the orders that
are outsoured, the triangles the delivered orders that are removed, and the plus


























































































Figure 3.3: Example of the remove-and-insert move.
The idea behind the yli moves of Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke (2013) is
to move parts of a route from one route to another. The yli move starts by
seleting a route, whih an be for example random or based on the distane to
other routes. From this hosen route a part, whih may onsist of more than one
order, is seleted to be moved. This seletion an again be for example random or
based on the distane from the loation of the order to the loation of orders in
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other routes. These seleted orders are moved to the other route whih has the least
insertion osts of these orders. Then, from this other route a part is seleted to be
moved. The yli move an be applied to all vehile routing problems. However, in
ase of the VRPO, we use a yli move that moves orders in between driven routes
and use an additional yli move that moves orders between driven and andidate
routes. This yli move is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where we selet the most left
route and from this route we selet the top part to be inserted into another route,
whih is in this ase the middle route. From the middle route we selet a part of the
route and this is inserted into the left route. This example is only with two routes,
whih are both driven, but it an also be used with more routes or with a andidate






















































































Figure 3.4: Example of the yli move.
3.3.3 New ruin-and-repair moves
The rst of our new moves that we disuss is the reate move whih reates a new
route. However, it is often not protable to reate a new route using only the orders
that are outsoured. The other routes should make spae for the new route. We
start the reation of a new route by seleting an outsoured order and put it into
an empty route. Next, we apply the repair proedure whih we all shifting. The
shifting proedure is very similar to the protable insertion method (see Setion
3.3.1), but has a few key dierenes. The routes whih were hanged in the move
are alled reeiving routes and the reeiving route in the rst step of the reate move
is the route whih was just reated. Instead of seleting the outsoured order with
the highest prot, we selet the order so far not belonging to the reeiving route
with the highest prot. In other words, orders that belong to driven routes are also
allowed to be inserted into the reeiving route. However, we only allow a ertain
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perentage of orders to be taken from eah driven route. This will typially result in
lled reeiving routes but the other routes whih were driven before we started the
shifting proedure will be partially lled. To adjust this, we repeat the proess a few
times but now the driven routes that have a load fator below a ertain perentage
are the reeiving routes. Furthermore, to avoid irular behavior we do not allow the
insertions from previous reeiving routes. In priniple, the reate move an be used
for all vehile routing problems. However, the goal of many VRP's is to minimize
the number of routes, whih implies that the reate move is likely to be only useful
for the TOP and VRPO. The shifting proedure an be used for all VRP's, even
though our proedure is primed to use outsoured orders. Figure 3.5 illustrates the
shifting move, where the dashed route is the rst reeiving route (and in this ase


























































































Figure 3.5: Example of the shifting proedure.
The destroy move selets a route and all the orders in the route are outsoured.
The split move splits a route. It selets a route and moves a part of the route to
an empty route. After the split, the shifting proedure is applied where the hosen
route and the route that reeived a part of the route are the reeiving routes. The
destroy move an be used for all VRP's, although it will not be helpful if the solution
before the destroy move already uses the minimal number of routes. The split move
has the same issues as the reate move. These moves are illustrated, without the
shifting proedure, in Figure 3.6.
The bomb move randomly selets an order, whih ould be delivered or out-
soured, to be the enter of the bomb. The delivered order whih has its loation
losest to the enter is removed from the route and outsoured until a number of
driven routes and a number of delivered orders are removed. After this the shifting
proedure is used where all the routes that were modied are reeiving routes.


























































































Figure 3.6: Example of the destroy and the split move.
The reseeding move selets several routes and removes parts of these routes.
Again, the shifting proedure is used after the reseeding to repair the solution where
the routes that were seleted are the reeiving routes. Both the bomb and reseed
move an be used in any VRP. However, the repair proedure should be suh that
it does not return to the previous solution. The bomb and reseeding moves are
illustrated, without the shifting proedure, in Figure 3.7, where the arrow points at

























































































Figure 3.7: Example of the bomb and the reseeding move.
The nal move is to apply the improvement method again.
3.3.4 Aeptane riterion
We not only aept a solution if it is better than the solution before the ruin-
and-repair move, but if a ertain number of moves did not nd an improvement
of the solution we also aept, with a ertain probability, a deterioration. The
reason behind this is that the ruin-and-repair moves were unable to improve the
solution for a ertain number of moves, in other words, the solution appears to
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be a loal optimum. Hene, moving to another solution, whih is in this ase the
deterioration, and applying the ruin-and-repair moves on this deterioration ould
lead to an improvement of the deterioration whih is better than the solution before
the deterioration.
3.3.5 Three heuristis
Using the dierent neighborhood moves disussed above, we reate three dierent
heuristis. In eah of these heuristis we have an objetive funtion whih onsists
of three levels. The rst level minimizes the total osts, whih inludes a penalty
for the infeasibility in the driven routes, where the infeasibility of a route is given
by the square of the apaity overload. The seond level minimizes the total dis-
tane driven and the total infeasibility. Finally, the third level tries to make the
andidate routes as protable as possible. The rst heuristi is a very simple large
neighborhood searh. One ould even argue that it is not a real large neighborhood
searh but an enhaned tabu searh. This heuristi, alled the reseeding-tabu searh
(R-TS), is a large neighborhood searh heuristi where we use a regular tabu searh
heuristi followed by two times the reseeding move and a tabu searh. The R-TS is
used as a baseline to ompare heuristis. The seond and third heuristi are large
neighborhood searh heuristis, the LNS-Fast and LNS-Slow, and both use all the
ruin-and-repair moves disussed in Setion 3.3. The main dierene between the
LNS-Fast and the LNS-Slow is that the LNS-Fast exeutes a move one and that
the LNS-Slow exeutes the move ve times.
Most heuristis are heavily inuened by the parameters. For example more
iterations will inrease the running time, but will probably also improve the nal
solution. Another example of parameters is how many orders to selet in our bomb
move sine more orders will result in a more diversied solution. Or a long tabu
duration moves the tabu searh away from the urrent solution. Furthermore, the
parameters for adjusting the infeasibility will guide the tabu searh sine a low
infeasibility penalty will imply that the tabu searh will visit infeasible solutions. In
the literature, these parameters are often optimized over a training set of instanes.
However, there is no guarantee that the training set is representative for all instanes.
Furthermore, it is often impossible to analyze all possible dierent values of the
parameters and hene a surrogate model, just like the one in Chapter 5, is used in
the literature to optimize the parameters. Finally, we need a robust heuristi whih
an handle dierent instanes. Therefore, we have opted for a dierent approah.
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The parameters are drawn randomly from reasonable bounds. For example, the
tabu searh of Cté and Potvin (2009) has as tabu duration a random integer in
[7, 14] and the two update parameters for infeasibility are 1.25. Our tabu duration
is a random integer in [tlower, tupper], where tlower is a random integer in [4, 9] and
tupper is a random integer in [12, 27], and both our update parameters are randomly
drawn from [0.5, 2]. By doing so, our loal searh will be dierent eah time.
Below we present an overview of our three heuristis, where Algorithm 3.3.2
desribes two heuristis. The parameter settings an be found in Appendix B.1.
Algorithm 3.3.1 Reseeding-tabu searh
Setup phase
Generate an initial solution
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
1: Searh the neighborhood for the best move that is not tabu
2: Implement it and update the tabu-list
Reseeding phase
Repeat the following twie
3: Apply the reseeding move
4: Apply the improvement phase
5: Keep the new solution if it is better than the urrent best solution
Algorithm 3.3.2 Large neighborhood searh-Fast (and -Slow)
Setup phase
Generate an initial solution
Improvement phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
1: Searh the neighborhood for the best move that is not tabu
2: Implement it and update the tabu-list
Ruin-and-repair phase
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
3: Choose a ruin-and-repair move and exeute it (5 independent times)
4: Apply the improvement phase (independently on all 5 solutions)
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5: Deide to aept the new solution (best of the 5) or revert to the solution
before the ruin method
3.4 Test instanes
The test instanes of Boldu et al. (2008) are modiations of the test instanes
of Christodes et al. (1979) (CE) and Golden et al. (1998) (G). In the 14 CE-
instanes, the number of orders ranges from 50 to 199, the number of routes from
4 to 13, and the number of orders divided by routes (n̄) from 8.3 to 20.0. For the
20 G-instanes, the number of orders ranges from 200 to 480, the number of routes
from 4 to 31, and the number of orders divided by routes from 12.0 to 60.0. Note
that in the G-instanes the rst 12 instanes have an n̄ between 23 and 60, while the
last 8 have a n̄ between 12 and 17. The oordinates, demand and apaity are kept,
but all the time restritions are dropped. In other words, the route-duration (and
hene length), time-windows and xed time per stop, are dropped. Additionally, the
number of available routes is set to ⌈0.8
∑n
i=1 qi⌉, where qi is the demand of order i,
and eah route has a variable ost of 1 per unit distane. This implies that slightly
more than 80% of the demand an be delivered by the own eet. Furthermore,
Boldu et al. (2008) set the xed ost of a route F to the average route length
within the best known solution of the original instane with timing restritions,
rounded to the nearest integer whih is divisible by 20. Finally, the outsoure osts
of eah order is set as follows: Let n̄ be as before and let qmin, qmax the minimum









1 if qi ∈ [qmin, qmin + η),
1.5 if qi ∈ [qmin + η, qmin + 2η),
2 if qi ∈ [qmin + 2η, qmax].
The outsoure osts, or ommon arrier osts, are given by pi = round(
F
n̄
+ µi · d0i).
In other words, the outsoure osts onsists of the average xed osts inurred per
order and the distane osts between an order and the depot times a fator whih
is based on the size of the order. An overview of these test-instanes is presented
in Boldu et al. (2008). This priing results in outsoure osts that are higher
than the osts when delivering the demand using the own eet. This is reeted
by the fat that in all exept G-13, G-14, and G-16, the best known solution uses
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all the available routes. Moreover, in the solutions we found that the routes deliver
on average more than 83% of the total demand. There are two variants of eah
instane, one with a homogenous eet and one with a heterogenous eet.
To amend the issue that the outsouring is only done out of neessity, we modied
the test instanes by halving the outsoure osts. This set of instanes, alled the
Half-Original instanes, are opies of the original instanes of Boldu et al. (2008),
but now the outsoure osts are halved, i.e., phalfi =
pi
2
. Furthermore, the instanes
with the original outsoure osts, and by inheritane the Half-Original osts, have
as additional harateristi that delivering orders with a small demand is preferred
over larger ones. In our solutions we found that on average more than 90% of the
orders are delivered, even while the total demand delivered is less than 84%. This
means that an average order size of an outsoured order is 1.6 times the size of an
average order. The dierene is even larger for the Half-Orig osts, namely 75%
of the orders are delivered while the demand delivered is only 65%. That orders
with a larger demand are delivered, instead of the more intuitive outsoured, is a
diret onsequene of the involved priing sheme and is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 3.4.1 Consider the same ompany as in Example 2.4.1. For onveniene
we repeat the important parts. The ompany has four orders a − d, and a depot
D. The demand of the orders and the outsoure osts of the full orders are given in
Table 3.1.
Order a b  d
Demand size 11 11 19 20
Outsoure osts 10 10 20 14
Table 3.1: Charateristis of the orders.
To deliver the orders, the ompany has two truks. Eah truk has apaity 44,
the xed osts for using a truk are 12, and the variable osts per unit distane
traveled are 1. Figure 3.8 desribes all the distanes between the orders.
The total distane when delivering all orders is 25, as is illustrated in Table 3.2.
This gives, aording to the settings in the original priing, that the (rounded) xed
osts per route are 12 and the outsoure osts pi = 6 + µi · d0i. This gives the
following three best solutions (see Table 2.6 for a full enumeration) together with
the solutions when everything is either outsoured or driven.










Figure 3.8: The distanes between the orders.
Orders Driven Routes Distane OutsoureCosts Total Costs
∅ 0 0 54 54
{,d} 1 16 20 48
{a,b,} 1 17 14 43
{a,b,d} 1 14 20 48
{a,b,,d} 2 25 0 49
Table 3.2: The basi solutions and the three best.
This implies that delivering orders {a, b, c} is the best one an do, in other words,
hoosing two orders with a small demand (a and b) instead of one with a large




= 6 in the formula of the priing together with that the other part
of the priing, in other words, µid0i, annot be more than twie as large for orders
that have the same distane to the depot. In this ase, order d has also the lowest
ratio of outsouring osts divided by demand. However, the following modiation
presented in Figure 3.9, where the loation of order d is shifted further away, shows
that there are also simple examples where the outsoured order has the highest ratio
of outsoure osts divided by demand.
The total distane when delivering all orders is now 33 see Table 3.4. There
are two dierent solutions, one whih has routes DdD and DacbD, and one whih
has routes DcdD and DabD. Sine we apply the original priing (whih uses the
distane osts for delivering all orders), we have that the xed osts per route are
16 and the adjusted outsoure osts are presented in Table 3.3.
The numbers in the three solutions also hange and are given below.












Figure 3.9: The orders and distanes.
Order a b  d
Demand 11 11 19 20
Outsoure 12 12 22 24
Table 3.3: Charateristis of the orders.
Orders Driven Routes Distane OutsoureCosts Total Costs
∅ 0 0 70 70
{,d} 1 22 24 62
{a,b,} 1 17 24 57
{a,b,d} 1 21 22 59
{a,b,,d} 2 33 0 65
Table 3.4: The basi solutions and the three best of the modied example.
Note that the optimal solution is again to outsoure order d. ⊳
Example 3.4.2 shows that the outsouring in the Original osts is done out of ne-
essity. Furthermore, it also shows why orders with a larger demand are outsoured,
even though these larger orders have a muh higher outsoure osts than orders with
a smaller demand.
Example 3.4.2 The CE-04 instane has 150 orders and 9 available routes. The
osts of outsouring an order depends on the xed osts of a route and the distane
of the loation of an order to the depot. The (jigsaw) surfae in Figure 3.10 is the
estimated prot, whih is the outsoure osts minus the estimated delivery osts
(see Chapter 4), of the orders. This gure shows that within eah level of µ it is
more protable to deliver orders with a small demand. Furthermore, there is not
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enough apaity to deliver all the orders and two orders with a small demand will







































Figure 3.10: The estimated prot of delivering orders
To amend the issue that orders with a large demand are more likely to be out-
soured and to avoid that the outsoure osts are dependent on the distane of
the loation to the depot, we reate a third set of osts. This set of instanes,
alled the New instanes, again opies the original instanes, but now with the out-
soure osts as a fration of the xed osts that the order apaity-wise onsumes




round(4 · 1.1 · F qi
Q
). These new osts are still slightly dependent on the
distane sine the xed osts F is present in this formula and F is derived from the
best known solution in the original problem with timing restritions.
3.5 Test results
As is ommon pratie in the literature, we run our heuristis 10 times and reord
the best and the average solutions. A summary of the results is displayed in Tables
40 Chapter 3. Heuristis for the VRP with Order outsouring
3.5-3.8, while the detailed results an be found in Appendix B.2. For all methods,
unless stated otherwise below, best orresponds to the average gap of the best
found solution from the ten runs ompared to the best known solution (BKS), avg
orresponds to the average gap of the average solution, and #BKS orresponds
to the number of times the method retrieved a best known solution. A few notes
on the heuristis in the literature. For some heuristis only the best found solution
is reported while only one run is provided of the RIP (randomized onstrution-
improvement-perturbation, Boldu et al. (2008)). There is a small issue onerning
trunated oordinates in the heuristis of Cté and Potvin (2009) and Potvin and
Naud (2011), whih implies that only a part of their results an be ompared. It
is unlear whether this trunation is positive or negative for their heuristi. An-
other interesting note is that the Tabu Searh (TS) of Potvin and Naud (2011) uses
the same ode as in Cté and Potvin (2009) (TS25), but now with 50,000 itera-
tions instead of the 25,000 as in Cté and Potvin (2009). Although the number of
iterations has been doubled, the results of the TS in Potvin and Naud (2011) are
worse. No explanation why these results are so dierent is given in Potvin and Naud
(2011). The nal note is that Kratia et al. (2012) reported the best result found
over 20 runs of their GA (geneti algorithm) instead of the ommonly used 10 and
that the values of the AVNS-RN (adaptable variable neighborhood searh-random
neighborhood ordering) are reverse engineered sine Stenger, Shneider, and Goeke
(2013) only provides the urrent best-known solution and a gap. Therefore, the
exat values of the AVNS-RN in Table B.2 ould be slightly dierent, but the inu-
ene on the gaps is negligible. The other heuristis in Table 3.5 are the TS+ (tabu
searh with ejetion hains, Potvin and Naud (2011)), AVNS (adaptable variable
neighborhood searh, Stenger, Vigo, Enz, and Shwind (2013)), MS-LS (multistart
loal-improvement searh, Vidal et al. (2015)), MS-ILS (multistart iterative loal
searh, Vidal et al. (2015)) and the UHGS (unied hybrid geneti searh, Vidal
et al. (2015)).
RIP TS25 TS TS+ GA AVNS AVNS-RN MS-LS MS-ILS UHGS R-TS LNS-F LNS-S
CE (#14)
best 1.09% 0.19% 0.45% 0.35% 4.42% 0.23% 0.16% 1.44% 0.10% 0.04% 0.25% 0.08% 0.04%
avg - 0.43% - - - - 0.45% 2.73% 0.34% 0.17% 0.81% 0.32% 0.22%
#BKS 0 5 4 4 0 2 7 0 8 10 4 8 10
G (#20)
best 2.38% 0.61% 0.79% 0.76% 6.61% 1.02% 1.02% 3.03% 0.85% 0.49% 1.05% 0.41% 0.24%
avg - 0.87% - - - - 1.56% 3.93% 1.39% 0.80% 1.82% 0.77% 0.60%
#BKS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2
Avg
best 1.85% 0.34% 0.58% 0.50% 5.71% 0.69% 0.67% 2.38% 0.54% 0.31% 0.72% 0.27% 0.16%
avg - 0.59% - - - - 1.11% 3.43% 0.95% 0.54% 1.40% 0.59% 0.44%
Table 3.5: Comparison on homogenous instanes and original outsoure osts.
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The gaps of the heuristis ompared to the best known solution (BKS) appear
to be small in Table 3.5. However, this is deeiving sine by onstrution around
half of the osts onsists of the xed route osts. This is part of the reason why a
relatively simple heuristi, like the R-TS, has only a gap of 0.72%, averaged over
the instanes. The LNS-Slow has on average a gap of 0.16%, while the UHGS has
0.31%, and the LNS-Fast has 0.27%. For the average solutions the gaps are loser
to eah other, 0.44% for the LNS-Slow against 0.54% for the UHGS and 0.59% for
the LNS-Fast. What is interesting is that several of the BKS's in the CE set are
found by many heuristis, inluding the simple R-TS heuristi. The dierenes are
larger when we look at the larger, and seemingly more diult G-instanes. For the
G-instanes, the R-TS has a gap of 1.05%, the UHGS has a gap of 0.49%, and the
LNS-Fast and the LNS-Slow have 0.41% and 0.24%, respetively. More importantly,
the maximum gap of the best solution is relatively large for the UHGS, 2.03% (at
G-12), while the largest gap of LNS-Fast is 0.86% (at G-07), and nally, for the
LNS-Slow it is only 0.62% (at G-04). From the detailed results in B.2 we obtain
that the LNS-Slow outperforms the UHGS on the G-instanes with many orders per
route (G-01 up to G-12), while the UHGS is only slightly better at the instanes
with many routes. This implies that our heuristis are better than the UHGS, whih
was the best heuristi for the VRPO before ours. We have retrieved all previous
best known solutions and even improved the best known solution of 3 (of the 14)
CE-instanes and 18 (of the 20) G-instanes. The results on our LNS's show that
using dierent neighborhoods an be worthwhile sine our LNS-Fast is muh better
than the AVNS(-RN). Our LNS-Fast and LNS-Slow have muh better results than
the MS-ILS. Sine the MS-ILS already nds the best known solution on 125 of
the 130 instanes of Arhetti et al. (2013) and performs better than the heuristis
of Arhetti et al. (2009), we think that our heuristis will perform well on those
instanes. The alulation time of the LNS-Fast is slightly less than the UHGS, 24.2
versus 26.4 minutes, while the alulation time of the LNS-Slow is three times more
(77.6 minutes).
In the heterogenous ase, whih uses multiple types of truks instead of one, the
results are more pronouned. The LNS-Slow and LNS-Fast have a gap of 0.25%
and 0.62%, respetively. We nd 10 (out of 14) new best known solutions for the
CE-instanes and 20 (out of 20) for the G-instanes. Furthermore, we have retrieved
all the best known solutions exept for CE-H-14, for whih we found 1907.75 while
the BKS is 1907.74. Again, the LNS-Slow is muh better than the other heuristis.
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RIP TS TS+ GA R-TS LNS-F LNS-S
CE (#14)
best 0.90% 0.65% 0.54% 3.91% 0.80% 0.38% 0.11%
avg - - - - 1.64% 1.06% 0.54%
#BKS 0 1 1 0 1 2 5
G (#20)
best 2.41% 1.95% 0.97% 7.08% 1.83% 0.78% 0.35%
avg - - - - 2.69% 1.37% 0.87%
#BKS 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Avg
best 1.79% 1.16% 0.71% 5.77% 1.41% 0.62% 0.25%
avg - - - - 2.26% 1.24% 0.73%
Table 3.6: Comparison on heterogenous instanes and original outsoure osts.
Table 3.7 shows the summary of the results of our three heuristis on the instanes
with half-original priing and Table 3.8 on the instanes with the new priing. The
results on these instanes are in line with what is found on the original instanes,
namely, that the G-instanes seem to be harder than the CE-instanes and that the
LNS-Slow is the best heuristi.
homogenous heterogenous
R-TS LNS-F LNS-S R-TS LNS-F LNS-S
CE (#14)
best 0.19% 0.06% 0.00% 0.68% 0.10% 0.03%
avg 0.63% 0.18% 0.10% 1.86% 0.36% 0.25%
#BKS 8 10 12 2 8 11
G (#20)
best 1.05% 0.11% 0.04% 1.51% 0.19% 0.04%
avg 1.56% 0.50% 0.33% 2.38% 0.70% 0.44%
#BKS 0 4 13 0 4 15
Avg
best 0.70% 0.09% 0.03% 1.19% 0.15% 0.03%
avg 1.19% 0.37% 0.24% 2.20% 0.57% 0.37%
Table 3.7: Comparison on half-original outsoure osts.
homogenous heterogenous
R-TS LNS-F LNS-S R-TS LNS-F LNS-S
CE (#14)
best 0.24% 0.07% 0.02% 0.38% 0.12% 0.02%
avg 0.74% 0.25% 0.10% 0.91% 0.36% 0.23%
#BKS 3 8 10 1 4 11
G (#20)
best 0.48% 0.16% 0.01% 0.66% 0.12% 0.01%
avg 0.86% 0.50% 0.21% 1.08% 0.42% 0.23%
#BKS 0 0 18 0 8 16
Avg
best 0.39% 0.13% 0.01% 0.55% 0.12% 0.01%
avg 0.83% 0.37% 0.17% 1.02% 0.40% 0.23%
Table 3.8: Comparison on new outsoure osts.
Additionally, we have tested our heuristis on the lassial VRP (without out-
souring). To be more preise, we have used the CE-instanes of Christodes et al.
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(1979) and the tai-instanes of Taillard (1993) for this test. The objetive for these
instanes is to minimize the total distane without minimizing the routes. The re-
sults are presented in Table B.19. From this table we obtain that the gaps are 1.73%
for the R-TS, 0.44% for the LNS-Fast, and 0.34% for the LNS-Slow. However, most
of the moves of the LNS's put as muh orders inside a route as possible, whih is not
neessary a good move for this problem. We also have tested our heuristis when
minimizing the number of routes is the main objetive and minimizing distane the
seondary objetive. The results are more pronouned. In other words, the dier-
enes between our heuristis are larger, but they give no additional insight and are
therefore omitted. Surprisingly, the LNS-Slow did nd, when minimizing the routes
and then distanes, two solutions whih use less distane than the previous BKS's
when only minimizing the distane. These results are bolded in Table B.19.
Finally, in Table 3.9, we present the results of the dierent moves used in the LNS-
Slow. For eah move we report the total relative improvement that the move found
in %(TRI%), whih is the amount of improvement divided by the osts before the
move, and the number of times the move found an improvement (#Impr). These
numbers are the averages over the ten runs and the averages over the instanes
with the same outsouring osts struture (Original, Half-Original, and New). This
table shows that the destroy move, ompared to the other moves, is not promising
sine it nds on average an improvement 0.6 times. In other words, on many runs
and many instanes this move does almost nothing. The reate and split moves are
not so useful in the original priing, whih is not strange sine (almost always) all
routes are used. From the table we also obtain that all the other moves, both the
ones from the literature and the new moves, are important. Most moves nd an
improvement at the beginning of the run. However, sine these results are averaged,
it is likely that eah move nds good improvements at the beginning. We did not
investigate whether a move inuened the remaining moves. For example, it ould
be that a move that has only a slight improvement brings the solution to a new
neighborhood from whih the other moves nd better solutions. Furthermore, it
ould be that removing a move will not inuene the outomes of the heuristi.
However, omparing our results to the results of the other LNS's indiates that
dierent moves are beneial.
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Moves Original Half-Original New Avg
# Name TRI% #Impr TRI% #Impr TRI% #Impr TRI% #Impr
1 Cyli(small, one-way) 5.6 9.7 4.6 8.6 3.5 8.4 4.6 8.9
2 Cyli(small) 4.5 8.5 5.0 7.5 3.7 7.7 4.4 7.9
3 Cyli(medium) 4.4 4.9 3.0 4.0 3.2 4.4 3.5 4.4
4 Cyli(large) 4.0 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.7
5 Cyli(small, andidate) 4.9 8.7 3.3 7.7 4.2 8.7 4.1 8.4
6 Cyli(medium, andidate) 4.5 7.6 4.1 6.9 3.5 7.6 4.0 7.4
7 Cyli(large, andidate) 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.3 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.4
8 Create + shifting 1.4 1.3 2.9 3.5 5.0 1.5 3.1 2.1
9 Destroy 1.8 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.6
10 Split + shifting 2.5 1.0 2.4 2.3 6.4 1.6 3.8 1.7
11 Bomb(small) + shifting 8.0 6.5 4.8 7.0 5.3 6.3 6.1 6.6
12 Bomb (large) + shifting 5.6 2.8 3.3 2.8 5.3 3.6 4.7 3.1
13 Ruin-and-repair(small) 4.8 7.6 4.1 7.6 4.2 8.7 4.4 7.9
14 Ruin-and-repair(large) 3.9 5.4 2.8 5.1 3.5 5.9 3.4 5.5
15 Reseed(small) + shifting 6.2 4.0 6.6 4.3 3.5 3.5 5.5 3.9
16 Reseed(large) + shifting 6.0 1.7 4.0 2.5 3.0 2.0 4.3 2.1
17 Tabu 4.2 9.1 3.4 7.7 4.2 10.5 3.9 9.1
Table 3.9: The value of the moves of the LNS-Slow (TRI = total relative improve-
ment).
3.6 Conlusions and reommendations
We argue that the original test instanes for the VRPO have as harateristi that
larger orders are outsoured out of neessity. To get more diverse instanes, we
reate two new priing mehanisms whih in turn yields new instanes. To takle
the dierent instanes we introdue new large neighborhood searh heuristis. Our
heuristis use several dierent ruin-and-repair moves. Most of these moves are new,
inluding an important repair move. The omputational results show that both our
LNS's nd on average better solutions than the previous best heuristi. Addition-
ally, we have improved most best known solutions. Moreover, the results indiate
that the new moves are worthwhile and that the LNS's are able to nd good so-
lutions on multiple types of instanes. What is surprising is that these results are
obtained without optimizing the dierent parameters but by randomly drawing the
parameters within reasonable bounds.
We did not ompare the heuristis on the running times. This is a deliberate
hoie sine time is not neessarily a good measure. Not only is the neessary
information missing to do a omparison, for example, how many ores were used,
but also optimization of the ode plays an important role. On the other hand,
looking at only solution values or the number of iterations is not a good measure
either. An idea of a good measure ould be the number of basi operations together
with the memory usage.
Chapter 4
Estimations for the VRP with Order
outsouring
4.1 Introdution
This hapter, whih is based on Huijink, Kant, and Peeters (2015), researhes an-
other method to determine whih orders to outsoure. In the previous hapter,
heuristis are used. Not every routing software pakage or transport management
system is able to determine whih orders to outsoure. Additionally, there is not
muh time to deide whih orders to outsoure sine the orders need to be reallo-
ated. It ould well be that even heuristis take too muh time. Finally, determining
routes for the remaining orders is not so useful sine the ompany will reeive orders
that are outsoured to it. Therefore, the ompanies are interested in so-alled rules
of thumb to determine whih orders to outsoure. These rules of thumb should be
fast and simple.
Whether or not an order should be outsoured depends on the (expeted) routing
osts of the order when the ompany delivers this order by itself and its outsouring
osts. However, the (expeted) routing osts of the order depends on other orders
whih are not outsoured. This is the ase for all orders, whih reates an interde-
pendene between them. Furthermore, it ould be that an order is outsoured even
when the expeted routing osts of that order are smaller than the outsoure osts.
For example due to the apaity onstraints or beause other orders are more prof-
itable to deliver. For the lassial VRP, there exist several methods to estimate the
routing osts (of an order) (Daganzo (1984); Fleishmann (1998); Goudvis (2001);
Figliozzi (2009); Baghuis (2014)). Eah of these methods splits the estimation into
three separate parts, the xed, the stem and the inter-order part. The xed part
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estimates the xed osts for delivering an order. The stem estimates the osts for
driving to the area in whih the order should be delivered. The inter-order part
estimates the osts for driving between orders. The estimations use the harater-
istis of the order and the amount of orders in the area or the harateristis of
orders that are near to the order. The possibility of outsouring orders has as a
onsequene that the number of routes that one should use, whih is a vital part in
the estimations of the VRP, is unknown.
To the best of our knowledge, the paper of Hall and Raer (1995) is the rst
one that estimates whih orders to outsoure, in other words, uses estimations in
the VRPO. Hall and Raer (1995) use the method of Daganzo (1984), whih is an
estimation method for the VRP, to estimate the delivery osts of an order. The
orders whih have the highest, and non-negative, unit regret, whih is the outsoure
osts minus the estimated delivery osts divided by the demand, are seleted to be
delivered by the own eet. Baghuis (2014) presents another method to estimate
whih orders to outsoure. This method estimates the inter-order osts by looking
at the diret distane between an order and its neighboring orders. The seletion
method of Baghuis (2014) selets bathes of orders suh that the total demand of
the orders in eah bath is more or less the apaity of a truk. Another estimation,
whih is used by several heuristis for the VRPO (Cté and Potvin (2009); Stenger,
Shneider, and Goeke (2013)), is to assume that the estimated delivery osts are
zero and use the same seletion as Hall and Raer (1995).
In this hapter, we present a new estimation method. This method estimates the
inter-order osts by looking at the insertion osts of the order and its neighboring
orders. Together with this estimation method, we reate a new seletion method.
Additionally, we also adopt the methods of Fleishmann (1998) and Goudvis (2001),
whih originally are for the VRP, to give an estimation method for the VRPO.
To measure the quality of the dierent estimation methods we develop three tests
and use these to ompare the dierent estimations for the VRPO. Finally, we also
ompare the estimations on the lassial VRP.
The rest of this hapter is organized as follows. The dierent estimation methods
are introdued and disussed in Setion 4.2, the tests in Setion 4.3, and the results
in Setion 4.4. The onlusions and reommendations are presented at the end of
this hapter.
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4.2 Estimations: an overview
Eah of the estimations has a two step proedure. In the rst step a sore is assigned
to and in the seond step this sore is used to selet the orders that will be delivered.
Eah method assigns to eah order a sore whih an be written as si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
where pi is the outsoure osts for the order, EstCostsi is the estimated osts for
delivering the order instead of outsouring it, qi is the demand of the order and Q
is the apaity restrition of the route. In other words, the sore is the regret for
not delivering the order per unit demand. For most estimations, the estimated osts
for delivering onsists of the sum of the xed (Fi), whih estimates and alloates
the xed osts of a route over the orders in a route, stem (Si), whih estimates
and alloates the osts for driving to the area in whih the orders are loated, and
inter-order ost (IOi), whih estimates and alloates the osts for driving from the
loation of one order to another. This implies that the estimation does not assign
the marginal or additional osts of the order, but it estimates the total osts that
are assigned to the order. This gives the following basi algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.1 Basis
Step 1: Assigning a sore
1: Estimate the osts of delivering, EstCostsi = Fi + Si + IOi
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
4: Selet whih orders to deliver based on the ranked sores and a stopping
riterium
The rank of order i is denoted by π(i) where the inverse π−1(r) denotes the order
with rank r. Furthermore, the distane between orders i and j is denoted by dij,
where order 0 denotes the depot.
4.2.1 Initialization estimation
Several of the heuristis developed to address the VRPO use a very simple seletion
method (Cté and Potvin (2009); Potvin and Naud (2011); Stenger, Shneider, and
Goeke (2013); Stenger, Vigo, Enz, and Shwind (2013)). The main idea of their
initialization, whih is also an estimation method, is to ignore the delivery osts in
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step 1. In step 2 the orders are seleted until the available apaity runs out. To be
more preise, EstCostsi = 0, whih gives the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.2 Initialization estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore
1: Estimate the osts of delivering, EstCostsi = 0
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
4: Selet the orders π−1(1), ..., π−1(k) to deliver and outsoure the orders
π−1(k + 1), ..., π−1(n), where k is suh that
∑k+1




In step 1, Hall and Raer (1995) use the method of Daganzo (1984) to estimate the
delivery osts of an order. The estimation of Daganzo (1984) assumes that the orders
are randomly distributed over the area and that the orders are homogenous. Due
to these assumptions the inter-order osts are equal for eah order. The inter-order
osts for eah order are estimated using the estimation for the traveling salesman
problem. The total distane travelled in the traveling salesman problem is estimated
by k
√
n · A where k is a onstant depending on the metri, n is the number of orders
and A is the size of the delivery area (Daganzo (1984)). However, in the VRPO it is
not known beforehand whih or how many orders are delivered. Therefore, Hall and
Raer (1995) assume that x orders will be delivered and alulate the estimation for
eah possible value of x. The xed osts are estimated by assigning the apaity
fration of the xed route osts to the order, F qi
Q
. The stem osts are estimated
by a apaity fration of the osts to drive to the area and bak, 2v · d0i qiQ where v
is the osts per kilometer of a truk, and the inter-order osts are the rst Taylor
approximation of the traveling salesman problem estimation, whih depend on the





. For eah value of x, step 2 onsists of seleting the
orders with a positive sore while taking the total apaity into aount. This gives
the following algorithm for a given value x.
Algorithm 4.2.3 Hall estimation for given value x
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Step 1: Assigning a sore
1: Estimate the osts of delivering, EstCostsi = F
qi
Q
+ 2v · d0i qiQ + v k2√ x
A
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
4: Selet the orders π−1(1), ..., π−1(k) to deliver and outsoure the orders









sπ−1(t) ≥ 0 > sπ−1(t+1)
This estimation depends on the number of orders x that were assumed to be
delivered. Note that for a given x the number of orders delivered is given by π−1(k)
whih is not neessary equal to x. The nal estimation is the estimation for whih
the number of orders delivered, π−1(k), is equal to the number of orders assumed to
be delivered, x. In the ase that there are multiple x's that satisfy this ondition,
then the one whih has the minimal estimated ost is hosen.
4.2.3 Baghuis and Baghuis(Adjusted) estimation
Another estimation is developed by Baghuis (2014). For step 1, Baghuis (2014) uses
the distane between the depot and the orders as a proxy for the stem osts and
the distane between orders as a proxy for the inter-order osts. Using results from
several test-instanes, Baghuis (2014) estimates the stem osts of a route, whih is
denoted by SB and is not the stem osts of an order, by taking the average distane
between the depot and the 30% losest orders. Similarly, the inter-order osts of
an order (v · IOBi ) are estimated by taking the average distane between the order
and its 5 losest orders. Additionally, Baghuis (2014) uses the undershoot, whih is
the part of the apaity that is not used in a route and has its roots in inventory
management, to estimate the osts. The xed osts are estimated by F qi
Q−U
, where










. Baghuis (2014) estimates the stem osts




SB where d̄0 is the average distane from the depot to an order,
q̄ is the average demand of an order. In other words, the stem osts of an order are
the average stem osts of an order multiplied by the ratio of the distane from the
depot to the loation of the order and the average distane of the loations of the
orders to the depot. For step 2, the ranking is divided into disjoint bathes, eah
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with the most orders suh that the demand of the orders is less than the apaity
of the routes. All bathes with positive sore are delivered.
Algorithm 4.2.4 Baghuis estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore







SB + v · IOBi
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
4: Divide the ranking into bathes
(π−1(1), ..., π−1(u1)), (π
−1(u1 + 1), ..., π








qπ−1(ℓ). Selet the orders π
−1(1), ..., π−1(uk) to
deliver and outsoure the orders π−1(uk + 1), ..., π








sπ−1(ℓ) and m is the number of available truks
Hall and Raer (1995) selet the orders until their sore is negative, whih an
imply that a route is not fully utilized. However, the Hall estimation assumes that
a route is fully utilized, whih an lead to an underestimation of the osts. To avoid
this, Baghuis (2014) uses an undershoot and selets the orders in bathes. However,
the seletion of Baghuis (2014) an result in not fully utilized routes. Often one
an utilize a route fully by allowing a small detour. Therefore, we use overlapping
bathes instead of disjoint bathes where eah bath ontains the previous bath
and the demand in eah bath is inreased by the apaity of a route. This gives
the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.5 BaghuisAdjusted estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore







SB + v · IOBi
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
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4: Divide the ranking into bathes (π−1(1), ..., π−1(u1)), (π
−1(1), ..., π−1(u2)), ...,








qπ−1(ℓ). Selet the or-
ders π−1(1), ..., π−1(uk) to deliver and outsoure the orders π
−1(uk+1), ..., π
−1(n),








sπ−1(ℓ) and m is the number of available
truks
4.2.4 Fleishmann estimation
In step 1, we use the estimation of Fleishmann (1998), whih bears some resem-
blane to the estimation of Daganzo (1984). Fleishmann (1998) assumes that orders
with similar harateristis are situated on a ring around the depot instead of a ran-
dom uniform distribution. A main part of the model is to determine the distane
between two orders in the ring. This distane (and its osts) an be estimated using
solutions from a part of the instanes, but we hoose to use an adjusted model of
Daganzo (1984) to estimate the inter-order osts. We hoose a irle with as enter
the order for whih we want to estimate the delivery osts, suh that the demand
of the all the orders inside the irle is at least the apaity of a route. Then, the
inter-order osts are given by IOi = v(1− qiQ ) k2√ yi
B
where B is the area of the irle
and yi is the number of orders in the irle. Just as in Fleishmann (1998), we
have the fration (1 − qi
Q
) sine there are yi − 1 inter-order distanes and not yi as
in Hall and Raer (1995). The main dierene between the Hall and Fleishmann
method is that the Fleishmann method uses orders lose to the order to estimate
the inter-order osts instead of all the orders as in Hall. In step 2, we use our se-
letion method whih we also use in the BaghuisAdjusted method. This gives the
following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.6 Fleishmann estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore
1: Estimate the osts of delivering, EstCostsi = F
qi
Q








2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
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4: Divide the ranking into bathes (π−1(1), ..., π−1(u1)), (π
−1(1), ..., π−1(u2)), ...,








qπ−1(ℓ). Selet the or-
ders π−1(1), ..., π−1(uk) to deliver and outsoure the orders π
−1(uk+1), ..., π
−1(n),








sπ−1(ℓ) and m is the number of available
truks
4.2.5 Goudvis estimation
For part 1, Goudvis (2001) estimates the inter-order osts by looking at the diret
distane between lose orders. Unlike Baghuis (2014), Goudvis (2001) assigns a
weight to eah order and uses a weighted average. However, the only part of the
weight of Goudvis (2001) whih has any meaning in the VRPO (or the normal
VRP) is that it depends on the distane between the loation of order i, whih is
the order of interest, and the loation of another order j, in other words, 1
1+dij
. The
other parts, for example whether the time-windows of the orders are ompatible,
have to be ignored. Sine only protable orders are delivered, we use the prot






. As estimation of the inter-order distane IOGi , we take the
order j with the highest sore Prj(i) and estimate the distane by the distane
between the orders i and j (dij). The remaining estimations are the same as in the
Hall estimation. Part 2 is the same as in the Fleishmann estimation, whih gives
the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.7 Goudvis estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore




+ 2v · d0i
qi
Q
+ v · IOGi
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
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4: Divide the ranking into bathes (π−1(1), ..., π−1(u1)), (π
−1(1), ..., π−1(u2)), ...,








qπ−1(ℓ). Selet the or-
ders π−1(1), ..., π−1(uk) to deliver and outsoure the orders π
−1(uk+1), ..., π
−1(n),








sπ−1(ℓ) and m is the number of available
truks
4.2.6 Huijink and Huijink(10) estimation
Both Goudvis (2001) and Baghuis (2014) use the distane between the loations
of two orders to estimate the inter-order osts. Another method to estimate the
inter-order osts is to look at the insertion osts of an order. First, for eah order i,
we take the 5 orders whih have the loations losest to the loation of i. For eah
pair ({k, l}) in the set of pairs that we an make with those 5 orders (Pairs(i)),
we alulate the insertion distane of the order i. Sine an order is more likely
to be inserted when the insertion distane is small, we take the weighted average.
However, we annot use the insertion distane as a weight sine it ould be that this
is equal to zero, hene we have to use 1+ insertiondistance as a weight. This gives






1 + dki + dil − dkl
∑
{k,l}∈Pairs(i)
dki + dil − dkl
1 + dki + dil − dkl
.
The other estimations are the same as in the Fleishmann method. Part 2 is also
the same as in the Fleishmann estimation, whih gives the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.8 Huijink estimation
Step 1: Assigning a sore




+ 2v · d0i
qi
Q
+ v · IOHi
2: Assign a sore to eah order, si =
pi−EstCostsi
qi
Step 2: Seleting whih orders to deliver
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3: Rank the orders in a desending manner aording to si
4: Divide the ranking into bathes (π−1(1), ..., π−1(u1)), (π
−1(1), ..., π−1(u2)), ...,








qπ−1(ℓ). Selet the or-
ders π−1(1), ..., π−1(uk) to deliver and outsoure the orders π
−1(uk+1), ..., π
−1(n),








sπ−1(ℓ) and m is the number of available
truks
For the Huijink10 method, we use the 10 losest orders instead of 5 (whih in-
reases the number of pairs from 10 to 45).
4.3 Tests
We develop three tests to measure the quality of eah estimation method. The most
important test is quality of the solution, whih is tested by omparing the osts
of the best found solution, whih uses the outsouring deision of the estimation
method, and the osts of the best known solution. The seond test is orretness
of the orders outsoured (delivered). In other words, does the estimation outsoure
(deliver) the same orders as the best known solution? This is tested by omparing
the number of orders that are outsoured (delivered) by both the estimation and
the best known solution and the number of orders that are outsoured (delivered)
by either the method or the best known solution. The nal test is the quality of the
estimation, whih is tested by omparing the estimated osts and the osts of the
best known solution. If one an estimate the osts of an instane quite reasonably,
then one an quikly determine what the inuene would be if the outsoure osts
would hange. The tests are formalized in Table 4.1, where we use the following
notation. The Costs of the method are the best found solution of the ten runs of the
AVNS-Fast of Chapter 3, where the outsoure osts are set suh that the orders that
were outsoured (delivered) by the estimation method are outsoured (delivered) by
the AVNS-Fast. We hoose the AVNS-Fast, sine it has a gap of less than 0.10%
on the CE-instanes. The BKSCosts are the osts of the best known solution of
the instane. Both are the number of orders that are outsoured (delivered) by
both the estimation method and the BKS and Either are the number of orders
outsoured (delivered) by either the method or the BKS. Finally, the EstCosts are
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the estimated osts of the estimation method. Note that the quality of the solution
is the most important test for the oalition in the priing based struture (Setion















Table 4.1: The tests.
4.4 Test results
The detailed results of the omputational experiments an be found in Appendix C.
Table 4.2 presents the summarized results of the quality of the solution test.
Instane set Init Hall Bag Fleish Goud Huij BagAdj Huij10
CE-Orig 0.61 0.51 2.65 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.73 0.74
CE-Half-Orig 2.46 2.35 2.87 1.64 2.61 1.98 2.20 1.88
CE-New 3.03 3.10 3.86 2.64 4.19 1.46 2.16 1.67
Average 2.04 1.99 3.13 1.61 2.44 1.35 1.70 1.43
Table 4.2: The average quality of solution for eah method in %.
The gaps are due to the hoie of the method on whih orders to outsoure, in
other words, the gap is lose to zero when the heuristi is allowed to hoose whih
orders to outsoure. Of the methods in the literature, the simple initialization is
better than both the Hall and Baghuis method. From the methods we translated
to the VRPO (Fleishmann and Goudvis), the Goudvis method performs worse
than the Initialization and the Fleishmann method performs better than the Hall
method. One ould onlude from the fat that the Fleishmann method is better
than the Hall method that it is better to determine the inter-order distane while
ignoring the fat that some orders would not be delivered than assuming the same
inter-order distane for eah order. Furthermore, the BaghuisAdj method performs
muh better than the original, whih shows that our seletion method outperforms
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the one of Baghuis (2014). What is interesting is that only hanging the estimation
for the inter-order osts already has a large inuene on the results.
Both the Huijink and Huijink10 method are on average better than all the other
methods. Furthermore, it shows that the Huijink method is quite robust with re-
spet to the amount of neighbouring orders inspeted. What is interesting is that
almost all methods perform similarly well on the CE-Orig-instanes, while there are
large dierenes as well as larger gaps on the other instanes. The gaps between
outsouring everything and the best known solutions is 129%, 28%, and 18% for the
Orig, Half-Orig, and the New-instanes, respetively. Furthermore, in the Half-Orig
and New-instanes there are some instanes where using one route more (or less)
than the number of routes in the best found solution does not have a large inuene
on the osts, for example, the instane Half-Orig CE-02 for whih the best known
solution uses 4 routes and a solution with 3 routes has a gap of just 0.14%. Note that
this is never the ase for the Orig-instanes sine the best known solution always
use all the available routes in these instanes. Hene, one would expet lower gaps
at the Half-Orig and New-instanes than on the Orig-instanes. The Fleishmann
method is the best performing one on the Half-Original-instanes and the Huijink
method on the New-instanes. The reason that the gaps appear to be small is partly
due to the fat that a large part of the osts omes from the xed osts of the routes
(on average 42%).
Instane set Init Hall Bag Fleish Goud Huij BagAdj Huij10
CE-Orig
Delivered 97.30 97.61 95.30 97.20 97.10 96.68 96.66 97.04
Outsoured 79.49 80.84 68.89 78.28 77.60 74.57 75.09 77.09
CE-Half-Orig
Delivered 73.05 63.24 79.85 81.35 77.84 81.55 72.75 81.69
Outsoured 38.61 68.93 69.08 69.51 68.58 69.80 68.92 71.40
CE-New
Delivered 81.09 67.72 82.12 84.68 78.71 87.09 83.94 86.91
Outsoured 15.35 30.64 40.66 37.83 41.66 48.45 45.25 48.82
Average
Delivered 83.81 76.19 85.76 87.74 84.55 88.44 84.45 88.55
Outsoured 44.48 60.14 59.54 61.87 62.61 64.28 63.09 65.77
Table 4.3: The average orretness of outsoured (delivered) of eah method in %.
Table 4.3 shows in onjuntion with Table 4.2 that the seond test, whih tests the
orretness of outsouring, is rather weak. For example omparing the Huijink and
the Fleishmann method on the CE-Half-Orig-instanes shows that Huijink hooses
on average more orders orretly, while Fleishmann has a lower gap. Similarly,
although the Hall method has more orders orret than the Initialization, it does
not show in the gap. This is largely due to the fat that the VRPO often has
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many solutions with nearly the same osts, even while the orders outsoured in eah
solution is quite dierent. Due to this grey area it ould be that two solutions have
almost the same osts, while they are ompletely dierent.
Instane set Hall Bag Fleish Goud Huij BagAdj Huij10
CE-Orig 4.36 4.69 7.64 4.01 6.70 5.10 4.48
CE-Half-Orig 3.92 4.49 7.45 1.64 6.59 4.51 4.57
CE-New 3.76 4.27 7.52 3.17 8.57 4.43 6.71
Average 4.01 4.48 7.54 2.94 7.29 4.68 5.25
Taillard (VRP) 47.99 32.14 12.51 25.82 10.98 32.40 9.76
Table 4.4: The average quality of estimation of eah method in %.
Comparing the estimations of the osts on the VRPO instanes shows that the
Goudvis method estimates the best, losely followed by all but the Fleishmann
method and our method. Our method whih looks at the ten losest orders per-
forms muh better on the estimation part than our method whih looks at the ve
losest orders. On the VRP instanes the results are reversed, our methods and
the Fleishmann method outperform all methods, even the Hall method, whih is
based on the estimation of Daganzo (1984). What is interesting is that all meth-
ods, exept the Fleishmann method and our methods, have a gap in the VRP
instanes whih is at least ve times the gap of the VRPO instanes. Furthermore,
the original Baghuis method needs more truks than available in three instanes in
the VRP. The reason for the disrepany between the gaps is that the Fleishmann
method, the Baghuis methods, as well as our methods, underestimate the distane
osts (sum of inter-order and stem) of the VRP instanes, while the other methods
overestimate these osts. On the other hand, the Baghuis methods overestimate the
xed-route osts while the other methods slightly underestimate these osts. Hene,
the under-estimation of the distane and the overestimation of the xed-route osts
partly anel eah other out. Similarly, the over-estimation of the distane and the
under-estimation of the xed routes partly anel eah other out. Another reason
is that in the VRPO instanes the routes have a large xed ost, whih leads to a
minimization of routes and hene the distane is inreased.
It is interesting that the method whih estimates the total osts quite good,
the Goudvis estimation, has a bad solution after the routing. Surprisingly, this
method has on average roughly the same amount of orders orretly outsoured
(delivered) as the other good performing methods. Therefore, one an onlude that
the Goudvis method estimation is suh that a few important orders are outsoured
(delivered) while they should not. The results onrm our ndings in Chapter 3
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that the Orig instanes have ertain harateristis. It is interesting that ignoring
the interdependene and using an estimation leads to a gap of at most two perent
for the Huijink estimation. Finally, it is surprising how far o the estimations are
in the VRP instanes.
4.5 Conlusion and reommendations
The results on these instanes indiate that the estimations are a viable option for
determining whih orders to outsoure in the priing based struture. Our estimation
method sores the best on quality of solution, whih is the most important measure
for the priing based struture. Surprisingly, the results on the quality of the solution
show that a good estimation of the total osts not neessary results in good hoies
on whih orders to outsoure (deliver). One would expet that a better estimation
would result in better osts after the outsouring. However, sine this is not the ase,
it deserves more attention. Furthermore, the estimations ignore the interdependene
between the order when estimating whih orders to outsoure. One method to solve
this is to use eah method a few times where only the orders that are delivered
are allowed to be used for estimating the delivery osts. Other follow up researh
is on other estimations, for example, using a minimal spanning tree together with
mathing to determine whih orders to outsoure. Finally, most estimations for the
VRP have their roots in estimations for the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP)
(Daganzo (1984)). However, as far as we are aware of, there is no researh on
estimations of the TSP with prots, whih is the TSP variant of the VRPO (Feillet
et al. (2005)). Most of the methods we disussed an readily be adapted to estimate
whih orders to outsoure in the TSP with prots.
Chapter 5
Priing based struture: the priing
5.1 Introdution
In this hapter, we analyze what the outsoure osts should be for the priing based
struture. Where in the previous two hapters we assumed that the outsoure osts
where known and we looked at one ompany, we now look at the priing based
struture and try to nd the best priing mehanism. In the priing based struture,
ompanies agree on a priing sheme, whih onsists of a fee for delivering the order
and the inter-depot osts of the order, together with a division of the delivery area
into regions. Eah ompany is assigned to a region and is obliged to deliver orders
outsoured in that area. However, there is no obligation to outsoure orders. In
priniple, the outsoure osts may dier per ompany and it may depend on various
parameters. What the outsoure osts should be depends on the objetive of the
ompanies. Here we assume that the ompanies want to minimize the joint osts,
whih is equivalent to maximizing the joint prot. Examples of other objetives are
to maximize the absolute or relative prot of eah ompany. Due to the underlying
omplexity, it is not easy to nd the optimal parameters of the priing sheme.
Therefore, we resort to a surrogate model, namely, Kriging (Forrester et al. (2008)).
A surrogate model approximates the outome of parameter ongurations using
the atual outomes of several ongurations. Iteratively, the surrogate model is
updated using the outome of a promising onguration.
The outome of a onguration, whih is in this ase the joint osts of ooperating,
is alulated as follows. The LNS-Faster, whih is a variant of the LNS-Fast (Chapter
3), determines whih orders are outsoured. See Appendix D for the details of the
LNS-Faster. The outsoured orders are transshipped and the LNS-Faster is used
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to alulate the osts after the outsouring. Setion 5.2 disusses the priing model
and how we determine the fee. In Setion 5.3, we present the test instanes together
with the inter-depot osts. We report the results in Setion 5.4 and the onlusion
and reommendation at the end of this hapter.
5.2 Priing model
The ompanies not only agree on a priing mehanism for whih the ompanies an
outsoure orders, but also on the region in whih a ompany is obliged to deliver
the outsoured orders. This priing sheme, whih onsists of a fee for the ompany
that delivers the order and the inter-depot osts of the order, and the regions are
not determined on a daily basis, but are xed for a longer period of time. We
assume that the regions are already assigned and that the goal of the ompanies is
to minimize the joint operational osts. However, in the priing based struture the
ompanies deide themselves in the operational phase whih orders they outsoure.
To be able to make a good deision on whih orders to outsoure, the ompany needs
to know the fee and inter-depot osts when outsouring an order.
The set of ompanies that form a ooperation is denoted by N = {1, ..., n}.
The outsoure osts of an order from ompany i ∈ N that has a loation in the
region of ompany j ∈ N are given by the funtion pij(.). The outsoure osts
pij(.) onsists of the fee that ompany i has to pay to ompany j, whih is denoted
by the funtion fij(.), and the inter-depot osts for transhipping the order from
ompany i to ompany j, whih is denoted by the funtion IDij(.). Hene, the osts
to outsoure an order from ompany i to ompany j, in whih region the loation
of the order lies, are given by pij(.) = fij(.) + IDij(.). For all ompanies i ∈ N , the
vetor of outsoure osts of a ompany, pi(.), is dened by pi(.) = (pi1(.), ..., pin(.)).
Similarly, the vetor of outsoure osts, p(.), is dened by p(.) = (p1(.), ...,pn(.)).
Sine the inter-depot transportation osts depend on all outsoured orders, there
is an interdependene of the outsoure osts. Eah ompany deides, given the
outsoure osts p(.), whih orders it outsoures. The total outsoure osts that
ompany i ∈ N pays is denoted by P paidi (p(.)) and the fee that it reeives is denoted
by P receivedi (p(.)). The routing osts of the ompany, whih depends on the orders
that it did not outsoure together with the orders outsoured to it, are denoted by
V RPi(p(.)). This gives that the total osts of ompany i, Costsi(p(.)), is dened by
Costsi(p(.)) = P
paid
i (p(.)) − P receivedi (p(.)) + V RPi(p(.)). The ompanies want to
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s.t. Costsi(p(.)) = P
paid
i (p(.))− P receivedi (p(.)) + V RPi(p(.)) ∀ i ∈ N
Note that P paidi (p(.))−P receivedi (p(.)) is equal to the inter-depot osts that ompany
i pays. This implies that the ompanies minimize the total routing osts together
with the inter-depot osts. The ompanies optimize the priing sheme for a test
period. This test period onsists of several days and should be representative for
the period for whih they want to determine the priing.
Due to the underlying omplexity, we have to use a surrogate model to nd the
optimal outsoure osts p(.). Kriging (Forrester et al. (2008)) is suh a surrogate
model, whih for nding the best priing mehanism operates as follows.
Algorithm 5.2.1 The Kriging model
Setup phase
Determine a set of initial priing shemes (fees and inter-depot osts)
For every initial priing sheme
Compute, given the priing sheme, the total osts
Kriging
Repeat the following until a stopping riterion is met
Determine the surrogate model (Kriging parameters)
Determine the priing sheme whih is most promising aording to the sur-
rogate model
Compute the total osts of this priing sheme
The rst step in Kriging is to determine a few initial priing shemes and alulate
the osts of these. Then, Kriging determines, using maximum likelihood, what the
outomes would be of all possible priing shemes. The outomes of the Kriging
model are searhed for the most promising priing sheme and the real osts of this
sheme are alulated. This improves the auray of the model and we repeat
the proedure until a stopping riterion is met. How we alulate, given the priing
sheme, the total osts is presented in Algorithm 5.2.2. To avoid the interdependene
of the inter-depot osts and the outsoure osts, we initially estimate the inter-depot
osts for any order. If neessary, we adjust the inter-depot osts and realulate
whih orders the ompanies outsoure.
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Algorithm 5.2.2 Calulation, given the priing sheme, of the osts
Determine whih orders to outsoure and the inter-depot osts
Repeat the following until the inter-depot osts are estimated `orretly'
For every day in the test period
1: Determine for eah ompany whih orders are outsoured
2: Compute the inter-depot osts based on the outsoured orders
If neessary, hange the inter-depot osts to the new inter-depot osts
Determine the osts after outsouring
For every day in the test period
3: Compute for eah ompany the fees and inter-depot osts paid, fees reeived
and the routing ost after the outsouring and the transshipment
The explanation of Algorithm 5.2.2 is as follows. First, eah ompany determines,
given the outsoure priing, whih orders it will outsoure. For this we use the
LNS-Faster, whih is a faster variant of the LNS-Fast (Chapter 3). The details of
the LNS-Faster heuristi an be found in Appendix D. However, the LNS-Faster
uses random elements whih imply that the solution an be dierent eah exeution.
Therefore, we run the LNS-Faster three times per ompany and use the best found
solution for eah ompany. How the inter-depot osts are alulated an be found
in Setion 5.3. If the inter-depot osts deviate to muh from the osts that were
used, then, the inter-depot osts are hanged to the new inter-depot osts. When
the inter-depot osts are updated, the ompanies need to reevaluate whih orders
they will outsoure and the ompanies use the previous best solution as a starting
point for the LNS-Faster. Finally, the ompanies alulate the osts for delivering
the orders after the outsouring. In other words, the osts for delivering the orders
that they did not outsoure together with the orders that are outsoured to them.
Again, eah ompany runs the LNS-Faster three times and the best solution is used.
We assume that the fee onsists of a xed part and a part whih depends on the
demand of the order. For simpliity, we assume that the fee is the same for eah
ompany. The nal assumption is that the fee is suh that there is no disrimination
where the order ame from. In other words, ip = α+ β · q where q is the demand of
the order.
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5.3 Test instane
For our test instane we assume that we have 9 ompanies (n = 9) whih are loated
in a 3 × 3 grid as in Figure 5.1. Eah ompany has one of the parts in Figure 5.1
as a home-region. We assume that the inter-depot transportation is exeuted using
a simple hub-and-spoke system with the middle ompany, ompany 5, as hub. The

















Figure 5.1: The inter-depot transport system.
There are 8 lines in Figure 5.1. Eah of these lines depit a route for the inter-
depot transport from the depot to the hub and bak. The truks used for the
inter-depot transport are longer heavier vehiles with xed osts 250, variable osts
1.15 per distane driven, and apaity 54 pallets. The additional osts for sorting
the order at the hub are 3. The inter-depot osts of an order from ompany i to
ompany j with demand q is dened as IDij(p(.)) = 3 + (ζi + ζj)q, where ζi (ζj)
denotes the unit osts of transporting an order from the depot of ompany i (j)
to the hub or the other way around. To be more preise, the number of vehiles
required on the line of ompany i ∈ N\{5} is given by mi = ⌈max{Ini,Outi}Q ⌉, where
Ini is the demand that goes from the hub to ompany i and Outi is the demand
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that goes to the hub from ompany i. Then, ζi =
miFi
Ini+Outi
, where Fi denotes the
osts per truk from depot i to the hub and bak. For the rst iteration, the ζ 's are
estimated by using the ζ 's of the nearest fee. Note that it ould be that there is an
imbalane in the demand going in and out. One way to solve this imbalane is to
have one ζOuti for the ow going to the hub and one ζ
In
i for the ow going to the
ompany. Then, the ζ of the ow whih is greater an be inreased, but it should
not be more than
miFi
max{Ini,Outi}
, and the other an be dereased, but it should not
be less than 0. For simpliity, we will not amend the osts in ase of an imbalane.
The following example shows the alulation of ζ2.
Example 5.3.1 Suppose that there is only one day in the test period. Company
2 outsoures orders with a total volume of 146.75 pallets. The other ompanies
outsoure orders with a total volume of 78.75 pallets to ompany 2. The number
of routes needed is 3 sine 146.75/54 ≈ 2.7. The total distane from the depot of
ompany 2 to the depot of ompany 5 and bak is 197. This implies that the inter-
depot osts of this line is 3 · (250+1.15 · 197)≈ 1430. This 1430 needs to be divided
over the orders, whih is done by usage. In other words, the osts of transporting an
order with size q pallets from ompany 2 to the depot (or the other way around) is
(1430/(146.75+75.75)) · q ≈ 6.43q. Note that osts for an order from or to ompany
2 has the same osts struture regardless the imbalane. Typially, there are more
days and the total transportation osts on a line is divided by the total amount of
orders to get more robust inter-depot osts for an order. ⊳
Sine we like to represent larger and smaller orders, as well as large and small
ompanies, and urban and rural areas, we have dened our instanes as follows. We
assume that there is data for ten dierent days. On eah of these days, the ompanies
have orders whih need to be delivered. The number of orders that a ompany has in
its region on a given day is a random integer in [Inside · (1−dev), Inside · (1+dev)],
where dev is a random number in [−Dev,Dev]. Similarly, the number of orders
outside its region is random integer in [Outside · (1 − dev), Outside · (1 + dev)].
Eah order outside its region is assigned, with a ertain probability, to the region
of another ompany. Similar as in pratie, it is more likely that an order has its
loation lose to the depot of the ompany and it is more likely to be loated in an
urbanized (industrialized) area. Therefore, we assign a weight to eah region whih is
based on the distane and the type of region. The weight for the region of ompany
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j is given by
Typej
1+dj
, where dj is the distane between the depot of the ompany
who owns the order and the depot of ompany j, and Typej reets whether it is
urbanized or not. There are three levels of urbanization, rural whih has value 1,
normal whih has value 2, and urban whih has value 4. The loation of an order,
within a region, is random and the demand of the order is drawn aording to the







































Table 5.1: The demand distribution of the orders, expressed as number of pallets.
The harateristis of the ompanies and regions is presented in Table 5.2.
Company/region Inside Outside Dev Urbanization
1 50 100 5% Normal
2 100 200 20% Normal
3 50 100 10% Rural
4 25 75 10% Normal
5 50 100 20% Normal
6 50 150 10% Urban
7 100 200 10% Urban
8 75 100 10% Normal
9 25 50 10% Rural
Table 5.2: The harateristis of the ompanies and regions.
Eah ompany has enough truks available to deliver all its orders inluding the
orders that are outsoured to the ompany. The truks for delivering the orders
have xed osts 50, variable osts 1 per distane and a apaity of 25. Finally, we
desire a priing sheme whih is robust for multiple days. Hene, we use the rst
four days to determine the priing sheme and the remaining six are for veriation.
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5.4 Test results
Table 5.3 presents the total osts (on the rst 4 days) for no ooperation (No oop),
whih implies that no orders will be outsoured, for all outsoured (All out), whih
implies that all orders that an be outsoured are outsoured, for no fee (No fee),
whih implies the deision on whih orders to outsoure is only based on the inter-
depot osts, and nally, for the outsoure osts based on the estimated osts (Es-
timated). For Estimated we estimate with the Huijink(5) estimation (Algorithm
4.2.8) what the osts are for delivering an order. The fee orresponding with these
estimated osts is ip = 2.16+5.10·q. In Table 5.3, Costs orresponds to the osts over
the test-period, Prot orresponds to the relative gap to no ooperation, Out orre-
sponds to the perentage of orders (averaged over the 4 days) that are outsoured
and similarly Cap orresponds to the perentage of demand that is outsoured.
Type Costs Prot (%) Out (%) Cap(%)
No oop 172,990 - 0 0
All out 159,748 7.66 100 100
No fee 153,884 11.04 85.88 78.24
Estimated 150,728 12.87 69.30 58.64
Table 5.3: The osts of four basi strategies.
The osts for no ooperation are obtained by improving the solution found by the
LNS-Fast heuristi (Chapter 3) as follows. The best solution is iteratively perturbed
and followed by the LNS-Fast until no improvement was found for a number of
iterations. For the other two strategies, all outsoured and no fee, the method
in Setion 5.2 is used. The results show that inorporating the inter-depot osts
leads to less osts than just outsouring everything or no ooperation. Furthermore,
the results show that using the estimated fee leads to the least osts of those four
methods.
In Table 5.4, we ompare the performane of the Huijink(5) estimation (Chapter
4) to the LNS-Faster. First, we estimate with the Huijink estimation (Algorithm
4.2.8) what the osts are for delivering an order. The fee orresponding with these
estimated osts is ip = 2.16 + 5.10 · q. The LNS-Faster is used twie in Algorithm
5.2.2, rst to determine whih orders are outsoured and then to alulate the rout-
ing osts. This method is alled the LNS-LNS in Table 5.4. Esti-Esti uses the
Huijink estimation instead of the LNS-Faster for determining whih orders to out-
soure and uses the estimation instead of the LNS-Faster for alulating the routing
5.4. Test results 67
osts. Finally, Esti-LNS uses the Huijink estimation for determining whih orders
to outsoure and the LNS-Faster for determining whih orders to outsoure.
Type Costs Prot (%) Out (%) Cap (%)
Esti-Esti 142,401 - 35.51 36.02
Esti-LNS 173,258 -0.15 35.51 36.02
LNS-LNS 150,728 12.87 69.30 58.64
Table 5.4: The estimated osts and the true osts when ip = 2.16 + 5.10 · q.
Table 5.4 shows that the estimation underestimates the delivery osts whih im-
plies that the estimation outsoures less orders than when the LNS-Faster deides
whih orders to outsoure. Moreover, the LNS-Faster outsoures smaller orders
while the estimation has more or less an equal perentage on orders and apaity
outsoured.
The previous results show that the LNS-Faster has more reliable results than the
estimation method. Hene, we use the LNS-Faster in our Kriging model. Figure
5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the results of the Kriging model, where the dots are the
alulated parameter ongurations. The osts of the alulated ongurations an







































Figure 5.2: The Kriging model.
The best onguration is ip = 3.86 + 1.95 · q. There are four alulated ong-
urations around the best onguration and they all have osts below 149, 500. The
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Figure 5.3: The Kriging model alternative view.
results of this onguration are presented in Table 5.5, where Costs orresponds to
the osts of the period, CostsDay orresponds to the average osts per day in the
period, ID-osts orresponds to the average of the true inter-depot transport osts
per day (without the fee of 3 per order), and the ID-Paid orresponds to the average
that the ompanies paid for the inter-depot transport per day, again without the fee
of 3 per order.
Type Costs CostsDay Prot (%) Out(%) Cap (%) ID-Costs ID-Paid
Test period 148,688 37,172 14.05 72.48 64.55 11,542 11,542
Operational period 225,899 37,650 12.11 70.29 62.94 11,454 11,585
Total 374,587 37,459 12.16 71.17 63.58 11,489 11,567
Table 5.5: The results of the best point ip = 3.86 + 1.95 · q.
The test period onsists of the rst four days and the operational period of the
last six days. This test period is used to determine the fee and inter-depot osts. For
the operational period, we use the fee and inter-depot osts (the ζ 's) obtained in the
test period. From Table 5.5, we see that the ompanies pay on the operational days
slightly too muh for the inter-depot osts ompared to the true average inter-depot
osts. The best fee is ip = 3.86+1.95 ·q while the estimated fee is ip = 2.16+5.10 ·q.
Due to the muh lower variable part (1.95 instead of 5.10), the ompanies outsoure
more demand than with the estimated fee. Eah ompany has a prot on all of the
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rst 4 days. However, there are several ompanies with losses on one of the last
six days. Companies an have a loss when delivering the orders outsoured to them
osts more than the fee they reeive. Furthermore, it ould imply that the rst
four days are not representative enough. On average, eah ompany makes a prot,
whih is shown in Table 5.6. The average prot ranges from 6.5% up to 22%. The
ompanies with the most prot are ompany 5, whih has muh less inter-depot osts
ompared to the other ompanies, and ompany 9, whih is the smallest ompany.
The higher prot in the test period an (partly) be explained by the fat that the
parameters are tuned on the test period and not on the operational period.
Company Test period Operational period Average
1 15.99 14.00 14.81
2 7.29 5.99 6.51
3 14.18 13.36 13.69
4 16.62 8.61 11.82
5 24.45 20.70 22.18
6 12.91 10.98 11.77
7 12.89 8.98 10.61
8 12.46 12.65 12.57
9 20.19 20.91 20.64
Table 5.6: The average prot of the ompanies in (%).
Table 5.7 presents the harateristis of eah ompany averaged over the ten days,
where NoCoop orresponds to the osts without ooperation, VRP orresponds to
the osts of the routing after the transshipment of the orders, Paid orresponds to
the outsoure osts paid, whih onsists of the fee paid to the other ompanies and
the inter-depot osts inluding the sorting osts. Re orresponds to the fee that the
ompany reeives, NOut orresponds to the number of orders outsoured, NIn to
the number of orders that are outsoured to the ompany, CapOut to the demand
outsoured, CapIn to the demand that is outsoured to the ompany, and ID-Costs
orresponds to the true inter-depot osts (without the fee of 3 per order) on the line
of the ompany.
Company 1 has on average an almost perfet balane between outsoured de-
mand and the demand that the ompany reeives. This is, however, deeiving sine
ompany 1 outsoures a demand of 68.13 while it reeives 135.25 on day three. The
remaining results are in line with the harateristis of the ompany.
The method in Setion 5.2 uses heuristis. This an imply that ompanies do
not make the optimal deisions or that the routing after the outsouring an be
improved. Moreover, the deep valley in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 indiate that the priing
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NoCoop VRP Paid Re NOut NIn CapOut CapIn ID-Costs
1 4358.92 2321.83 1850.89 459.46 72.20 73.30 92.93 91.04 1368.94
2 7225.53 3987.16 3241.28 473.32 123.60 73.50 165.36 93.68 1667.93
3 4334.77 2236.36 1739.16 234.13 65.80 36.00 78.99 49.39 1140.78
4 3120.70 1994.45 1216.60 459.28 48.60 74.20 61.51 89.88 1000.76
5 3835.75 2068.11 1688.23 771.28 89.60 117.80 124.70 161.14 -
6 5659.06 2951.84 2878.92 837.85 115.30 129.60 160.56 174.29 1858.55
7 7536.84 4241.97 3359.11 864.14 129.40 128.90 178.84 187.78 2395.64
8 4340.71 2557.77 1706.91 469.79 69.20 74.70 84.83 91.01 1143.72
9 2603.24 1359.09 1002.69 295.95 36.70 42.40 44.08 53.60 912.62
Table 5.7: The average harateristis per day, over the ten days.
mehanism is likely not robust. This point is strengthened by the fat that the
prots are muh less in the operational period. The deep valley ould also imply
that the randomness of the heuristi is still an issue. The regressing Kriging model
(Forrester et al. (2008)), whih takes this randomness into aount by allowing for


































Figure 5.4: The regressing Kriging model.
The dierene between the two Kriging models is that the regressing model is
smoother. The regressing model has the same interesting area, but it assumes that
the alulated ongurations in the interesting area are too optimisti.
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Figure 5.5: The regressing Kriging model alternate view.
5.5 Conlusions and reommendations
We analyze the priing based struture and introdue a new test-instane. Fur-
thermore, we present a solution method for this omplex problem whih is based
on Kriging and the heuristis of Chapter 3. The results show that the estimations
an not be used on this instane due to both a too large gap and a too large dif-
ferene in the outsoured orders. Furthermore, the results show that Kriging is
able to determine promising areas of parameter ongurations when there are not
too many parameters. However, there is some variane in the outomes sine our
solution method uses heuristis whih ontain randomness. When verifying the pri-
ing, ompanies have a negative result on ertain days. It ould be that something
whih is good for the oalition as a whole is bad for one ompany. However, it is
something whih has to be taken into aount when the oalition implements the
method. The dierenes between the results on the rst four and the last six raise
the question whether the rst four instanes are representative. Another reason for
the negative results in a few instanes ould be due to the fat that the ompanies
are dierent and, therefore, eah ompany requires a dierent fee. Possible elds of
future researh are to redue the variane in the results, hange the assumption on
the inter-depot osts, for example, adjust the osts as proposed or to inorporate
parameters for the inter-depot osts, and use other surrogate models than Kriging.
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Furthermore, a dierent objetive an be used as well as a ompany dependent fee.
Chapter 6
Transferable utility games, nuleoni
and bankrupty
6.1 Cooperative onsiderations in transportation
The way to alloate jointly generated prots is important for suess when trans-
portation ompanies ooperate using the entral planning struture. Many entral
planning strutures for transportation ompanies have failed on mistrust on the ap-
plied prot alloation sheme (Cruijssen et al. (2007)). To prevent this mistrust,
several types of alloation shemes are investigated in the literature on oopera-
tion between transportation ompanies. The rst lass of shemes are orporate
rules. Corporate rules use a spei harateristi of the underlying transportation
problem, for example proportional to volume or proportional to the stand alone
transportation osts (Cruijssen et al. (2007)). A more omplete list of orporate
rules as ompensation shemes an be found in Table 6.1. For an explanation of
these rules we refer to their respetive papers.
However, using a single harateristi, it ould be the ase that the true ontri-
bution of a ompany to the optimal ooperation is negleted. For example, using
the volume will give a ompany with many orders a large share of the savings, even
though it ould well be that this ompany did not generate any savings for the
ooperation. Compensation shemes whih take the marginal osts or savings of a
ompany into aount are typially solution onepts of ooperative game theory.
These solution onepts in general use the worth of oalitions, potentially an oper-
ating subgroup, to determine an appropriate alloation. This worth of the oalition
estimates the minimal osts for delivering all the orders of the ompanies belonging
to the oalition in a onsistent way. The game theoreti solution onepts used in
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Corporate rule Papers
Equal split of the gains Fleishmann (1999)
Equal unit osts Fleishmann (1999)
Proportional to volume Fleishmann (1999); Cruijssen
et al. (2007); Frisk et al.
(2010)
Proportional to the number of orders delivered Cruijssen et al. (2007)
Proportional to the stand alone transportation
osts
Fleishmann (1999); Cruijssen
et al. (2007); Lui et al. (2010)
Proportional to the distane traveled Cruijssen et al. (2007)
Proportional to the number of orders Cruijssen et al. (2007)
Shadow Pries Frisk et al. (2010)
Table 6.1: Corporate rules for entral planning strutures for transportation.
the literature on ooperation between transportation ompanies an be found in
Table 6.2. For an explanation of these onepts we refer to their respetive papers.
Game theoreti rule Papers
Equal Charge method Frisk et al. (2010)
Alternative Cost Avoided Method Frisk et al. (2010); Hezarkhani
et al. (2015)
Cost Gap Method Frisk et al. (2010)
Shapley value Frisk et al. (2010); Lui et al.
(2010); Krajewska et al. (2008);
Hezarkhani et al. (2015)
Core guaranteed Shapley mehanism Dai and Chen (2012)
nuleolus Frisk et al. (2010); Lui et al.
(2010); Hezarkhani et al. (2015)
Equal Prot Method Frisk et al. (2010); Audy et al.
(2011); Hezarkhani et al. (2015)
Modied Equal Prot Method Audy et al. (2011)
Weighted Relative Savings Model Lui et al. (2010)
Core guaranteed proportional mehanism Dai and Chen (2012)
Core guaranteed ontribution-based
mehanism
Dai and Chen (2012)
Proportional Hezarkhani et al. (2015)
Modied proportional Hezarkhani et al. (2015)
Table 6.2: Game theoreti solution onepts used in entral planning strutures for
transportation.
In the remainder of this dissertation, we onsider a pure game theoreti setting.
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In other words, we assume that eah oalition has a worth and we investigate fair
alloations. More speially, we fous on the per apita nuleolus (Grotte (1970))
and the proportionate nuleolus. Both these alloations are variants of the nuleolus
(Shmeidler (1969)). The nuleolus (Shmeidler (1969)) lexiographially minimizes
the maximal dissatisfation of oalitions, where the dissatisfation of a oalition for
a given alloation is expressed as the dierene between the worth of the oalition
and the joint payo that the oalition reeives aording to this alloation, while the
per apita nuleolus (Shmeidler (1969)) lexiographially minimizes the maximal
dissatisfation per player of oalitions. The main dierene between the nuleolus
and the per apita nuleolus is that the per apita nuleolus inorporates the size
of the oalitions. An important result for both the nuleolus and the per apita
nuleolus is that the resulting alloation is an element of the ore (Gillies (1953)),
if the ore is non-empty. The remainder of this hapter is as follows. In Setion
6.2, we provide the basi notions of ooperative game theory. Setion 6.3 provides
an overview of the three Kohlberg (1971) type of haraterizations of the nuleolus.
These haraterizations for the nuleolus are also valid for the per apita nuleolus.
Finally, bankrupty problems, whih deals with the question how to divide the
remaining estate over the laimants, are introdued in Setion 6.4.
6.2 Transferable utility games and nuleoni
A transferable utility TU-game is dened by a pair (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is
the nite set of players and v : 2N → R is the harateristi funtion. The set of
all TU-games with player set N is denoted by TUN and a TU-game with player set
N is abbreviated by v. For every oalition S ∈ 2N , v(S) is alled the worth of the
oalition, whih is the maximal joint amount of money that the oalition an obtain
on its own by ooperating in an optimal way, with v(∅) = 0 by onvention.
The ardinality of a oalition S ∈ 2N is denoted by |S|. By RN , we denote the
set of all real-valued vetors with |N | elements in whih eah oordinate orresponds
to a player i ∈ N . For S ∈ 2N , we denote by eS ∈ RN the vetor for whih eSi = 1
for all i ∈ S and eSi = 0 for all i ∈ N\S.
An eient vetor is a vetor x ∈ RN suh that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). The imputation
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set, I(v), is dened by




The ore, Core(v) (Gillies (1953)), onsists of all imputations for whih no oalition
would be better o if it separated itself from the grand oalition. Formally, the ore
is dened by
Core(v) = {x ∈ I(v) |
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
For x, y ∈ Rt we have x ≤L y, i.e., x is lexiographially smaller than (or equal to)
y, if x = y or if there exists an ℓ ∈ {1, ..., t} suh that xk = yk for all k ∈ {1, ..., ℓ−1}
and xℓ < yℓ.
Let v ∈ TUN . The exess exc(v, S, x) of oalition S ∈ 2N for an imputation
x ∈ I(v) is dened by




For a game v ∈ TUN and imputation x ∈ I(v), the exess vetor θ(x) ∈ R2|N| has
as its oordinates the exesses of all 2|N | oalitions arranged in a weakly dereasing
order, i.e., θk(x) ≥ θk+1(x) for all k ∈ {1, ..., 2|N | − 1}. The nuleolus is dened as
follows.
Denition 6.2.1 (f. Shmeidler (1969))
Let v ∈ TUN be suh that I(v) 6= ∅. The nuleolus, n(v), is the unique imputation
suh that θ(n(v)) ≤L θ(y) for all y ∈ I(v).
For a game v ∈ TUN and an imputation x ∈ I(v) we dene the per apita exess of
any non-empty oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} by






The per apita exess vetor θP (x) ∈ R2|N|−1 has as its oordinates the per apita
exesses of all non-empty oalitions arranged in a weakly dereasing order, in other
words, θPk (x) ≥ θPk+1(x) for all k ∈ {1, ..., 2|N | − 2}.
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Denition 6.2.2 (f. Grotte (1970))
Let v ∈ TUN be suh that I(v) 6= ∅. Then, the per apita nuleolus, pcn(v), is the
unique imputation suh that θP (pcn(v)) ≤L θP (y) for all y ∈ I(v).
6.3 Charaterizations of nuleoni using balaned
olletions
Besides the original denition of the nuleolus, there exist multiple haraterizations
(f. Kohlberg (1971); Groote Shaarsberg et al. (2013)) that use balaned olle-
tions. One of the advantages of these haraterizations is that they provide ways
to quikly determine whether an imputation is the nuleolus or not. We use the
following variant, whih uses the following denitions: A map ρ : 2N\{∅} → [0,∞)
is alled balaned if
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
ρ(S)eS = eN .
Furthermore, a olletion B ⊂ 2N\{∅} of oalitions is alled balaned if there exists
a balaned map ρ on N suh that
B = {S ∈ 2N\{∅} | ρ(S) > 0}.
We all the grand oalition N and the empty oalition ∅ trivial. Let x ∈ I(v) and
dene B1(v, x) to be the set of the non-trivial oalitions for whih the exess with
imputation x is the highest. Formally,
B1(v, x) =
{
S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} | exc(v, S, x) ≥ exc(v, T, x) for all T ∈ 2N\{∅, N}
}
.











| exc(v, S, x) ≥ exc(v, T, x)









Sine 2N\{∅, N} is nite, it is lear that there exists a unique t(v, x) ∈ N, suh that
{
Bk(v, x) 6= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, ..., t(v, x)}
Bk(v, x) = ∅ for all k ∈ {t(v, x) + 1, ...}
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Proposition 6.3.1 (f. Kohlberg (1971))
Let v ∈ TUN be suh that Core(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ I(v). Then, x = n(v) if and
only if
⋃k
ℓ=1 Bℓ(v, x) is balaned for all k ∈ {1, ..., t(v, x)}.
An alternative haraterization is provided by Groote Shaarsberg et al. (2013).
Let D ⊆ 2N and let H(D) be as follows:
H(D) =
{
S ∈ 2N | eS ∈ span(eN , {eT}T∈D)
}
,
where span denotes the linear hull. Formally,





S | γS ∈ R for all S ∈ D ∪ {N}
}
and note that
H({∅}) = {∅, N}.
Proposition 6.3.2 (f. Groote Shaarsberg et al. (2013))
Let v ∈ TUN be suh that Core(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ I(v). Then, x = n(v) if and only
if there exists a sequene D1,D2, ...,Dτ of non-empty subolletions of 2N\{∅, N}
with the following properties:
(i) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} the olletion D̄r =
⋃r
k=1Dk is balaned.
(ii) there exists a sequene of real numbers γ1, γ2, ..., γτ suh that
exc(v, T, x) = γr for every T ∈ Dr and all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and that
γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ ... ≥ γτ .
(iii) for all T ∈ 2N\{{∅, N} ∪ D̄τ} it holds that
T ∈ H({S ∈ D̄τ : exc(v, S, x) ≥ exc(v, T, x)}).
Example 6.3.1 Consider the four person game v ∈ TUN with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
given by:
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 0 60 30 30 80 90 100
6.3. Charaterizations of nuleoni using balaned olletions 79
Then, n(v) = (5, 13, 41, 41) and the sorted exesses of the non-trivial oalitions
are as follows:
S {1} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2} {1, 3, 4} {2} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4}
exc(v, S, n(v)) −5 −5 −7 −7 −13 −22 −29 −29
S {3} {4} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4}
exc(v, S, n(v)) −41 −41 −46 −46 −54 −54
These exesses imply that B1(v, n(v)) = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, B2(v, n(v)) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}}, B3(v, n(v)) = {{2}}, B4(v, n(v)) = {{3, 4}}, B5(v, n(v)) =
{{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, B6(v, n(v)) = {{3}, {4}}, B7(v, n(v)) = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}},












Hene, regarding the haraterisation in Proposition 6.3.2, one an onlude that
τ = 4, D1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}}, D3 = {{2}}, and D4 =
{{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}. ⊳
Both Proposition 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 require that (a part of) the oalitions are put
into a sequene of olletions, and that all oalitions in a olletion have the same ex-
ess. Moreover, both sequenes of olletions have to satisfy the same balanedness
requirement. However, there are two important dierenes between the proposi-
tions. First, in Proposition 6.3.2 it is allowed that several olletions have the same
exess as opposed to Proposition 6.3.1. In other words, in Proposition 6.3.2 it is al-
lowed to split a large Kohlberg olletion into multiple smaller olletions. Seond,
Proposition 6.3.2 states that a non-trivial oalition either belongs to a olletion
or it is in the span of the olletions with higher exesses, while Proposition 6.3.1
states that eah non-trivial oalition belongs to a olletion. Hene, it is possible
to use a subset of the Kohlberg olletions to determine whether an imputation is
the nuleolus or not, in other words, some of the Kohlberg olletions are irrelevant.
Finally, note that the sequene of the original Kohlberg olletions satises the three
properties of Proposition 6.3.2.
We formulate another variant whih exploits the idea of Groote Shaarsberg
(Groote Shaarsberg et al. (2013)) that not all Kohlberg olletions are relevant.
For olletions D ⊆ 2N , denote by F(D) the set of the free oalitions. In other
words, oalitions whih are not in the span of D. Formally, the set of free oalitions
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is given by
F(D) = 2N\H(D).
Proposition 6.3.3 Let v ∈ TUN be suh that Core(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ I(v).
Then, x = n(v) if and only if there exists a sequene D1,D2, ...,Dτ of non-empty
subolletions of 2N\{∅, N} suh that for D̄r−1 =
⋃r−1
ℓ=1 Dℓ, Dr ⊆ F(D̄r−1) for all
r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, that satises the following properties:
(A) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} the olletion D̄r =
⋃r
k=1Dk is balaned and F(D̄τ ) = ∅.
(B) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all T ∈ Dr it holds that
exc(v, T, x) = max
S∈F(D̄r−1)
exc(v, S, x).
Proof: only if part. We show how to dene a sequene D1, ....,Dτ of relevant
olletions from the Kohlberg olletions. In this proof, we abbreviate Bk(v, n(v))
by Bk.
Let B1, ...,Bt(v,n(v)) be the sequene of Kohlberg olletions of the nuleolus.
Then, determine the sequene of relevant olletions with the following algo-
rithm:
1: r = 1 and D1 = B1
2: while F(D̄r) 6= ∅ do
3: r = r + 1
4: kr = min
{
ℓ ∈ {1, ..., t(v, n(v))} | Bℓ ∩ F(D̄r−1) 6= ∅
}
5: Dr = Bkr ∩ F(D̄r−1)
6: end while
7: τ = r
By onstrution we have that Dr ⊆ F(D̄r−1) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and that
F(D̄τ) = ∅. Left to show is that the sequene satises (B) and the remaining part
of (A).
For eah r ≤ τ , we have Dr = Bkr ∩ F(D̄r−1), whih implies that the oalitions
in olletion Dr have maximum exess with respet to the nuleolus over the set
F(D̄r−1). This gives (B).
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Left to prove is the balanedness of the olletions D̄r for all r ∈ {1, ...τ}, whih is
shown by indution.
Basis: D̄1 is balaned, being equal to B1. Let r ∈ {2, . . . , τ} and assume that D̄r−1
is balaned. Dene B̄kr =
⋃kr
ℓ=1 Bℓ and denote G = B̄kr ∩H(D̄r−1). Then, B̄kr is the
disjoint union of G and Dr, i.e., G ∩ Dr = ∅ and B̄kr = G ∪ Dr. Beause B̄kr and
D̄r−1 are balaned, there exist for both olletions a balaned map, i.e., there exists









Furthermore, sine G ⊆ H(D̄r−1), we have that for every S ∈ G, there exists a vetor










T for all T ∈ D̄r−1 ∪ {N}. By substituting the equation
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Note that α(T ) > 0 for all T ∈ D̄r−1 and that βT ∈ R for all T ∈ D̄r−1 ∪ {N}.
For ε suiently lose to 0, this provides a balaning equation for D̄r. Hene, D̄r is
balaned, whih proves (A).
if part. Consider a sequene D1, ...,Dτ of non-empty oalitions suh that
Dr ⊆ F(D̄r−1) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and that satises (A) and (B) of Proposition
6.3.3. We show that this sequene satises onditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposi-
tion 6.3.2.
Condition (A) implies (i). Furthermore, (B) implies (ii) sine F(D̄r)( F(D̄r−1).
Property (iii) is inferred as follows. Let T ∈ 2N\{{∅, N} ∪ D̄τ}. By (A) we have
that F(D̄τ ) = ∅, hene there exists a unique r ∈ {1, ..., τ} with T ∈F(D̄r−1)\F(D̄r).
Furthermore, T ∈F(D̄r−1)\F(D̄r) implies exc(v, T, x) ≤ γr and exc(v, S, x) ≥ γr for
all S ∈ D̄r. Therefore, we have
T ∈ F(D̄r−1)\F(D̄r) = H(D̄r)\H(D̄r−1)
⊆ H(D̄r)
⊆ H({S ∈ D̄τ : exc(v, S, x) ≥ γr})
⊆ H({S ∈ D̄τ : exc(v, S, x) ≥ exc(v, T, x)}).
This proves (iii) of Proposition 6.3.2. Hene, Proposition 6.3.3 implies Proposition
6.3.2. 
Example 6.3.2 (Example 6.3.1 ontinued.) Consider the four person game v ∈
TUN with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} analyzed in Example 6.3.1 with n(v) = (5, 13, 41, 41).
Regarding the haraterization in Proposition 6.3.3 one an hoose τ = 3, D1 =
{{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}}, and D3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}. Note that
the four olletions used in Example 6.3.1 to illustrate Proposition 6.3.2 do not
satisfy the onditions of Proposition 6.3.3. ⊳
Wallmeier (1983) showed that the haraterization of Kohlberg (1971) an be
reformulated to provide a haraterization of the per apita nuleolus. Similarly,
the haraterizations above an be reformulated. In Chapter 6, the following per
apita variant of Proposition 6.3.3 is used.
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Proposition 6.3.4 Let v ∈ TUN be suh that Core(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ I(v).
Then, x = pcn(v) if and only if there exists a sequene D1,D2, ...,Dτ of non-empty
subolletions of 2N\{∅, N} suh that Dr ⊆ F(D̄r−1) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} that satisfy
the following properties:
(A) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} the olletion D̄r =
⋃r
k=1Dk is balaned and F(D̄τ) = ∅.
(B) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all T ∈ Dr it holds that
excP (v, T, x) = max
S∈F(D̄r−1)
excP (v, S, x).
6.4 Bankrupty problems, bankrupty rules and
bankrupty games
In a bankrupty problem an insuient monetary estate has to be divided among
a number of laimants, eah having a justied laim on this estate. Bankrupty
rules propose general priniples and proedures to solve any bankrupty problem.
From the wide variety of bankrupty rules we mention the onstrained equal award
rule, the onstrained equal loss rule and the Aumann-Mashler rule (f. Aumann
and Mashler (1985)). An overview of bankrupty rules and their properties an be
found in Thomson (2003).
O'Neill (1982) assoiates a ooperative bankrupty game with transferable utility
to eah bankrupty problem. As a result, game theoreti solution onepts suh as
the nuleolus (Shmeidler (1969)) an be viewed as bankrupty rules, too when they
are applied to the bankrupty game assoiated with the bankrupty problem. Inter-
estingly, it turns out that the Aumann-Mashler rule oinides with the nuleolus
of the orresponding bankrupty game (Aumann and Mashler (1985)).
A bankrupty problem, for short, a problem, is denoted by (N,E, c), where
N = {1, ..., n} is the set of laimants, whih will be alled players, E ∈ R+ is
the monetary estate that has to be divided over the players, and c ∈ RN+ is the
vetor of laims. By the nature of a problem, the sum of laims exeeds the estate,
i.e., E ≤
∑
i∈N ci. The lass of problems on N is denoted by BR
N
and a problem
with player set N is abbreviated by (E, c).
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A bankrupty rule, whih is abbreviated by a rule, f : BRN → RN is a fun-
tion that assigns to eah problem (E, c) ∈ BRN a vetor f(E, c) ∈ RN suh that
∑
i∈N fi(E, c) = E and 0 ≤ f(E, c) ≤ c.
Denition 6.4.1 The onstrained equal award rule (CEA) is dened by
CEAi(E, c) = min{α, ci}
for all problems (E, c) ∈ BRN and all i ∈ N , where α is suh that
∑
i∈N
min{α, ci} = E.
The onstrained equal award rule divides the estate as equally as possible among
the players, given that no one an reeive more than his laim.
Denition 6.4.2 The onstrained equal loss rule (CEL) is dened by
CELi(E, c) = max{0, ci − β}
for all problems (E, c) ∈ BRN and all i ∈ N , where β is suh that
∑
i∈N
max{0, ci − β} = E.
The onstrained equal loss rule divides the loss, whih is the laim minus the amount
reeived, as equally as possible among the players, given that no one an reeive a
negative amount. The onstrained equal award rule and onstrained equal loss rule
are losely related, whih is shown in the following well-known proposition that is
readily derived.
Proposition 6.4.3 The onstrained equal award rule is the dual of the onstrained
equal loss rule and vie versa, i.e.,




for all problems (E, c) ∈ BRN .
A rule that ombines the onstrained equal award and onstrained equal loss rule is
the Aumann-Mashler rule.
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Denition 6.4.4 (f. Aumann and Mashler (1985))

































for all problems (E, c) ∈ BRN .
We refer to Aumann and Mashler (1985) for a motivation based on the onede
and divide priniple and onsisteny.
O'Neill (1982) assoiates with every problem (E, c) ∈ BRN a orresponding
bankrupty game vE,c ∈ TUN . In eah bankrupty game, the worth of oalition
S ∈ 2N is the part of the estate that is left after all the players outside the oalition,
i.e., the players inN\S, reeive their laim. However, the worth of oalition S equals
0 when the estate is not enough to over the amount laimed by N\S. Formally,
vE,c(S) = max{0, E −
∑
i∈N\S
ci} for all S ∈ 2N .
It is well known that every bankrupty game has a non empty ore, so one an
use the propositions in Setion 6.3 to haraterize the (per apita) nuleolus. The
nuleolus for bankrupty games orresponds to the Aumann-Mashler rule.
Proposition 6.4.5 (f. Aumann and Mashler (1985))
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let vE,c be the orresponding bankrupty game. Then,
AM(E, c) = n(vE,c).
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Example 6.4.1 Consider the bankrupty problem with player set N = {1, 2, 3},





ci < E, we have
AM(E, c) = (50, 100, 150) + CEL(100, (50, 100, 150)) = (50, 125, 225). The orre-
sponding bankrupty game vE,c and the exesses of AM are provided below.
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vE,c(S) 0 0 100 100 200 300 400
exc(vE,c, S, AM(E, c)) −50 −125 −125 −75 −75 −50 0
Sine τ = 2, D1 = {{1}, {2, 3}} and D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} satisfy the onditions
of Proposition 6.3.3 we have that n(vE,c) = AM(E, c) = (50, 125, 225). ⊳
Chapter 7 will disuss the per apita nuleolus for bankrupty games.
Chapter 7
The per apita nuleolus and the
lights rule
7.1 Introdution
This hapter, whih is based on Huijink, Borm, Kleppe, and Reijnierse (2015),
introdues the lights bankrupty rule and a family of laim-and-right rules for
bankrupty problems that ontains the lights rule as a spei member. The es-
sential feature of the lights rule is that, for eah bankrupty problem, it takes into
aount a vetor of lights, whih only depends on the laim vetor and not on the
estate. The new term light, a blend of laim and right, is explained below. The
lights rule alloates to eah laimant at most his light when the estate is less than
the sum of the lights. In this ase the lights an be viewed as a modied laim ve-
tor. However, eah laimant will reeive at least his light when the estate exeeds
the sum of the lights. Hene, in the latter ase the lights an be viewed as rights of
the laimants. When the lights represent modied laims, the lights rule divides
the estate over the laimants using the onstrained equal award rule with the lights
as new laims. Whenever the lights represent rights, the lights rule rst assigns
to every laimant its right. Then, the remaining estate is divided using the on-
strained equal loss rule with the original laims minus the lights as the new laim
vetor. In Setion 7.2, it is shown that the lights rule oinides with the per apita
nuleolus of the orresponding bankrupty game. Furthermore, several properties of
the lights rule are presented. The unied lass of laim-and-right bankrupty rules
is introdued in Setion 7.3. Finally, it is shown that the laim-and-right family
oinides with the inreasing-onstant-inreasing family of Thomson (2008).
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7.2 Bankrupty and the per apita nuleolus
This setion introdues a new (bankrupty) rule σ that is based on so alled lights.
These lights an be interpreted as either the laims of the players when the estate
is relatively small or as the rights of the players when the estate is relatively large.
Moreover, it is proven that this new rule oinides with the per apita nuleolus
of the orresponding bankrupty game. Throughout the remainder of this hapter
we assume, for notational ease and without loss of generality, that laim vetors
are weakly inreasing. In other words, we assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn for a
(bankrupty) problem (N,E, c) with N = {1, ..., n}.












δ(c) + CEL(E −
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for all problems (E, c) ∈ BRN , where the light vetor δ(c) ∈ RN is reursively











Example 7.2.1 Consider a problem with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and vetor of
laims c = (4, 9, 10, 19). Then
δ1(c) =
1
n + 1− 1
(









n+ j − 1
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Case 1 : small estate (
∑
i∈N δi(c) ≥ E):
Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and c = (4, 9, 10, 19) as above and take E = 10.5. Con-






i∈N δi(c) = 15
3
35
> 10.5 = E. In this
ase, the light vetor δ(c) is interpreted as the appropriate vetor of laims and





Case 2 : large estate (
∑
i∈N δi(c) < E):
Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and c = (4, 9, 10, 19) as above but now take E = 20.5.






i∈N δi(c) = 15
3
35
< 20.5=E. In this ase,
the light vetor δ(c) is interpreted as the vetor of rights and
σ(E, c) = δ(c)+CEL(E−
∑
i∈N δi(c), c−δ(c)) = (1, 3, 334 , 1234).
A hydrauli interpretation: Suppose that the estate symbolizes an amount of
water and that the laims symbolize the amount of water laimed. Then, eah laim
an be represented by a buket whih has the volume of that laim. In the lights
rule σ, eah buket is split into two smaller bukets, namely the lights bukets of
volume δ(c) and the remainder buket of volume c−δ(c). This is visualized in Figure
7.1, where the water will be poured into the bukets at the arrow and any overspill
will ood from the bukets of volume δ(c) into the bukets of volume c− δ(c).














Figure 7.1: The bukets of the σ rule.
In Figure 7.2, the small estate ase with E = 10.5 is visualized. The water is
poured into the bukets at the arrow and the result is visualized by the dashed area.
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α = 3.25














Figure 7.2: σ(N, 10.5, c) visualized.
In Figure 7.3, the ase with the large estate E = 20.5 is visualized. Again the
water is poured into the bukets at the arrow, but now there is overow of size
E −
∑
i∈N δ(c) = 20.5 − 15 335 = 52970 . Again, the result is visualized by the dashed
area. ⊳
β = 6.75














Figure 7.3: σ(N, 20.5, c) visualized.
The following lemma implies that eah light is non-negative and is less than the
laim of the orresponding player.
Lemma 7.2.2 Let c ∈ RN+ be a vetor of laims. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
1
n
ci ≤ δi(c) ≤
i
n+ i− 1ci.
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sine the right hand side orresponds to the ase j = 1. Consequently, δj(c) ≥ 0 for

















n + i− 1ci,






i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. 
That the lights rule indeed is a bankrupty rule, 0 ≤ σ(E, c) ≤ c for all
bankrupty problems (E, c), follows from Lemma 7.2.2 together with the fat that
both the CEA and CEL rules satisfy the bankrupty rule onditions. Lemma 7.2.3
shows that the lights form a non-dereasing sequene, in other words, the lights
are monotoni.
Lemma 7.2.3 Let c ∈ RN+ be a vetor of laims. Then, for all i ∈ {2, ..., n},
δi(c) ≥ δi−1(c).
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
The player j ∈ {1, ..., i} with highest index for whom the maximum in (7.2) is
attained for δi(c) is of importane later on. This player is alled the light-argument
of player i and is formally dened below.
Denition 7.2.4 Let c ∈ RN+ be a vetor of laims. Then, the light-argument
ai(c) ∈ N of player i ∈ N is dened by
ai(c) := max
{
j ∈ {1, ..., i} | δi(c) =
1







Similarly as for the lights, we have monotoniity for the light-arguments.
Lemma 7.2.5 Let c ∈ RN+ be a vetor of laims. Then, for all i ∈ {2, ..., n},
ai(c) ≥ ai−1(c).
Proof: Let i ∈ {2, ..., n} and let k ∈ {1, ..., ai−1(c)}. We show that ai(c) ≥ k,
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Hene, ai(c) ≥ ai−1(c). 
In the following proposition, it is shown that the light-arguments of all players
exept for player 1 annot be player 1 and it provides an expliit expression for the
light vetor of two- and three-player problems.
















c2 − 16c1,max{12c3 − 16c1, 35c3 − 15c2 − 115c1}) if N = {1, 2, 3}.
Proof: Sine ai(c) ≥ ai−1(c) (Lemma 7.2.5), we only have to prove that a2(c) ≥ 2.




























we obtain a2(c) ≥ 2. 
The lights do not only satisfy monotoniity, but also monotoniity of losses. In
other words, the laims minus the lights form a non-dereasing sequene.
Lemma 7.2.7 Let c ∈ RN+ be a vetor of laims. Then, for all i ∈ {2, ..., n},
δi(c)− δi−1(c) ≤
i
n + i− 1(ci − ci−1).
Hene, ci−1 − δi−1(c) ≤ ci − δi(c) for all i ∈ {2, ..., n}.
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Proof: Let i ∈ {2, ..., n}. The proof is split into two ases, depending on the
light-argument.
Case 1: Assume ai(c) ≤ i− 1. Then
δi(c)− δi−1(c) =
1
n + ai(c)− 1





















n + ai(c)− 1
(ci − ci−1)
≤ i
n+ i− 1(ci − ci−1).
Case 2: Assume that ai(c) = i. Then,
δi(c)− δi−1(c) =
1




























































n + i− 1ci−1
−
( 1








n+ i− 1(ci − ci−1)
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where the rst inequality follows from the fat that δi−1(c) ≥ 1nci−1 (Lemma 7.2.2).

The next example ats as a stepping stone for the proof that the lights rule
oinides with the per apita nuleolus of a bankrupty game.
Example 7.2.2 (Example 7.2.1 ontinued.)
Case 1 : small estate, i.e.,
∑
i∈N δi(c) ≥ E:
Consider the problem (E, c) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E = 10.5 and c = (4, 9, 10, 19).








), a1(c) = 1,
a2(c) = a3(c) = 2 and a4(c) = 4. The orresponding bankrupty game and the per
apita exesses of σ(E, c) are as follows:
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3}
vE,c(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
excP (vE,c, S, σ(E, c)) −1 −3 −3 14 −3 14 −2 −2 18 −2 18 −3 18
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
vE,c(S) 0 0 0 0.5 1.5 6.5 10.5









Set D1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}} and D3 = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}}.
Then, D1 ⊆ 2N\{∅, N} = F({∅}) and learly D̄1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}} is bal-
aned. Furthermore, the oalitions in D1 have the highest per apita exess
of all (free) oalitions. Similarly, D2 ⊆ 2N\{∅, {1}, {2, 3, 4}, N} = F(D̄1) and
D̄2 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}} is balaned sine ρ = (13 , 23 , 13 , 13), whih assigns
to the orresponding oalitions in D̄2 a weight, is a balaned map for D̄2. The oali-
tions in D2 have the highest per apita exess of all urrently free oalitions, where
the urrently free oalitions are F(D̄1). Furthermore,
D3 ⊆ {{3}, {4}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}= F(D̄2) and













) is a orresponding balaned map. The oalitions in D3 have the
highest per apita exess of all urrently free oalitions (F(D̄2)). Finally, note that
F(D̄3) = ∅. Using Proposition 6.3.4, we onlude that σ(E, c) = pcn(vE,c).
Case 2 : large estate, i.e.,
∑
i∈N δi(c) < E:
Consider the problem (E, c) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E = 20.5 and c = (4, 9, 10, 19).
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), a1(c) = 1,
a2(c) = a3(c) = 2 and a4(c) = 4. The orresponding bankrupty game and the per
apita exesses of σ(E, c) are as follows:
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3}
vE,c 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0
excP (vE,c, S, σ(E, c)) −1 −3 −3 34 −12 34 −2 −2 38 −6 18 −3 38
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
vE,c 6.5 7.5 1.5 10.5 11.5 16.5 20.5
excP (vE,c, S, σ(E, c)) −4 58 −4 12 −2 112 −2 112 −2 −1 0
Now, take D1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}} and
D3 = {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}}. Regarding D1 and D2 we refer to ase 1. Moreover,
D3 ⊆ {{3}, {4}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}= F(D̄2) and













) is a orresponding balaned map. The oalitions in D3
have the highest per apita exess of all the urrently free oalitions. Finally,
note that F(D̄3) = ∅. Again, using Proposition 6.3.4 we an onlude that
σ(E, c) = pcn(vE,c).
General remarks on the ases:
The relevant olletions of these examples an be expressed by the light-argument
vetor. For both ases (E = 10.5 and E = 20.5) we have that
D1 = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}} = {{1, ...., a1(c)− 1} ∪ {1}, N\{1}},
D2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}} = {{1, ...., a2(c)− 1} ∪ {2}, N\{2}}.
Furthermore, when E = 10.5, we have that
D3 = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}} = {{1, ...., a3(c)− 1} ∪ {3}, {1, ...., a4(c)− 1} ∪ {4}},
and when E = 20.5, we have that
D3 = {{1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}} = {N\{3}, N\{4}}.
This struture of the relevant olletions will form the basis of the proof of our main
result. ⊳
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Theorem 7.2.8 Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let vE,c be the orresponding bankrupty
game. Then,
σ(E, c) = pcn(vE,c).
Proof: In this proof, σ(E, c) is abbreviated to σ and vE,c is abbreviated to v.
Furthermore, sine σ and the per apita nuleolus both depend ontinuously on the
estate E, we assume that
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) 6= E.
In order to apply Proposition 6.3.4, we will do the following:
Part I: Dene τ , and for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, dene appropriate relevant olletions
Dr and show that Dr ⊂ F(D̄r−1).
Part II: Show that the sequene D1, ...,Dτ satises ondition (A) of Proposition
6.3.4, i.e., D̄r =
⋃r
ℓ=1Dℓ is balaned for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and F(D̄τ) = ∅.
Part III: Show that the sequene D1, ...,Dτ satises ondition (B) of Proposition
6.3.4, i.e., for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all S ∈ Dr, it holds that
excP (v, S, σ) = max
T∈F(D̄r−1)
excP (v, T, σ).
The remainder of the proof an be found in Appendix E 
In the proof of Theorem 7.2.8, it is seen that the relevant oalitions of the per
apita nuleolus have a speial struture for bankrupty games. This is formalized
in the following orollary.
Corollary 7.2.9 Let (E, c) ∈ BRN be a problem and let x = pcn(vE,c). Then,
there exists a player t ∈ {1, ..., n} and a sequene D1, . . . ,Dτ ⊂ 2N\{∅, N}, where
τ = min{t, n− 1}, that satisfy (A) and (B) of Proposition 6.3.4, where
Dr = {{1, ..., ar(c)− 1} ∪ {r}, N\{r}},













{{1, ..., a(τ)− 1} ∪ {τ}, N\{τ}} if τ < t,








for some m ∈ {1, ..., τ}.
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Several properties that the lights rule does or does not satisfy are provided
below. Proposition 7.2.19 provides a ompat overview of these results.
Denition 7.2.10 A rule satises order preservation if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and
all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, it holds that fi(E, c) ≤ fi+1(E, c) and
ci − fi(E, c) ≤ ci+1 − fi+1(E, c).
A rule satises anonymity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN , any permutation π, and all
i ∈ N , it holds that fi(E, c) = fπ(i)(E, (cπ(j))j∈N).
A rule satises equal treatment of equals if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all i, j ∈ N
with ci = cj, it holds that fi(E, c) = fj(E, c).
Denition 7.2.11 A rule satises laims trunation invariane if for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN , it holds that f(E, c) = f(E, (min{cj , E})j∈N).
A rule satises resoure monotoniity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all
x ∈ (0,
∑
i∈N ci −E], it holds that f(E, c) ≤ f(E + x, c).
A rule satises minimal rights rst if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN , it holds that
f(E, c) = m+ f(E −
∑
i∈N mi, c−m) where m = (max{E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj, 0})i∈N .
A rule satises respet of minimal rights if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all i ∈ N ,
it holds that fi(E, c) ≥ max{E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj , 0}.
Denition 7.2.12 A rule satises the onede-and-divide priniple if for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2 and all i ∈ N , it holds that
fi(E, c) = max{E − cN\{i}, 0}+ 12(E −
∑
ℓ∈N max{E − cN\{ℓ}, 0}).
A rule satises laims monotoniity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all i ∈ N , it
holds that fi(E, c̄) ≥ fi(E, c), whenever c̄i > ci and c̄j = cj for all j ∈ N\{i}.
A rule satises linked resoure-laims monotoniity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN , all
i ∈ N , and all x ∈ R+, it holds that fi(E+x, c̄) ≤ fi(E, c)+x, whenever c̄i = ci+x
and c̄j = cj for all j ∈ N\{i}.
Denition 7.2.13 A rule satises regressivity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all
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A rule satises progressivity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and for all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}






Denition 7.2.14 A rule satises omposition down if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and
all x ∈ (0, E], it holds that f(E − x, c) = f(E − x, f(c, E)).
A rule satises omposition up if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and all x ∈ (0, E], it holds
that f(E, c) = f(E − x, c) + f(x, c− f(c, E − x)).
Denition 7.2.15 A rule satises no advantageous transfer if for all





c̄i = ci for all i ∈ N\N̄ , it holds that
∑
i∈N̄ fi(E, c̄) =
∑
i∈N̄ fi(E, c).
Denition 7.2.16 A rule satises self-duality if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN , it holds that
f(E, c) = c− f(
∑
i∈N ci −E, c).
For the denitions of onsisteny, null-laims onsisteny and onverse onsis-
teny, we refer to Thomson (2003).
Denition 7.2.17 A rule satises others oriented laims monotoniity if for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN , all i ∈ N , and all j ∈ N\{i}, it holds that fi(E, c̄) ≥ fi(E, c) and
fj(E, c̄) ≤ fj(E, c), whenever c̄i > ci and c̄j = cj for all j ∈ N\{i}.
Denition 7.2.18 A rule satises population monotoniity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN ,
and all N̄ ⊂ N with ∑ℓ∈N̄ cℓ ≥ E it holds that fi(N,E, c) ≤ fi(N̄, E, cN̄) for all
i ∈ N̄ , where cN̄ is the vetor of original laims ci of the players i ∈ N̄ .
A rule satises linked resoure-population monotoniity if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN
and all N̄ ⊂ N with ∑ℓ∈N̄ cℓ ≥ E, it holds that
fi(N̄ , E −
∑
j∈N\N̄ cj , cN̄) ≤ fi(N,E, c) for all i ∈ N̄ , where cN̄ is the vetor of
original laims ci of the players i ∈ N̄ .
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Proposition 7.2.19 The lights rule satises: order preservation, anonymity,
equal treatment of equals, laims trunation invariane, resoure monotoniity, min-
imal rights rst, respet of minimal rights, onede-and-divide priniple, laims
monotoniity and linked resoure-laims monotoniity.
It does not satisfy: regressivity, progressivity, omposition down, omposition up,
no advantageous transfer, self-duality, onsisteny, null laims onsisteny, on-
verse onsisteny, others oriented laims monotoniity, population monotoniity,
and linked resoure-population monotoniity.
Proof: Below we present the main arguments behind the proofs for the properties
that the lights rule satises or a ounterexample for the properties that it does not
satisfy.
• The lights satisfy a property similar to order preservation, i.e., δi−1(c) ≤ δi(c)
and ci−1 − δi−1(c) ≤ ci − δi(c) for all i ∈ {2, ..., n} (Lemma 7.2.3 and Lemma
7.2.7), and are bounded, in other words, 0 ≤ δi(c) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N (Lemma
7.2.2). Sine CEA and CEL both satisfy order preservation and sine the
lights rule is a proper ombination, it satises order preservation.
• Anonymity and equal treatment of equals follow from the fat that the lights
rule orresponds to the per apita nuleolus (Theorem 7.2.8).
• Claims trunation invariane follows from the fat that the lights rule is a
game theoreti rule (as implied by Theorem 7.2.8).
• Resoure monotoniity is obvious sine δ(c) is independent of E and sine the
rule is a ombination of CEA and CEL.
• Minimal rights rst follows from the fat that the minimal right of player i
is equal to the worth of that player, in other words, mi(E, c) = vE,c({i}),
Theorem 7.2.8 and the fat that the per apita nuleolus satises ovariane,
in other words, pcn(vE,c) = m(E, c) + pcn(vE,c−m).
• Respet of minimal rights is implied by eieny, non-negativity, and minimal
rights rst.
• Conede-and-divide priniple follows from Theorem 7.2.8 and the fat that
pcn(v) = n(v) for all TU-games (N, v) with |N | = 2, and hene
AM(E, c) = σ(E, c) if |N | = 2.
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• Claims monotoniity and its dual, linked resoure-laims monotoniity, are
proven to be valid simultaneously. From here, abbreviate σ(E, c) to σ(c). Let
(E, c) ∈ BRN , let k ∈ N and dene c̄ ∈ RN by c̄k = ck + ε, where ε > 0 and
c̄j = cj for all j ∈ N\{k}. We will prove that σk(c̄) ∈ [σk(c), σk(c) + ε].
Due to the ontinuity of σ with respet to c, we an assume without loss of
generality, that ε is suh that c̄1 ≤ c̄2 ≤ · · · ≤ c̄n. This is true due to the fat
that, in the ase of equal laims, we an renumber the players suh that player
k beomes the last player in his laim ategory. Due to ontinuity again, we
only have to prove the assertions for a dense set of laim vetors. Therefore,
we an assume that
∑
i∈N δi(c) 6= E. Indeed, if
∑
i∈N δi(c) = E, we an




ℓ) > E for all ℓ ∈ N by dening cℓn = cn + 1ℓ and cℓj = cj for all
j < n.
Dene t(E, c) := min{i ∈ N | σi(c) 6= δi(c)} (sine
∑
i∈N δi(c) 6= E suh agents
exist). One more, by ontinuity, we an hoose ε suiently small to establish
that t(E, c) = t(E, c̄), so we abbreviate t(E, c) and t(E, c̄) to t. We hoose ε




i∈N δi(c̄)− Ē are
both positive or both negative.
We will rst show that
δk(c) < δ̄k(c̄) < δk(c) + ε. (7.4)












. For i < k, δi(c) does not depend
























n+ j − 1jε
< δk(c) + ε,
whih yields (7.4).
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δi(c) if i < t,








in whih α(c) and β(c) are determined by
∑





ℓ∈N max{0, cℓ − δℓ(c)− β(c)}, respetively.
If k < t, then, σk(c̄) = δk(c̄) and σk(c) = δk(c), so σk(c̄) ∈ [σk(c), σk(c) + ε]
follows from (7.4).
If k ≥ t and ∑i∈N δi(c) > E, then, δi(c̄) = δi(c) for all i < t, so
σk(c̄) = α(c̄) = α(c) +
ε
n− t+ 1 = σk(c) +
ε
n− t + 1 .
Therefore, we assume from here on that k ≥ t and
∑
i∈N δi(c) < E. We rst



































(β(c)+ c̄i−ci)−ε and hene β(c̄) = β(c). Therefore,
σk(c̄) = c̄k − β(c̄) = ck + ε− β(c) = σk(c) + ε.
• In order to show that the lights rule does not satisfy regressivity and progres-
sivity, we refer to the various problems in Example 7.2.1.
• In order to show that the lights rule does not satisfy omposition down,
onsider the problems with n = 2, c = (2, 4), E = 2.5 and E ′ = 1.25.
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• In order to show that the lights rule does not satisfy omposition up, onsider
the problems with n = 2, c = (2, 4), E = 1.25 and E ′ = 2.5.
• In order to show that the lights rule does not satisfy no advantageous transfer,
onsider the problems with n = 3, E = 300, c = (100, 200, 300) and
c′ = (0, 300, 300).
• In order to show that the lights rule does not satisfy self-duality, onsider the
problem with n = 3, E = 200, and c = (100, 200, 300).
• The lights rule does not satisfy onsisteny and onverse onsisteny due to
the fat that it is not the AM rule.
• Others oriented laims monotoniity (these problems are also used for other
properties below): Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, N̄ = {2, 3, 4}, E = 8, c = (1, 5, 6, 8)
and c̄ = (1 1
10

















). So, f4(N,E, c̄) > f4(N,E, c), ontraditing
others oriented laims monotoniity.
• Furthermore, σ(N̄, E, cN̄) = (123 , 216 , 416), so f2(N,E, c) > f2(N̄ , E, cN̄), on-
traditing population monotoniity.
• Moreover, σ({1, 3, 4}, E − c2, c{1,3,4}) = (13 , 113 , 113), whih ontradits linked
resoure-monotoniity sine f1({1, 3, 4}, E − c2, c{1,3,4}) > f1(N,E, c).
• Finally, σ(N,E, (0, 5, 6, 8)) = (0, 2, 3, 3), whih ontradits null laims onsis-
teny sine f2(N,E, (0, 5, 6, 8)) > f2(N̄, E, cN̄).

7.3 The laim-and-right family of bankrupty rules
Both the Aumann-Mashler rule and the lights rule have two dierent regimes
depending on the size of the estate. For the Aumann-Mashler rule, the estate is
onsidered to be small if the estate is less than half of the total amount laimed and
large otherwise. Hene, half of the sum of the laims an be seen as a swith-point
for the Aumann-Mashler rule. Moreover, eah player reeives at most half of his
laim in the rst regime. Therefore, half of his laim an be seen as his modied
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laim. On the other hand, in the seond regime, half of the laim is onsidered to
be his right, sine eah player will reeive at least half of his laim.
The lights rule has a similar setup. Namely, the estate is onsidered to be small if
the estate is less than the total amount of the lights and the estate is large otherwise.
Hene, the swith-point for the lights rule is the sum of the lights. Figure 7.4,
on page 106, illustrates the lights rule. Similar to the Aumann-Mashler rule,
the lights at as new laims in the rst regime and rights in the seond regime.
Note that in both the Aumann-Mashler rule and the lights rule the onstraint
equal award rule is used in the rst regime and the onstraint equal loss rule in the
seond.
To show that both the Aumann-Mashler rule and the lights rule are based on
the same oneptual idea, we use the onept of laim-and-right funtions, whih
are formalized below. Let C ⊆ RN+ be the set of weakly inreasing (laim) vetors.
Denition 7.3.1 A funtion λ : C → C is alled a laim-and-right funtion if
c− λ(c) ∈ C for all c ∈ C. The lass of laim-and-right funtions is denoted by Λ.
Note that the funtions λ(c) = 0, λ(c) = c, λ(c) = 1
2
c and λ(c) = δ(c), for all
c ∈ C, are all laim-and-right funtions.
With eah laim-and-right funtion, one an dene a rule that is based on two
regimes. The rst regime ours when the estate is insuient to over λ(c). In
this ase, λ(c) is viewed as the laim vetor rather than c itself. The seond regime
ours when the estate is suient to over λ(c) and in this ase λ(c) is onsidered
as a right vetor and c− λ(c) is onsidered as the vetor of laims in the remaining
problem. Subsequently, within the rst regime, the onstrained equal award rule
is used and within the seond regime, the onstrained equal loss rule is used. The
resulting family of rules is alled the laim-and-right family and is formally dened
as follows.
Denition 7.3.2 Let λ ∈ Λ be a laim-and-right funtion. The laim-and-right
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for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
Using the four examples of laim-and-right funtions disussed above, we have the
following result.
Theorem 7.3.3 CEA, CEL, AM and σ are laim-and-right rules.
As a nal result, we have that the laim-and-right family CR of rules oinides
with the Inreasing-Constant-Inreasing family ICI of rules introdued by Thomson
(2008). Note that the TAL-family (f. Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006)) is a part
of the ICI-family, and as a result of Theorem 7.3.5, also a part of the CR-family.
The ICI-family is dened as follows.
Denition 7.3.4 (f. Thomson (2008))
Dene a list H := {(Fk, Gk)}n−1k=1 by a pair of funtions from C to R suh that for
eah c ∈ C the following holds:








cℓ − (n− k)ck for all k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} (7.6)
Denote by HN the family of lists and dene for notational onveniene F0(c) = 0,
Gn(c) = Fn(c) = Fn−1(c) and G0(c) =
∑n
ℓ=1 cℓ. An ICI rule assoiated with
H = {(Fk, Gk)}n−1k=1 ∈ HN , whih we all ICIH , is formulated for every
(E, c) ∈ BRN as follows. When the estate inreases from Fi−1(c) to Fi(c), eah
inrement is divided equally over players {i, ..., n}. Furthermore, when the estate
inreases from Gi to Gi−1, eah inrement is divided equally over players {i, ..., n}.
This gives the following formula:







































n+ 1− ℓ +
E − Fr−1(c)

















n+1−r if E > Fn−1(c) and i ≥ r,
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in whih
r := r(E, c) =
{
min{ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} | E ≤ Fℓ(c)} if E ≤ Fn−1(c),
min{ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n} | E ≥ Gℓ(c)} if E > Fn−1(c).
The following gure shows the main idea behind the proof of Theorem 7.3.5.










































Figure 7.4: Path of σ({1, 2, 3}, E, (100, 200, 300)).
The ICI-family has as point of view the estate, i.e., in Figure 7.4, the ut-o
points are when a ertain estate has been reahed, whereas the CR-family has the
alloation of players as ut-o points.
Theorem 7.3.5 Let f be a rule. Then, f ∈ ICI if and only if f ∈ CR.
Verve Proof: only if part. Let H = {(F,G)}n−1k=1 ∈ HN be a list. Dene, for eah





for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. We rst prove
that λH ∈ Λ.






n + 1− ℓ






n + 1− ℓ
= λHi−1(c),
in whih the inequality uses that the sequene F (c) weakly inreases, i.e., (7.5).
Furthermore,










= ci−1 + ci − ci−1 −
Fi(c)− Fi−1(c)


















n + 1− ℓ
)
= ci−1 − λHi−1(c).
To larify, at the inequality it is used that










cℓ + (n+ 1− i)ci−1
)
= Gi(c)−Gi−1(c) + (n+ 1− i)(ci − ci−1)
≤ (n+ 1− i)(ci − ci−1),
in whih the rst equality uses (7.6) and the inequality uses that the sequene G(c) is
weakly dereasing, i.e., (7.5). Note that the hoie of λHn (c) implies both inequalities
for i = n. Furthermore, λH1 (c) =
F1(c)
n
≥ 0 and sine












we have that λH1 (c) =
F1(c)
n
≤ c1. Hene, λH ∈ Λ.
Next, we prove that ICIH(E, c) = CRλ
H
(E, c). First, note that ICIH divides the
estate similar as in the CEA rule when E ≤ Fn−1(c), in other words,







for all i ∈ N .
Furthermore, the part of the estate whih is larger than Fn−1(c) is divided similar as




CEA(N,E, cH) if E ≤ Fn−1(c),
cH + CEL(N,E − Fn−1(c), c− cH) if E > Fn−1(c),












λHi (c) ≥ E,
λH(c) + CEL(N,E −
∑
i∈N
λHi (c), c− λH(c)) if
∑
i∈N












if part. Let λ ∈ Λ. Dene, for eah c ∈ C, Hλ = {(F λk , Gλk)}n−1k=1 by




λℓ(c) + (n + 1− i)λi(c)






cℓ − (n− i)ci,
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. We will rst prove that Hλ = {(F λk , Gλk)}n−1k=1 ∈ HN .
Clearly, by the denition, Hλ = {(F λk , Gλk)}n−1k=1 satises ondition (7.6) of a list.
What is left to show is ondition (7.5). Let k ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}. Then,














λℓ(c) + (n + 2− k)λk−1(c)
= F λk−1(c).
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This time, the inequality uses that c1 − λ1(c) ≤ ... ≤ cn − λn(c) (Denition 7.3.1).
Furthermore, F λ1 (c) = nλ1(c) ≥ 0 and














Hene, the list Hλ = {(F λk , Gλk)}n−1k=1 ∈ HN . What is left to prove is that
ICIH
λ
(E, c) = CRλ(E, c), in other words, show that λ = λH
λ
. This follows from the



















λk(c) + (n + 2− ℓ)λℓ−1(c))





(n+ 1− ℓ)(λℓ(c)− λℓ−1(c))
n + 1− ℓ
= λi(c)− λ0(c)
= λi(c),
where, for notational onveniene, we dene λ0(c) = 0 and set




This hapter, whih is based on the preliminary manusript Huijink, Borm, Hen-
drikx, and Reijnierse (2016), introdues the idea behind the proportionate nuleo-
lus, whih is a new type of nuleolus inspired by Faigle et al. (1998). Intuitively, the
proportionate nuleolus selets the alloation that lexiographially maximizes the
minimal ratio between the joint payo to all players in a oalition and the worth of
a oalition. This idea, however, reates problems, in partiular when a oalition has
worth zero. This hapter starts by illustrating these problems using examples and
then formalizes the proportionate nuleolus. At the end of this hapter, we mention
some preliminary results.
An obvious initial idea to dene the proportionate nuleolus is by following the






for an alloation x. However, suh a denition would have
several drawbaks, whih are illustrated in the following examples.
Example 8.1.1 Consider the two person game v ∈ TUN with N = {1, 2} given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) −2 −1 1
Lexiographially minimizing the proportionate exesses among all eient al-




) sine the orresponding proportion-




, 0) with orresponding vetor of oalitions ({1}, {2}, N).
However, this implies that player 2 reeives less than player 1, while player 2 has a
higher individual worth than player 1. ⊳
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Example 8.1.1 shows that proportionality and negative worths do not go together.
This problem an be avoided by restriting the domain of the proportionate nuleolus
to non-negative games. Another important issue, however, is that the exesses are
not dened for oalitions with worth zero. The following example shows that we
should not just ignore the oalitions with worth zero.
Example 8.1.2 Consider the two person game v ∈ TUN with N = {1, 2} given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) 0 1 1
When ignoring oalition {1}, there is no eient alloation in RN whih lexio-
graphially minimizes the aompanying proportionate exess vetor. The alloation
(−A,A+1) for any A ∈ R+ has as proportionate exess vetor (0,−A) for the vetor
of oalitions (N, {2}). ⊳
The issue in the previous example an be avoided by requiring the outome to be
an eient alloation and non-negative. However, even so, ignoring the oalitions
with worth zero will bite uniity.
Example 8.1.3 Consider the two person game v ∈ TUN with N = {1, 2} given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) 0 0 1
Any vetor in conv{(1, 0), (0, 1)} will lexiographially minimize the maximal
exess when ignoring all oalitions with worth zero. Obviously, for this game, the




) on the basis of symmetry. ⊳
The following example shows that proportionality implies that the solution on-
ept will not satisfy so alled ovariane.
Example 8.1.4 Consider the two person game v ∈ TUN with N = {1, 2} given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) 1 2 6
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The vetor (2, 4) lexiographially minimizes the maximal exess. However, if we
modify the game v by adding the additive game whih assigns (1, 1) to the respetive
players, we obtain the following game w ∈ TUN :
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
w(S) 2 3 8





whih is unequal to (2, 4) + (1, 1) = (3, 5). ⊳
A way out ould be to restrit the domain of games under investigation even
further to stritly positive games. Instead, we propose another route to nd a
unique proportionate nuleolus for eah non-negative game. We are going to modify
the initial idea of proportional exesses in the following way.
Denition 8.1.6 Let v ∈ TUN+ be a non-negative game (v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ 2N),
let ε > 0 and let x ∈ EN(v) where EN(v) = {y ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N yi = v(N)}. Then,
the ε-proportionate ratio of any non-empty oalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} is dened by





The ε-proportionate ratio vetor of any game v ∈ TUN+ with N = {1, ..., n} is
dened by θε(v, x) ∈ R2n−1 and has as its oordinates the ratios of all non-empty
oalitions arranged in a weakly inreasing order. In other words, θεk(v, x) ≤ θεk+1(v, x)
for all k ∈ {1, ..., 2n − 2}. We want to maximize the ε-proportionate ratio vetor
lexiographially.
Denition 8.1.7 Let v ∈ TUN+ and ε > 0. Then, the set X ε(v) is given by
X ε(v) = {xε(v) ∈ EN(v) | θε(v, xε(v)) ≥L θε(v, y) for all y ∈ EN(v)}.
Note that X ε(v) is a general nuleolus (Mashler et al. (1992)), whih implies that
this set ontains exatly one point. For ompleteness, we present another proof.
Lemma 8.1.8 Let v ∈ TUN+ and let ε > 0. Then, |X ε(v)| = 1.
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Proof: First, we prove that the set X ε(v) is non-empty. Then, we prove that the
set onsist of one point only.
Non-emptiness: Note that the set {x(v) ∈ EN (v) | θε(v, x(v)) ≥L θε(v, v(N)n eN )} is
ompat. Sine xε(v) ⊂ {x(v) ∈ EN(v) | θε(v, x(v)) ≥L θε(v, v(N)n eN)} and θε(·) is
a ontinuous funtion on EN(v), there exists a lexiographi maximum on this set.
Hene, X ε(v) is not empty.
Uniity : Let x, y ∈ X ε(v) with x 6= y. Clearly, θε(v, x) = θε(v, y). Consider
z = 1
2
(x+ y) ∈ EN(v), for whih we show that θε(v, z) > θε(v, x) whih ontradits
the fat that x ∈ X ε(v). Let







S∗ = {S ∈ S | Qε(v, S, x) ≤ Qε(v, T, x) for all T ∈ S}.
Note that S and S∗ are non-empty.
Let Q = Qε(v, S∗, x) for any S∗ ∈ S∗ and let S ∈ 2N\{∅, N}. The proof is divided
into ases, depending on the ratio of the oalition S.






i∈S zi, whih implies that
Qε(v, S, z) = Qε(v, S, x) = Qε(v, S, y).







i∈S zi, whih implies that
Qε(v, S, z) = Qε(v, S, x) = Qε(v, S, y).
Case 3: Suppose Qε(v, S, x) = Q and S ∈ S∗. Using ase 1, we an assume that
Qε(v, S, y) ≥ Q. Furthermore, sine S ∈ S∗, we have that ∑i∈S xi 6=
∑
i∈S yi. This
implies that Qε(v, S, y) > Q, whih implies that









Qε(v, S, x) + 1
2
Qε(v, S, y) > Q.
Case 4: Suppose Qε(v, S, x) > Q. Again, using ase 1, we an assume that
Qε(v, S, y) ≥ Q. Hene, Qε(v, S, z) > Q.
Sine Qε(v, S, z) ≥ Qε(v, S, x) for all S suh that Qε(v, S, x) ≤ Q, and sine S∗ is
non-empty, there exists at least one oalition S suh that
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Qε(v, S, z) > Qε(v, S, x) = Q, we have that θε(v, z) > θε(v, x). 
Denition 8.1.9 Let v ∈ TUN+ and let ε > 0. Then, xε(v) is dened as the unique
element in X ε(v).
The alloation xε(v) is the unique alloation, in other words a singleton, whih lexi-
ographially maximizes the ratios. Moreover, it also satises the Kohlberg riteria
disussed in Setion 6.3. We use the following variant of Proposition 6.3.3.
Proposition 8.1.10 Let v ∈ TUN+ , let ε > 0 be suh that Core(v) 6= ∅, and let
x ∈ EN(v). Then, x = xε(v) if and only if there exists a sequene D1,D2, ...,Dτ of
non-empty subolletions of 2N\{∅, N} suh that Dr ⊆ F(D̄r−1) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}
that satisfy the following properties:
(A) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} the olletion D̄r =
⋃r
k=1Dk is balaned and
F(D̄τ ) = ∅.
(B) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all T ∈ Dr it holds that
Qε(v, T, x) = min
S∈F(D̄r−1)
Qε(v, S, x).
The proof is a repliation of the proof of Proposition 6.3.3 with minor hanges and
is therefore omitted. Subsequently, the proportionate nuleolus an be dened as
the limit of the sequene xε when ε tends to 0. The following example illustrates
the proportionate nuleolus for the games in Examples 8.1.2 and 8.1.3.
Example 8.1.5 (Examples 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 revisited.)
Consider the two person game of Example 8.1.2 with N = {1, 2}, v({1}) = 0,




) sine the orresponding ratios
are given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) 0 1 1






and, with τ = 1 and D1 = {1, 2}, all onditions of Proposition 8.1.10 are satised.
Furthermore, propnucl(v) = limε↓0 x
ε(v) = (0, 1).
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For the game of Example 8.1.3, with N = {1, 2}, v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 0 and




), sine the orresponding ratios are given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v(S) 0 0 1






and, with τ = 1 and D1 = {1, 2}, all onditions of Proposition 8.1.10 are satised.






Huijink, Borm, Hendrikx, and Reijnierse (2016) provide a diret Kohlberg
(Kohlberg (1971)) type of haraterization for the proportionate nuleolus whih
does not rely on the Kohlberg riteria for the ε-proportionate nuleolus xε(v). More-
over, it denes a suitable redued game property that an be used to haraterize
the proportionate nuleolus.
Example 8.1.6 (Example 1.1.2 revisited.)
Consider the problem of the two ompanies in Example 1.1.2. CompanyX (player 1)
has osts 105, ompany Y (player 2) has osts 72. When ooperating, the ompanies
have osts 139. Note that in the orresponding game we onsider osts rather than
rewards. For a TU-game v, the proportionate nuleolus maximizes the minimal
ratio. Translating the ideas behind the proportionate nuleolus to a ost setting,
we nd that the proportionate nuleolus of a ost game minimizes the maximal
ratio. The problem gives the following two person ost game c, with N = {1, 2},





sine the orresponding ratios are given by:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}






and, dereasing the osts (and ratio) of one player will inrease the osts (and







Details of hapter 2
The four ondential interviews were onduted using a questionnaire as a starting
point. The interviewees reeived the questions beforehand and the interview took
plae in a fae-to-fae meeting. During these fae-to-fae meeting, follow up ques-
tions were asked. In one ase, the interviewee answered the questions by email and
the follow up questions were asked via the telephone. The questions (in Duth)
an be found in Setion A.2. For onveniene, an exerpt of the opportunities and
impediments is translated in English and an be found in the following setion.
A.1 Exerpt of the interviews
Opportunities:
• Without ooperation we were not able to guarantee 24 hour delivery. The
ooperation inreased our servie level whih improved our market position.
• Due to the ooperation we are able to redue our osts, while we have more
business.
Seletion impediments:
• The reason that we hose the priing based struture is that we do not want
to share all our information and we want to make our own deisions.
• For a ooperation to work, it is needed that the ompanies need eah other
everyday and that the osts an be redued when ooperating.
• The ompanies in the ooperation were hosen due to their geographial fous.
Sometimes, additionally for their type of lients/orders and the resoures.
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• If the ompanies do not trust eah other, the ooperation will fall apart. The
energy whih is needed to make the ooperation a suess will be missing.
• The main risks of ooperation are the dependeny on the others and that a
ompany stops due to, for example, bankrupty or retirement.
• A previous ooperation failed due to opportunisti behavior of a ompany.
• It is neessary to make sure that the ompany who delivers an outsoured
order does not steal the lient.
Operational impediments:
• It is important that eah ompany has gains everyday from ooperating. The
gains are divided by the priing mehanism.
• Sometimes it is diult to determine whether an order should be outsoured
or delivered with the own eet. There are no good software pakages available.
• For a good ooperation, it is neessary that the ompanies an share the deliv-
ery information quikly and easily using a good transportation management
system.
• In order to have a good division of the gains, it is neessary that there is a
balane within the ooperation. Companies need to outsoure similar amounts
to eah partner and the outow and inow should be similar.
• There should be no disrimination between orders of own lients and orders
from the partners.
A.2 Questionnaire (in Duth)
Vragen over het samenwerkingsverband
• Hoe is het samenwerkingsverband ontstaan?
• Hoe werkt het samenwerkingsverband?
• Hoe is het georganiseerd?
• Wie leidt het verband?
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• Wat is geentraliseerd en wat gedeentraliseerd?
• Wordt het van bovenaf aangestuurd of bepalen de partners zelf welke pakketjes
ze bezorgen en uitwisselen?
• Hoe werkt het uitwisselen van de orders? (Via een hub en spoke met een
entraal depot?)
• Van wie is het depot?
• Hoe worden de kosten van het depot verdeeld?
• Of is er een web?
• Hoe worden de kosten van het web verdeeld?
• Hoe wordt het web bepaald?
• Vervoert het samenwerkingsverband zelf ook orders?
• Zo ja, vershilt dit vervoer met het vervoer van de partners?
• Welke afspraken zijn er gemaakt en worden de afspraken nageleefd?
• Heeft elk bedrijf een vooraf afgesproken jaht- of bestel gebied?
• Wordt er entraal winst gemaakt?
• Hoe wordt die winst verdeeld?
• Wat zijn de entrale kosten?
• Hoe worden de kosten verdeeld?
• Wat te doen bij disussies?
• Wat zijn de voordelen van het samenwerken?
• Maakt elk bedrijf elke dag winst door samen te werken?
• Wat zijn de nadelen aan het samenwerken?
• Waarom werkt dit samenwerken wel?
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• Stel: we hebben een afspraak niet, werkt het dan wel?
• Zijn er ook samenwerkingsverbanden/afspraken die niet werken?
• Zijn er risio's?
• Hoe zijn deze verdeeld?
• Wat zijn de plannen voor de toekomst met het samenwerkingsverband?
• Uitbreiding door meer leden?
Partner Seletie
• Hoe zijn de partners gevonden?
• Moesten de partners voldoen aan bepaalde eisen?
• Bv. grootte, solvabiliteit, geograshe plaatsing, klantenbestand, orderkarak-
teristieken, soort truks?
Operationele vragen voor de vervoerders
• Hoe bepalen de bedrijven welke orders uitgewisseld moeten worden?
• Welke regels gebruiken ze?
• Hoe zien die regels eruit?
• Hoeveel proent wordt bepaald met deze regels?
• Hoe wordt de beslissing over de andere pakketjes gemaakt?
• Wordt er ook soms gekeken of een pakketje niet beter zelf gedaan kan worden?
• i.e., een pakketje dat volgens de regel uitgewisseld zou worden toh zelf bezor-
gen.
• Zijn de bedrijven verpliht tot uitwisselen?
• i.e., mogen ze alleen in hun eigen gebied bestellen?
• Moeten ze de orders die de andere partners uitwisselen aannemen?
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• Zijn er afspraken waar deze pakketjes aan moeten voldoen?
• Wat zijn de kosten van het uitwisselen van een order?
• Wat moet een bedrijf betalen en wat krijgt het als het een order van een
partner ontvangt om te bezorgen?
• Hoe worden deze prijzen vastgesteld?
• Wanneer en hoe wordt er gepland?
• Wordt er eerst bepaald wat wordt uitgewisseld en worden de routes pas gepland
als de uitgewisselde orders binnen zijn?
• Wordt het met de hand gepland of met software, welke software?
• Worden er ook pik-up and delivery orders gedaan door de bedrijven?
• Of gaat alles via het depot van het bedrijf?
• Wat is de verdeling tussen pik-up and delivery en pakjes die via het depot
gaan?
• Hoeveel orders bezorgen jullie gemiddeld per dag?
• Hoeveel worden er uitgewisseld naar de partners?
• Hoeveel worden er ontvangen?
• En totaal in het hele netwerk per dag?
• Bezorgt en uitgewisseld?
• Wat zijn de speiaties van de gemiddelde order?
• Grootte, volume, time-window et.
• Hoe ver ligt het ophaal en aever adres uit elkaar?
• Of hoeveel van de orders liggen buiten het eigen gebied?
• Hoeveel stops maakt een truk gemiddeld?
• Wat is de gemiddelde stop afstand?
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• Zijn er ook routes die altijd worden gereden?
• i.e. vaste routes.
• Wat zijn de plannen voor de toekomst van het bedrijf?
Out-insouren aan derden
• Gebruiken jullie derden om pakjes te bestellen?
• Wordt alleen een truk met haueur gehuurd of gaat de order naar een ander
bedrijf?
• Ook in de stad, last mile?
• Ook voor pik-up en delivery?
• Leveren jullie ook pakjes van derden?
• Idem as hierboven.
• Leveren jullie een truk en haueur of gaat de order door het systeem?
Stadsdistributie
• Waarin vershilt stadsdistributie met normale vervoersopdrahten?
• Hebben deze orders andere karakteristieken?
• Grootte, volume, time-window et.
• Heeft het bezorgen in de stad andere eigenshappen dan de rest?
• Is het tijdsvenster de boosdoener?
• Hoeveel winkelstraten kan een truk doen?
• Kan een truk vershillende steden doen?
• Hoe vol zit een truk voor een stad?
• Hoeveel stops doet een truk in de stad?
• Wat is de stopafstand in de stad?
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• Hoeveel orders worden er in de stad bezorgd? (binnenstad en wijken, geen
industrieterrein)
• In verhouding met het totale aantal.
• Wijs je een stad toe aan een enkele partner?




Details, parameters and test results
of hapter 3
B.1 Details and parameters of heuristis
The remove-and-insert move from Arhetti et al. (2007) removes randomly a random
integer in [LB,UB]. The parameters for the two heuristis are presented in Table
B.1.







Table B.1: The parameters for the remove-and-insert move.
The yli move, whih are base upon the moves of Stenger et al. (2013), draws
a random integer in [LB,UB]. This number represents the number of routes whih
are involved in this yli move. The rst driven route is seleted based on one of
the following four riteria.
1. Random: All driven routes have the same probability of being seleted.
2. Distane: The probability is proportional to the total distane traveled in this
route. Hene, longer routes have higher probability of being seleted.
3. Unit Distane: Similar to Distane, but now the distane traveled divided by
the demand used in the route.
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4. Distane to Others: The probability is proportional to the inverse of the least
insertion ost of an order in this route to other routes. In this way, a route is
favored whih has orders lose to another route.
From this route, a sequene of orders with length a random integer in
[OrdersLB,OrdersUB], is seleted based on one of the following riteria.
1. Random: All orders have the same probability of being seleted.
2. Distane: The probability is proportional to the sum of the distane osts
from the loation before the sequene to the starting loation of this sequene
and the distane osts from the last loation of this sequene to the loation
after the sequene. Hene, sequenes that are far away from the other orders
in the route have a higher probability.
3. Average Insertion Distane: The probability is inversely proportional to the
average insertion distane of the sequene in the losest non-hosen driven
route. By doing so, the orders that are lose to another driven route have a
higher hane of being hosen.
4. Demand: The probability is proportional to the total demand of the sequene.
These orders are inserted into a driven route whih is not yet modied by this
move and that has the least insertion osts of the sequene of orders. To failitate
a losed yling, we additionally allow the rst route to be hosen when seleting
the nal route. Again, a sequene of orders, with as length a random integer in
[SecondLB, SecondUB], is seleted based on the same riteria, where the orders
just inserted are not allowed to be seleted.
Similarly, the seond type of yli moves (CyliCandidate) swithes orders be-
tween driven routes and andidate routes. Again, a random integer in [LB,UB]
is drawn. The rst andidate route is seleted based on one of the following four
riteria.
1. Random: All andidate routes have the same probability of being seleted.




otherwise, where the Prot is the outsoure osts of the sequene
minus the distane osts within this sequene. Furthermore, sine the virtual
route, whih ontains all the undelivered orders that do not belong to andidate
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routes, does not have a distane, it reeives half the value of the andidate route
with the lowest value. Hene, routes that have a smaller loss are more likely
to be seleted.




otherwise, where ProtOrder is the outsoure
osts of the best order minus the insertion osts of this order divided by its
demand. Again, the virtual route has half the value of the lowest one.
4. Unit Insertion Prot in Driven route: Now the probability is proportional to
1+ProfitIns if ProtIns is positive and −1
−1+ProfitIns
otherwise, where ProtIns
is the outsoure osts minus insertion osts in the losest driven route divided
by the demand of the best order. In this way, the route is favored whih has
the order whih an be most protable inserted into a driven route.
From this andidate route (or virtual route) a sequene of orders with length a
random integer in [OrdersLB,OrdersUB] is drawn based on the following riteria.
1. Random: All orders have the same probability of being seleted.
2. Unit Prot: The probability is proportional to 1 + Profit
Demand




otherwise, where Prot is the outsoure osts minus
the distane osts of the sequene and Demand is the demand of the order
sequene. There is no sequene in the virtual route. Therefore, the rst order
is hosen with probability proportional to its outsoure osts divided by the
demand. Then, other orders are added at the beginning or the end of the
sequene, where the probability is proportional to the prie minus the least
distane osts to the end or beginning divided by the demand of the order. By
doing so, the orders that have the most unit prot are hosen to be removed.




otherwise, where ProtIns is the outsoure osts of
the sequene of orders minus the insertion osts in the not hanged driven route
losest for this sequene. Again, the virtual route needs a dierent treatment,
namely, eah order reeives a probability proportional to its outsoure osts
minus the insertion osts and they are drawn until the needed number of orders
is reahed. In this way, the protable sequenes to insert into other routes are
taken out of the andidate route.
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4. Unit Insertion Prot: Similar to Insertion Prot but now divided by the
demand of the orders. Hene, the unit wise protable sequenes are removed
out of the andidate route.
The seleted orders are inserted into the driven route whih is not yet modied
by this move and that has the least insertion osts of the sequene of orders. To
failitate a losed yling, we additionally allow the rst route to be hosen when
seleting the nal route. Again, a sequene of orders, with length a random integer
in [SecondLB, SecondUB], is seleted but sine the route is driven, we need dierent
riteria.
1. Random: All orders have the same probability of being seleted.
2. Distane: The probability is proportional to the sum of the distane osts
from the loation before the sequene to the starting loation of this sequene
and the distane osts from the last loation of this sequene to the loation
after the sequene. Hene, sequenes that are far away from the other orders
in the route have a higher probability of being removed.
3. Average Prot: The probability is proportional to
1
1+Profit
if Prot is positive
and 1− Profit otherwise, where Prot is the outsoure osts of the sequene
of orders minus the distane osts. By doing so, the orders whih have the
least prot have the highest probability to be removed.
4. Unit Average Prot: Similar to Average Prot but now divided by the demand
of the orders.
The orders seleted from a driven route are inserted into the next route, whih
ould be driven or not, whih is not yet hosen, does not have an average prot
of more than two times the average prot of the removed orders and has the least
insertion osts of the orders. Similar as in Stenger et al. (2013) we have an adaptive
mehanism for the seletion riteria.
For the LNS-Slow, we hanged the Demand riterion to the following.
4. Distane/Average Insertion Distane: The probability is proportional to the
sum of the distane osts from the loation before the sequene to the starting
loation of this sequene and the distane osts from the last loation of this
sequene to the loation after the sequene, divided by the average insertion
B.1. Details and parameters of heuristis 129
distane of the sequene in the losest not hanged driven route. Hene, se-
quenes that are not lose to other orders in this route but are lose to other
routes are favored.
The parameters are presented in Table B.2.
Heuristi name LB UB OrdersLB OrdersUB SecondLB SecondUB
LNS-Fast
Small, one-way 2 2 3 4 0 0
Small 2 2 2 3 2 3
Medium 2 2 3 4 3 4
Large 2 4 2 4 2 4
Candidate, small 2 2 2 3 2 3
Candidate, medium 2 2 5 6 2 3
Candidate, large 2 4 2 4 2 4
LNS-Slow
Small, one-way 2 2 3 4 0 0
Small 2 2 2 4 2 4
Medium 2 4 3 4 3 4
Large 3 5 2 5 2 5
Candidate, small 2 2 3 5 2 4
Candidate, medium 2 3 2 4 2 4
Candidate, large 3 5 2 5 2 5
Table B.2: The parameters for the yli move.
The reate move selets an outsoured order whih has the highest value, where
the value is the outsoure osts minus the distane osts of this order to the ten
losest outsoured orders.
The shifting proedure assigns to eah order whih does not belong to a re-
eiving route a sore whih is based on the insertion prot of the order. If the
order is outsoured, then the value is
pi−InsertionCostsi
qi
, where InsertionCostsi is




multiplied (divided) by (1 + DistanceNowi − InsertionCostsi)
when the DistanceNow, whih is the detour osts to deliver the order in its urrent
route, is larger (smaller) than the insertion osts. The order with the highest value
and that feasible an be inserted, is hosen. The LNS-Fast has two reate moves
while the LNS-Slow has only one.
The destroy move randomly selets a driven route and all orders in this route
are outsoured. The LNS-Fast has two destroy moves while the LNS-Slow has only
one. For the LNS-Slow, the destroy move is followed, with a 50% probability, by
the reate move.
The split move randomly selets a driven route and the route is split where the
distane between two orders is the largest. The shifting proedure is applied after
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the split move.
The bomb move randomly selets an order as enter and repeatedly outsoures
the delivered order that has its loation losest to the enter. The move stops when
either the ratio of the orders that the move outsoures is Max, or when the number
of routes whih have been aeted is MaxRoutes, or when the ratio of the orders
that aeted is at least Min together with the number of routes aeted is at least
MinRoutes. For the LNS-Slow, we draw Max randomly in [MaxLB,MaxLB],
MaxRoutes in [MaxRoutesLB,MaxRoutesUB], Min in [MinLB,MinUB] and
MinRoutes in [MinRoutesLB,MinRoutesUB]. After the bomb move, the solution
is repaired using the shifting proedure. The parameters for the bomb move are
presented in Table B.3, where m is the number of routes available, and Table B.4.
Name Min(%) Max(%) MinRoutes MaxRoutes
Small 10 40 3 6
Large 12.5 40 3 m-1
Table B.3: The parameters for the bomb move for the LNS-Fast.
Min (%) Max (%) MinRoutes MaxRoutes
Name LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
Small 10 20 30 40 2 4 3 5
Large 20 30 40 50 3 6 7 9
Table B.4: The parameters for the bomb move for the LNS-Slow.
The reseed move draws a random integer in [LB,UB] of routes. From eah route
a sequene of orders, with length a random integer in [OrderLB,OrderUB], stays
in the route and the other orders are outsoured. Again, the solution is repaired
using the shifting proedure. For the LNS-Slow, we draw a sequene of orders with
as length a random integer in [#O · OredrLB,#O · OrderUB], where #O is the
number of orders in the route. The shifting proedure is used to repair the solution.
The parameters for the reseed move are presented in Table B.5.
Heuristi Name LB UB OrdersLB OrdersUB
LNS-Fast
Small 2 6 5 11
Large 5 m 6 11
LNS-Slow
Small 1 3 30% 60%
Large 4 6 60% 70%
Table B.5: The parameters for the reseed move.
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Eah of these moves if followed by a tabu searh heuristi whih has the following
parameters. The minimal number of iterations is presented by Min, whih is a
random integer in [MinLB,MinUP ]. Similarly, the maximum number of iterations
is Max, the maximum number of iterations without improvement NoImpr, after
how many iterations to realulate the infeasibility penalty by Infeas, inrease
(derease) the penalty by Up (Down), and the tabu duration is a random integer in
[TLower, TUpper].
Min Max NoImpr Up Down Infeas TLower TUpper
Heuristi LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
LNS-Fast 25 45 300 500 25 35 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 5 4 9 12 27
LNS-Slow 15 20 166 233 20 40 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 6 5 10 13 26
Table B.6: The parameters for the tabu searh after the move.
The nal move is a slightly longer tabu searh heuristi. The parameters are
presented in Table B.7.
Min Max NoImpr Up Down Infeas TLower TUpper
Heuristi LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
LNS-Fast
200 300 1000 1500 100 150 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 5 4 9 12 27
200 300 1000 1500 100 150 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 5 4 9 12 27
LNS-Slow 150 200 500 700 30 60 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 6 5 10 13 26
Table B.7: The parameters for the tabu searh move.
Finally, the minimal number of iterations for the LNS-Fast and LNS-Slow are
Min, the maximum Max, and the heuristi stops after NoImpr iterations without
improvement of the loal solution. The parameters are presented in Table B.8.
Heuristi Min Max NoImpr
LNS-Fast 200 1400 40
LNS-Slow 150 750 34
Table B.8: The parameters for LNS.
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RIP TS25 TS TS+
Boldu et al. (2008) Cté and Potvin (2009) Potvin and Naud (2011) Potvin and Naud (2011)
Instane BKS single CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best CPU(s) best CPU(s)
CE-01 1119.47 1132.91 25 1119.47 1119.47 8.5 1119.47 24.3 1119.47 24.9
CE-02 1814.52 1835.76 73 1814.52 1816.07 12.5 1814.52 33.0 1814.52 33.9
CE-03 1919.05 1959.65 107 1924.99 1930.28 34.7 1921.10 78.6 1930.66 81.0
CE-04 2505.39 2545.72 250 2515.50 2526.41 83.3 2525.17 193.2 2525.17 200.6
CE-05 3081.42 3172.22 474 3097.99 3112.25 128.3 3113.58 309.9 3117.10 353.2
CE-06 1207.47 1208.33 25 1207.47 1207.47 9.9 1207.47 25.5 1207.47 25.2
CE-07 2004.53 2006.52 71 2006.52 2010.96 14.0 2006.52 32.7 2006.52 34.0
CE-08 2052.05 2082.75 110 2055.64 2063.06 36.9 2060.17 85.1 2056.59 81.6
CE-09 2418.64 2443.94 260 2429.19 2433.86 83.3 2438.43 185.3 2435.97 188.2
CE-10 3373.42 3464.90 478 3393.41 3402.72 129.6 3406.82 311.1 3401.83 345.7
CE-11 2330.94 2333.03 195 2330.94 2336.59 54.6 2353.39 126.3 2332.36 131.0
CE-12 1952.86 1953.55 128 1952.86 1961.49 24.2 1952.86 60.4 1952.86 59.5
CE-13 2858.83 2864.21 188 2859.12 2863.96 53.7 2882.70 130.0 2860.89 132.1
CE-14 2213.02 2224.63 110 2214.14 2220.23 24.8 2219.97 65.0 2219.97 64.2
Average % 1.09 % 178.1 0.19 % 0.43 % 49.9 0.45 % 118.6 0.35 % 125.4
G-01 14104.64 14388.58 651
G-02 19111.60 19505.00 1178
G-03 24308.19 24978.17 2061
G-04 34022.19 34957.98 3027
G-05 14223.63 14683.03 589
G-06 21357.16 22260.19 1021
G-07 23251.53 23963.36 1628
G-08 29597.19 30496.18 2419
G-09 1318.03 1341.17 832 1323.57 1324.87 274.7 1328.14 611.0 1325.62 819.1
G-10 1581.68 1612.09 1294 1592.93 1598.14 471.2 1590.83 938.8 1590.82 1762.3
G-11 2155.67 2198.45 2004 2166.66 2174.45 720.2 2172.28 1492.7 2173.80 3284.3
G-12 2472.49 2521.79 2900 2490.01 2499.80 1071.4 2492.75 2309.7 2495.02 8587.6
G-13 2256.60 2286.91 802 2271.29 2274.13 157.6 2278.99 360.8 2274.12 504.5
G-14 2678.19 2750.75 1251 2693.35 2702.50 248.4 2705.00 610.4 2703.31 976.9
G-15 3143.29 3216.99 1862 3157.31 3162.85 377.1 3158.92 924.8 3161.26 1952.0
G-16 3606.30 3693.62 2778 3637.52 3645.80 556.4 3639.11 1313.7 3638.39 4675.1
G-17 1666.31 1701.58 806
G-18 2727.80 2765.92 1303
G-19 3491.54 3576.92 1903
G-20 4295.00 4378.13 2800
Average % 2.38 % 1655.5 0.61 % 0.87 % 484.6 0.79 % 1070.2 0.76 % 2820.2
TotalAverage % 1.85 % 1047.1 0.34 % 0.59 % 208.0 0.58 % 464.7 0.50 % 1105.3
Table B.9: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on homogenous instanes with
original outsoure osts: Part 1.
Note that the results from the Tabu Searhes of Cté and Potvin (2009) (TS25) and
Potvin and Naud (2011) (TS and TS+) are omitted for G-(H-)-01 up to G-(H-)-07
and from G-(H-)-17 to G-(H-)-20. This is beause the heuristis of Cté and Potvin
(2009) and Potvin and Naud (2011) aidently trunate the oordinates to integers
when loading the instanes. The trunation implies that those instanes are dierent
and hene they annot be ompared.
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GA AVNS AVNS-RN
Kratia et al. (2012) Stenger et al. (2013) Stenger et al. (2013)
Instane BKS best CPU(s) best CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 1119.47 1158.98 49.7 1123.95 92.5 1119.47 1124.06 81.2
CE-02 1814.52 1893.66 91.2 1814.52 48.6 1814.52 1816.88 63.4
CE-03 1919.05 1987.75 111.4 1920.86 212.1 1919.05 1931.52 258.1
CE-04 2505.39 2668.87 204.1 2512.05 279.7 2509.20 2526.00 179.6
CE-05 3081.42 3279.64 342.1 3099.77 228.6 3111.61 3121.21 132.9
CE-06 1207.47 1233.20 47.3 1207.81 75.9 1207.47 1208.80 79.8
CE-07 2004.53 2086.17 92.0 2013.93 50.9 2004.53 2008.74 61.0
CE-08 2052.05 2130.82 113.8 2052.05 253.1 2052.05 2062.31 251.1
CE-09 2418.64 2558.70 224.7 2432.51 259.0 2431.22 2439.94 190.8
CE-10 3373.42 3598.36 358.7 3391.35 201.0 3389.09 3407.02 162.2
CE-11 2330.94 2383.34 137.4 2332.21 316.0 2330.94 2332.34 370.5
CE-12 1952.86 2042.84 111.0 1953.55 92.9 1953.64 1953.64 107.5
CE-13 2858.83 2929.02 163.7 2858.94 278.5 2858.94 2860.94 351.4
CE-14 2213.02 2338.22 103.8 2215.38 93.2 2215.45 2215.45 148.8
Average % 4.42 % 153.6 0.23 % 177.3 0.16 % 0.45 % 174.2
G-01 14104.64 14910.52 629.3 14157.08 652.6 14155.86 14178.46 979.3
G-02 19111.60 20258.91 4568.4 19204.36 1558.4 19187.73 19283.51 1809.6
G-03 24308.19 25941.17 13529.3 24602.61 2356.1 24535.87 24706.75 2267.4
G-04 34022.19 36083.77 22360.7 34415.82 2500.9 34535.60 34682.98 2241.1
G-05 14223.63 14875.44 1803.1 14272.32 1301.1 14276.20 14318.88 2263.5
G-06 21357.16 22440.03 4826.8 21440.79 1783.5 21396.38 21529.04 2049.0
G-07 23251.53 24621.42 11098.2 23375.60 2262.8 23434.04 23607.02 2107.7
G-08 29597.19 31326.38 12532.0 29797.62 2339.7 29819.94 29920.96 1907.3
G-09 1318.03 1368.47 3236.9 1335.45 602.0 1332.04 1341.42 704.1
G-10 1581.68 1646.20 7682.2 1604.50 978.4 1604.41 1615.02 864.9
G-11 2155.67 2235.24 17381.0 2189.02 1534.3 2188.65 2205.53 1311.0
G-12 2472.49 2578.12 32100.7 2520.29 2043.9 2528.72 2542.11 1975.8
G-13 2256.60 2347.49 1113.6 2291.83 116.5 2283.74 2294.41 170.8
G-14 2678.19 2796.74 2454.8 2708.22 183.5 2717.77 2728.54 215.6
G-15 3143.29 3283.07 5083.7 3194.82 357.3 3177.52 3198.96 221.0
G-16 3606.30 3804.04 11131.3 3671.34 561.2 3674.68 3689.94 370.0
G-17 1666.31 1898.36 372.9 1682.49 110.3 1672.02 1694.55 182.3
G-18 2727.80 3079.03 851.8 2741.80 156.4 2751.63 2761.05 211.5
G-19 3491.54 3940.71 1110.9 3507.94 194.1 3516.85 3530.97 234.3
G-20 4295.00 4823.76 1606.5 4332.44 290.3 4347.85 4358.94 241.3
Average % 6.61 % 7773.7 1.02 % 1094.2 1.02 % 1.56 % 1116.4
TotalAverage % 5.71 % 4636.0 0.69 % 716.6 0.67 % 1.11 % 728.4
Table B.10: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on homogenous instanes with
original outsoure osts: Part 2.
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MS-LS MS-ILS UHGS
Vidal et al. (2015) Vidal et al. (2015) Vidal et al. (2015)
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 1119.47 1121.32 1128.28 5.2 1119.47 1119.66 34.1 1119.47 1119.66 38.5
CE-02 1814.52 1840.71 1883.44 3.9 1814.52 1817.34 68.8 1814.52 1815.63 59.6
CE-03 1919.05 1943.64 1958.80 17.0 1922.18 1929.60 258.1 1919.05 1922.88 476.8
CE-04 2505.39 2548.29 2568.49 26.3 2505.39 2516.12 576.7 2505.39 2509.82 934.7
CE-05 3081.42 3181.86 3201.29 29.3 3090.53 3102.95 620.7 3081.59 3095.58 1289.3
CE-06 1207.47 1207.47 1216.57 5.8 1207.47 1207.56 36.5 1207.47 1207.47 38.5
CE-07 2004.53 2046.62 2079.67 4.1 2006.52 2022.93 71.2 2006.52 2012.33 73.2
CE-08 2052.05 2088.10 2100.59 17.3 2054.64 2062.21 263.4 2052.05 2057.57 500.3
CE-09 2418.64 2478.01 2505.24 25.9 2428.03 2433.28 482.1 2424.32 2428.19 1241.0
CE-10 3373.42 3462.56 3491.59 30.1 3382.23 3393.78 714.9 3381.67 3387.12 1229.9
CE-11 2330.94 2343.03 2408.13 37.5 2330.94 2336.06 891.7 2330.94 2331.13 1202.9
CE-12 1952.86 1970.05 1982.06 8.7 1952.86 1953.13 113.6 1952.86 1953.13 150.8
CE-13 2858.83 2909.83 3025.26 40.1 2858.83 2859.01 881.6 2858.83 2859.07 1184.9
CE-14 2213.02 2215.38 2226.44 9.7 2213.02 2213.02 144.8 2213.02 2213.02 189.8
Average % 1.44 % 2.73 % 18.6 0.10 % 0.34 % 368.4 0.04 % 0.17 % 615.0
G-01 14104.64 14272.27 14329.96 102.5 14151.74 14165.45 1811.6 14131.18 14151.51 2405.9
G-02 19111.60 19417.12 19524.50 209.6 19142.75 19191.56 1828.1 19166.58 19190.77 2409.9
G-03 24308.19 24916.33 25038.41 415.2 24493.16 24609.36 1828.8 24409.02 24588.29 2418.1
G-04 34022.19 34883.27 35182.78 639.2 34708.93 34907.49 1864.6 34362.80 34517.47 2421.1
G-05 14223.63 14492.24 14735.12 199.1 14255.09 14373.87 1817.5 14223.63 14296.07 2408.0
G-06 21357.16 21741.15 22024.07 285.3 21382.16 21546.18 1834.2 21396.60 21488.29 2411.4
G-07 23251.53 23751.10 23980.00 381.3 23407.50 23547.12 1830.5 23373.38 23463.05 2414.9
G-08 29597.19 30271.82 30459.11 447.7 29953.21 30064.28 1856.4 29823.18 29918.06 2415.7
G-09 1318.03 1370.26 1397.08 60.7 1332.09 1339.06 1305.5 1328.65 1332.63 2323.4
G-10 1581.68 1664.96 1682.31 95.9 1595.45 1617.58 1709.2 1597.61 1603.82 2342.3
G-11 2155.67 2248.04 2281.79 163.3 2196.75 2228.23 1811.6 2182.01 2192.68 2405.2
G-12 2472.49 2624.19 2652.57 236.9 2540.92 2553.40 1818.0 2522.64 2529.84 2407.2
G-13 2256.60 2319.74 2337.43 29.3 2274.19 2277.57 513.1 2258.02 2261.50 1412.7
G-14 2678.19 2764.11 2791.23 43.5 2701.78 2708.56 917.7 2683.73 2687.50 1935.7
G-15 3143.29 3272.34 3296.86 61.8 3170.50 3177.53 1480.4 3145.11 3152.00 2301.4
G-16 3606.30 3794.17 3811.80 89.7 3641.69 3672.62 1755.0 3620.71 3632.04 2450.1
G-17 1666.31 1708.26 1717.55 19.4 1669.59 1677.37 379.0 1666.31 1671.72 1805.3
G-18 2727.80 2793.63 2801.70 27.7 2734.81 2741.10 582.7 2730.55 2733.12 2035.0
G-19 3491.54 3570.94 3585.64 36.6 3508.53 3515.47 712.9 3497.20 3504.26 1989.5
G-20 4295.00 4405.90 4433.41 45.9 4316.28 4333.59 1079.2 4312.45 4319.37 2523.0
Average % 3.03 % 3.93 % 179.5 0.85 % 1.39 % 1436.8 0.49 % 0.80 % 2261.8
TotalAverage % 2.38 % 3.43 % 113.3 0.54 % 0.95 % 996.9 0.31 % 0.54 % 1583.7
Table B.11: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on homogenous instanes with
original outsoure osts: Part 3.
In the paper of Vidal et al. (2015), the running times are not given. These times
were provided by him by email.
B.2. Detailed test results 135
R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 1119.47 1119.47 1120.15 10.1 1119.47 1119.47 16.2 1119.47 1119.47 47.4
CE-02 1814.52 1814.52 1821.07 24.0 1814.52 1817.89 40.5 1814.52 1817.06 95.8
CE-03 1919.05 1921.20 1930.42 50.9 1921.10 1928.96 94.0 1919.05 1925.08 236.7
CE-04 2505.39 2520.88 2529.49 122.4 2506.40 2521.85 265.1 2509.81 2518.14 642.7
CE-05 3081.42 3096.61 3110.45 234.5 3086.88 3102.68 496.4 3090.49 3101.40 1437.2
CE-06 1207.47 1207.47 1208.43 11.2 1207.47 1207.56 15.0 1207.47 1207.47 44.2
CE-07 2004.53 2004.88 2011.64 26.1 2004.53 2009.03 33.0 2004.53 2009.58 98.6
CE-08 2052.05 2065.16 2072.62 51.0 2058.22 2068.52 111.4 2052.05 2059.56 239.6
CE-09 2418.64 2438.35 2447.73 134.0 2425.41 2431.26 309.2 2420.71 2426.35 953.9
CE-10 3373.42 3399.95 3413.53 219.5 3380.43 3392.14 554.5 3373.84 3388.22 1704.1
CE-11 2330.94 2330.94 2392.91 68.7 2330.94 2338.09 132.1 2330.94 2330.94 399.0
CE-12 1952.86 1953.55 1966.32 47.5 1952.86 1953.13 85.1 1952.86 1952.86 183.6
CE-13 2858.83 2858.94 2892.05 75.8 2858.83 2859.19 130.9 2858.83 2858.92 437.8
CE-14 2213.02 2214.11 2214.32 42.2 2213.02 2214.24 55.2 2213.02 2213.78 185.2
Average % 0.25 % 0.81 % 79.8 0.08 % 0.32 % 167.0 0.04 % 0.22 % 479.0
G-01 14104.64 14215.96 14255.60 327.2 14159.16 14178.79 754.8 14129.48 14163.43 2433.9
G-02 19111.60 19427.81 19570.07 701.9 19145.09 19212.59 1573.0 19140.69 19254.23 6630.0
G-03 24308.19 24815.06 25175.22 1282.0 24435.85 24584.51 3224.4 24406.67 24566.00 11062.8
G-04 34022.19 34650.73 35012.77 1853.4 34285.64 34485.85 4939.1 34231.56 34425.00 15875.4
G-05 14223.63 14398.20 14627.22 311.4 14223.63 14305.10 414.3 14229.50 14261.06 1591.3
G-06 21357.16 21624.94 21979.24 656.2 21509.52 21564.90 825.5 21357.16 21440.38 4337.2
G-07 23251.53 23807.31 24096.44 1039.2 23452.22 23570.53 2156.5 23263.22 23440.51 7585.3
G-08 29597.19 29960.57 30181.65 1694.4 29717.00 29874.71 3917.1 29657.38 29864.19 12316.5
G-09 1318.03 1323.25 1328.30 458.9 1321.20 1324.08 1211.1 1320.29 1325.79 3852.0
G-10 1581.68 1586.47 1595.64 684.9 1583.78 1590.01 2096.5 1588.05 1592.14 6922.9
G-11 2155.67 2167.57 2180.98 1203.8 2164.63 2173.27 3850.1 2163.50 2172.45 12303.3
G-12 2472.49 2493.57 2511.72 2074.2 2480.21 2493.22 7812.0 2483.06 2493.94 19555.0
G-13 2256.60 2273.85 2284.81 218.3 2266.43 2272.29 523.2 2261.66 2264.92 2260.2
G-14 2678.19 2694.86 2710.24 396.6 2694.34 2699.00 1163.7 2684.66 2689.99 4838.5
G-15 3143.29 3168.79 3174.45 1014.1 3151.41 3161.40 2344.9 3150.67 3156.84 8198.0
G-16 3606.30 3641.54 3683.87 1086.1 3633.69 3645.61 3558.9 3624.56 3633.76 12741.7
G-17 1666.31 1676.52 1683.68 365.5 1666.96 1674.11 782.5 1666.31 1672.81 1878.0
G-18 2727.80 2737.70 2749.69 604.5 2735.65 2739.57 1144.7 2731.28 2734.86 3916.6
G-19 3491.54 3530.26 3538.79 961.2 3502.05 3509.68 1943.4 3494.28 3499.55 5225.4
G-20 4295.00 4347.73 4375.36 1267.8 4320.54 4331.77 2750.6 4307.63 4314.48 8081.6
Average % 1.05 % 1.82 % 910.1 0.41 % 0.77 % 2349.3 0.24 % 0.60 % 7580.3
TotalAverage % 0.72 % 1.40 % 568.2 0.27 % 0.59 % 1450.7 0.16 % 0.44 % 4656.2
Table B.12: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on homogenous instanes with
original outsoure osts: Part 4.
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hapter 3
RIP TS TS+ GA
Boldu et al. (2008) Potvin and Naud (2011) Potvin and Naud (2011) Kratia et al. (2012)
Instane BKS single CPU(s) best CPU(s) best CPU(s) best CPU(s)
CE-H-01 1191.70 1192.72 26.0 1191.70 25.7 1191.70 26.0 1203.27 49.2
CE-H-02 1789.41 1798.26 72.0 1795.51 33.7 1791.21 34.8 1860.84 94.4
CE-H-03 1916.81 1934.85 105.0 1926.33 79.0 1917.96 80.8 1988.73 109.3
CE-H-04 2459.56 2493.93 251.0 2481.64 195.6 2481.68 198.5 2622.24 206.1
CE-H-05 3116.71 3195.66 490.0 3143.92 295.9 3143.01 342.4 3314.16 340.4
CE-H-06 1204.48 1210.23 25.0 1206.82 25.4 1206.82 25.1 1210.75 51.5
CE-H-07 2025.98 2042.79 74.0 2035.90 32.5 2031.85 32.0 2108.23 90.4
CE-H-08 1983.27 2015.72 112.0 1991.23 81.4 1986.51 84.5 2057.75 119.2
CE-H-09 2419.69 2445.88 267.0 2445.49 188.9 2447.58 193.0 2601.96 233.7
CE-H-10 3246.91 3304.69 482.0 3271.70 309.5 3272.37 342.4 3415.40 382.5
CE-H-11 2301.78 2308.76 188.0 2325.74 127.0 2336.51 133.9 2381.52 139.5
CE-H-12 1908.05 1908.74 130.0 1912.47 60.7 1915.05 60.4 1954.80 109.7
CE-H-13 2832.88 2842.18 195.0 2872.14 125.0 2868.13 136.5 2883.67 143.9
CE-H-14 1907.74 1920.36 114.0 1925.46 65.8 1907.75 67.2 1988.79 111.6
Average 0.90 % 180.8 0.65 % 117.6 0.54 % 125.5 3.91 % 155.8
G-H-01 14084.33 14408.31 647.0 14812.40 661.9
G-H-02 18348.97 18663.15 1254.0 19395.20 4757.0
G-H-03 24897.32 25561.55 2053.0 26523.43 1404.3
G-H-04 34033.16 35495.66 2904.0 36261.53 23744.7
G-H-05 15423.65 16138.50 512.0 16254.20 889.6
G-H-06 19640.47 20329.04 1005.0 20717.86 5350.7
G-H-07 23244.67 24184.83 1608.0 24727.21 10955.3
G-H-08 27053.10 27710.66 2584.0 27521.28 3408.2 27334.84 18625.2 28605.47 23568.1
G-H-09 1318.74 1346.03 814.0 1331.11 592.7 1329.27 1829.3 1386.03 3259.7
G-H-10 1543.97 1575.82 1332.0 1554.96 1087.1 1555.59 1564.3 1622.14 8750.4
G-H-11 2172.77 2218.91 2140.0 2191.23 1445.5 2195.83 3207.9 2266.04 14759.3
G-H-12 2462.95 2510.07 2970.0 2535.00 2108.3 2482.92 4224.0 2580.32 32527.2
G-H-13 2215.19 2253.45 733.0 2231.88 405.8 2237.38 1801.3 2330.81 1256.3
G-H-14 2648.26 2711.81 1246.0 2685.51 630.3 2684.70 1042.9 2809.86 2687.7
G-H-15 3099.16 3156.93 1895.0 3123.60 976.6 3127.33 2111.2 3285.70 5963.1
G-H-16 3586.62 3649.09 2785.0 3853.21 1571.2 3621.85 6217.4 3780.43 10786.4
G-H-17 1688.66 1705.48 762.0 1932.18 389.1
G-H-18 2730.52 2759.99 1299.0 3062.08 729.9
G-H-19 3442.57 3517.48 1892.0 3892.96 1004.0
G-H-20 4306.64 4413.82 2733.0 4865.32 1450.4
Average 2.41 % 1658.4 1.95 % 1358.4 0.97 % 4513.7 7.08 % 7744.7
TotalAverage 1.79 % 1050.0 1.16 % 603.1 0.71 % 1842.7 5.77 % 4619.9
Table B.13: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on heterogenous instanes
with original outsoure osts: Part 1.
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R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-H-01 1191.70 1191.70 1193.00 10.1 1191.70 1194.22 15.3 1191.70 1193.09 53.0
CE-H-02 1789.41 1795.91 1804.13 25.2 1796.13 1802.79 39.4 1789.41 1799.19 129.1
CE-H-03 1916.81 1922.82 1936.32 52.4 1916.81 1927.28 82.9 1917.46 1924.47 236.2
CE-H-04 2459.56 2484.79 2499.79 128.6 2477.69 2491.28 180.3 2468.63 2480.63 916.8
CE-H-05 3116.71 3152.15 3167.93 257.3 3135.83 3150.62 529.8 3123.07 3136.80 1682.0
CE-H-06 1204.48 1205.77 1209.52 11.9 1206.82 1211.36 16.0 1204.48 1207.75 59.9
CE-H-07 2025.98 2034.98 2041.41 24.6 2033.42 2039.31 44.2 2025.98 2032.50 119.8
CE-H-08 1983.27 1987.54 2004.60 53.1 1989.21 1995.29 92.2 1983.96 1987.58 326.7
CE-H-09 2419.69 2461.18 2471.66 129.5 2444.36 2453.97 264.5 2425.06 2446.58 1000.2
CE-H-10 3246.91 3271.86 3288.80 245.5 3267.88 3281.33 429.9 3254.66 3262.88 1937.1
CE-H-11 2301.78 2365.32 2418.32 88.7 2312.92 2371.09 144.2 2305.73 2313.60 527.6
CE-H-12 1908.05 1925.45 1937.72 50.9 1908.93 1934.57 65.3 1908.05 1919.17 192.8
CE-H-13 2832.88 2844.41 2925.09 77.2 2836.09 2863.02 104.0 2833.77 2847.97 404.7
CE-H-14 1907.74 1928.71 1948.96 51.4 1916.45 1929.76 72.6 1913.55 1925.31 198.9
Average 0.80 % 1.64 % 86.2 0.38 % 1.06 % 148.6 0.11 % 0.54 % 556.1
G-H-01 14084.33 14220.30 14315.62 332.8 14175.86 14197.77 643.2 14084.33 14123.48 3608.8
G-H-02 18348.97 18561.79 18737.67 699.9 18482.03 18533.04 2242.3 18403.41 18523.85 8184.2
G-H-03 24897.32 25315.53 25740.72 1119.7 25049.48 25209.63 2775.0 24949.88 25127.31 11445.1
G-H-04 34033.16 34654.94 35062.09 1679.5 34362.17 34476.52 4289.3 34147.04 34405.37 14821.2
G-H-05 15423.65 15647.09 15879.83 249.4 15423.65 15565.58 358.9 15423.65 15491.65 1619.8
G-H-06 19640.47 20030.05 20275.03 549.4 19742.57 19905.66 1161.2 19695.40 19868.59 4414.2
G-H-07 23244.67 23893.59 24162.40 886.0 23532.62 23638.61 2420.2 23394.23 23544.57 9853.6
G-H-08 27053.10 27446.57 27738.53 1452.9 27155.11 27305.97 4593.2 27111.30 27343.98 17610.4
G-H-09 1318.74 1346.36 1356.71 403.6 1330.30 1344.25 1060.9 1325.09 1330.04 4634.4
G-H-10 1543.97 1582.04 1591.64 724.0 1568.51 1575.60 1887.8 1551.92 1560.45 7680.1
G-H-11 2172.77 2216.85 2227.39 1110.8 2199.48 2216.19 3570.7 2188.14 2197.42 10844.3
G-H-12 2462.95 2539.58 2547.00 1773.3 2496.50 2519.29 8742.8 2491.08 2510.01 22103.2
G-H-13 2215.19 2260.02 2266.93 243.0 2229.22 2243.92 921.0 2216.80 2227.53 2819.4
G-H-14 2648.26 2690.26 2726.82 343.0 2660.89 2675.40 1646.0 2653.58 2664.39 5595.0
G-H-15 3099.16 3147.99 3168.74 853.5 3134.03 3148.68 2402.7 3111.08 3124.36 8458.0
G-H-16 3586.62 3672.97 3682.11 1334.9 3621.89 3649.42 4877.1 3608.27 3624.19 14078.1
G-H-17 1688.66 1705.92 1716.15 305.5 1696.72 1700.91 1068.0 1689.30 1695.24 2661.4
G-H-18 2730.52 2757.40 2775.02 512.1 2738.17 2752.74 1741.4 2736.29 2740.59 3760.1
G-H-19 3442.57 3505.20 3534.22 841.5 3461.47 3486.10 2570.1 3451.70 3462.83 7257.6
G-H-20 4306.64 4399.10 4435.14 1167.4 4345.29 4364.39 3737.8 4321.06 4341.49 10005.3
Average 1.83 % 2.69 % 829.1 0.78 % 1.37 % 2635.5 0.35 % 0.87 % 8572.7
TotalAverage 1.41 % 2.26 % 523.2 0.62 % 1.24 % 1611.5 0.25 % 0.73 % 5271.7
Table B.14: Comparison of heuristis in the literature on heterogenous instanes
with original outsoure osts: Part 2.
138 Appendix B. Details, parameters and test results of 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R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 940.66 940.66 940.66 8.2 940.66 940.66 18.4 940.66 940.66 53.4
CE-02 1605.51 1605.51 1608.00 15.1 1605.51 1607.48 26.1 1605.51 1607.05 122.3
CE-03 1706.18 1706.18 1723.93 28.4 1706.18 1706.78 58.8 1706.18 1706.66 243.1
CE-04 2237.96 2247.35 2259.89 97.6 2245.37 2250.13 189.3 2237.96 2243.47 515.5
CE-05 2770.34 2795.24 2818.86 149.0 2777.37 2791.48 328.7 2770.34 2778.85 1481.1
CE-06 985.66 985.66 985.66 7.8 985.66 985.66 18.6 985.66 985.66 63.0
CE-07 1721.33 1721.33 1722.70 14.3 1721.33 1721.33 26.5 1721.33 1721.33 129.7
CE-08 1804.49 1804.68 1808.73 25.4 1804.49 1804.49 61.7 1804.49 1804.49 237.1
CE-09 2250.46 2259.03 2272.57 91.4 2254.69 2261.07 166.3 2250.68 2255.55 807.6
CE-10 3024.15 3037.10 3051.76 152.8 3025.90 3034.87 426.9 3024.36 3031.39 1361.9
CE-11 2172.90 2172.90 2187.15 45.6 2172.90 2172.90 64.9 2172.90 2172.90 439.7
CE-12 1800.85 1800.85 1817.46 36.9 1800.85 1802.52 57.2 1800.85 1800.85 164.4
CE-13 2626.79 2626.79 2641.49 49.5 2626.79 2626.79 58.5 2626.79 2626.79 385.2
CE-14 1922.85 1932.46 1933.59 34.7 1922.85 1925.38 47.2 1922.85 1927.92 203.9
Average 0.19 % 0.63 % 54.0 0.06 % 0.18 % 110.6 0.00 % 0.10 % 443.4
G-01 12436.61 12515.67 12575.64 380.2 12443.83 12473.49 584.6 12436.61 12470.22 1805.9
G-02 17776.73 18085.95 18177.09 723.1 17785.73 17888.16 1449.8 17798.71 17851.93 6159.2
G-03 23059.15 23542.31 23791.36 1380.6 23059.15 23161.63 3802.2 23093.44 23187.79 10620.9
G-04 30502.95 31401.51 31643.91 2127.9 30502.95 30743.75 6024.1 30582.02 30701.44 15880.1
G-05 13504.63 13620.64 13808.72 274.0 13549.86 13565.68 442.0 13510.42 13539.15 1203.6
G-06 18804.73 19131.60 19316.61 589.7 18810.01 18943.16 1356.5 18804.73 18904.76 3196.8
G-07 21676.11 22198.97 22338.11 1047.8 21676.11 21835.66 3004.9 21701.00 21759.72 8149.5
G-08 26262.70 26795.63 26956.80 1639.6 26262.70 26437.72 3838.7 26270.65 26369.04 11898.5
G-09 1208.17 1210.49 1215.13 357.1 1210.15 1213.28 1017.3 1208.17 1210.48 3028.9
G-10 1459.31 1467.58 1472.40 619.0 1461.32 1467.08 2686.0 1459.31 1463.96 5932.9
G-11 1989.39 2003.58 2008.89 1011.5 1990.65 2001.80 3357.5 1992.44 1999.34 10556.3
G-12 2308.00 2331.91 2337.43 1594.8 2313.66 2326.35 4292.4 2308.00 2321.32 16791.0
G-13 1864.50 1871.21 1876.80 295.2 1867.66 1873.54 660.7 1864.50 1869.14 2382.9
G-14 2273.69 2278.74 2289.17 538.8 2275.42 2282.32 1190.6 2273.69 2279.73 3939.8
G-15 2727.13 2742.70 2747.59 803.1 2728.51 2736.12 2371.4 2727.13 2733.24 6804.9
G-16 3194.65 3214.05 3220.45 1425.5 3201.93 3209.86 3811.3 3194.65 3203.14 11057.4
G-17 1506.42 1514.64 1520.32 244.5 1508.83 1510.51 447.1 1506.42 1508.23 1794.6
G-18 2420.46 2430.18 2436.72 520.7 2424.70 2426.59 840.5 2420.46 2422.93 3122.4
G-19 3099.49 3118.98 3131.01 756.3 3106.97 3112.98 1618.6 3099.49 3105.88 5261.1
G-20 3886.86 3915.36 3923.88 986.0 3888.46 3898.38 2551.2 3886.86 3892.43 8428.8
Average 1.05 % 1.56 % 865.8 0.11 % 0.50 % 2267.4 0.04 % 0.33 % 6900.8
TotalAverage 0.70 % 1.19 % 532.9 0.09 % 0.37 % 1382.0 0.03 % 0.24 % 4253.3
Table B.15: Comparison of our heuristis on the homogeneous instanes with half-
original outsoure osts.
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R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-H-01 977.38 977.38 983.18 8.4 977.38 977.38 16.9 977.38 977.38 52.3
CE-H-02 1583.65 1585.32 1592.20 18.9 1585.32 1585.47 33.4 1585.32 1585.33 147.1
CE-H-03 1688.51 1708.63 1724.24 30.0 1688.51 1692.05 48.2 1688.51 1691.50 234.8
CE-H-04 2205.69 2214.48 2250.90 90.0 2207.15 2213.60 199.3 2205.69 2213.08 729.9
CE-H-05 2791.55 2822.16 2854.05 161.0 2804.41 2815.80 310.0 2791.55 2801.69 1662.1
CE-H-06 977.38 977.38 986.10 7.6 977.38 977.38 12.6 977.38 977.38 58.3
CE-H-07 1704.52 1713.37 1732.40 15.8 1704.52 1705.44 27.2 1704.52 1704.52 129.0
CE-H-08 1789.60 1796.14 1814.53 31.9 1790.59 1795.16 55.5 1789.60 1792.03 312.4
CE-H-09 2229.19 2260.34 2282.47 94.3 2236.01 2244.82 166.6 2232.48 2238.13 741.2
CE-H-10 2958.74 2992.47 3020.20 164.1 2968.81 2977.85 359.3 2958.74 2966.11 1644.8
CE-H-11 2144.23 2163.30 2232.65 52.6 2144.23 2164.79 81.4 2146.69 2167.80 312.0
CE-H-12 1759.78 1784.74 1804.19 39.1 1759.78 1768.62 53.5 1759.78 1765.97 179.7
CE-H-13 2611.25 2625.99 2666.18 52.0 2611.25 2617.35 71.3 2611.25 2616.82 310.1
CE-H-14 1742.97 1749.66 1766.54 34.2 1742.97 1744.69 43.6 1742.97 1743.13 201.8
Average 0.68 % 1.86 % 57.1 0.10 % 0.36 % 105.6 0.03 % 0.25 % 479.7
G-H-01 12388.53 12468.29 12562.88 327.7 12388.53 12458.77 812.6 12388.67 12450.85 2214.1
G-H-02 17647.94 17911.18 18015.02 683.1 17680.53 17755.04 1846.4 17647.94 17712.64 6188.3
G-H-03 23185.22 23705.36 23837.41 1153.8 23196.85 23365.56 3637.1 23217.38 23303.71 12854.1
G-H-04 30562.87 31515.65 31754.33 1719.2 30562.87 30745.98 5750.9 30595.08 30727.85 15815.3
G-H-05 13628.09 13989.77 14088.29 209.6 13737.34 13757.65 387.7 13628.09 13708.55 1111.3
G-H-06 18657.87 19139.17 19309.62 492.1 18698.61 18820.31 1153.7 18657.87 18732.83 4321.8
G-H-07 21667.02 22307.68 22410.60 878.2 21677.33 21818.77 2937.1 21667.02 21755.58 8852.1
G-H-08 25605.72 26220.00 26373.02 1425.8 25605.72 25825.78 4948.0 25701.52 25846.74 15225.8
G-H-09 1189.89 1196.27 1219.74 317.2 1191.10 1199.68 1206.1 1189.89 1196.42 3085.1
G-H-10 1419.46 1430.80 1444.11 588.2 1419.67 1426.49 2272.4 1419.46 1425.22 5763.5
G-H-11 1994.00 2003.06 2028.53 984.7 1998.34 2016.69 3670.1 1994.00 2004.07 11671.8
G-H-12 2294.19 2319.86 2349.60 1402.3 2296.31 2316.75 7551.0 2294.19 2304.20 16820.4
G-H-13 1822.11 1836.60 1850.56 261.0 1824.70 1831.04 770.5 1822.11 1827.18 1929.4
G-H-14 2216.72 2234.72 2253.12 468.5 2217.67 2225.52 1826.2 2216.72 2224.22 3650.2
G-H-15 2665.05 2690.17 2710.19 760.4 2665.05 2675.88 3163.2 2668.01 2675.72 6414.7
G-H-16 3133.58 3158.71 3183.54 1237.2 3138.99 3144.90 4869.7 3133.58 3144.02 10913.1
G-H-17 1484.19 1496.98 1509.74 234.7 1490.03 1494.31 508.3 1484.19 1488.67 2381.9
G-H-18 2389.68 2416.87 2443.22 419.7 2399.25 2403.82 1343.3 2389.68 2393.91 4120.3
G-H-19 3039.23 3104.18 3118.94 670.9 3052.30 3063.66 1937.3 3039.23 3049.80 6645.9
G-H-20 3832.45 3901.84 3930.85 981.8 3850.45 3865.79 3070.5 3832.45 3847.81 8697.7
Average 1.51 % 2.38 % 760.8 0.19 % 0.70 % 2683.1 0.04 % 0.44 % 7433.8
TotalAverage 1.19 % 2.20 % 472.5 0.15 % 0.57 % 1624.4 0.03 % 0.37 % 4582.9
Table B.16: Comparison of our heuristis on the heterogenous instanes with half-
original outsoure osts.
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R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 1082.37 1082.37 1084.47 6.7 1082.37 1083.71 11.1 1082.37 1082.37 68.7
CE-02 1764.02 1769.18 1772.25 14.3 1764.02 1768.74 24.7 1764.02 1765.48 143.0
CE-03 1779.45 1787.64 1796.86 30.2 1783.00 1785.13 64.7 1782.66 1783.89 242.2
CE-04 2290.51 2305.44 2319.44 80.9 2293.07 2301.22 180.7 2291.79 2294.44 736.7
CE-05 2780.37 2788.17 2799.96 146.5 2784.57 2792.04 235.1 2780.37 2784.69 1232.4
CE-06 1202.26 1202.26 1208.13 7.0 1202.26 1202.62 12.6 1202.26 1202.26 36.7
CE-07 1983.37 1987.44 1997.00 17.4 1983.37 1987.70 37.7 1983.37 1983.52 117.4
CE-08 1948.95 1950.02 1966.43 32.2 1948.95 1952.61 78.0 1948.95 1949.99 185.9
CE-09 2310.51 2330.64 2341.48 67.0 2318.01 2325.42 183.7 2310.51 2318.37 606.9
CE-10 3150.98 3157.35 3171.65 182.5 3158.20 3165.19 407.3 3152.73 3157.29 1105.9
CE-11 2203.91 2204.53 2211.57 45.8 2204.53 2205.18 95.2 2205.16 2205.38 363.0
CE-12 1894.10 1894.10 1902.76 36.7 1894.10 1896.49 52.8 1894.10 1894.10 172.5
CE-13 2857.77 2857.91 2865.42 79.3 2857.77 2861.62 119.8 2857.77 2859.08 333.4
CE-14 2083.85 2091.04 2117.77 21.7 2083.85 2084.82 75.7 2083.85 2084.95 175.8
Average 0.24 % 0.74 % 54.9 0.07 % 0.25 % 112.8 0.02 % 0.10 % 394.3
G-01 12160.83 12167.03 12203.75 274.3 12171.99 12199.00 578.0 12160.83 12172.32 2209.0
G-02 17255.76 17305.88 17340.51 536.4 17277.95 17310.63 1358.9 17272.27 17281.46 5784.7
G-03 22469.01 22538.27 22578.90 975.3 22501.25 22524.09 2197.0 22469.01 22483.14 9927.6
G-04 29646.47 29724.59 29782.63 1496.0 29688.87 29719.40 4954.5 29646.47 29695.83 14295.0
G-05 13660.87 13775.64 13809.26 237.2 13668.69 13678.37 524.7 13660.87 13666.51 2032.7
G-06 18939.58 18988.28 19006.62 425.4 18941.45 18958.08 1179.8 18939.58 18959.35 4827.7
G-07 21258.96 21274.59 21344.67 806.7 21266.90 21309.52 2225.0 21258.96 21279.35 6528.5
G-08 25245.47 25342.60 25379.77 1181.7 25279.78 25314.52 3161.7 25245.47 25305.86 10793.8
G-09 1425.30 1427.05 1440.65 354.3 1427.97 1432.77 945.2 1425.30 1429.17 1980.7
G-10 1680.21 1690.15 1696.69 592.4 1683.72 1687.41 2070.6 1680.21 1684.13 4355.4
G-11 2337.93 2364.69 2378.77 998.9 2350.42 2365.70 3029.8 2337.93 2348.90 8794.1
G-12 2666.87 2696.75 2715.36 1450.7 2679.29 2691.56 5267.5 2666.87 2680.82 11648.1
G-13 2450.61 2456.34 2474.08 320.7 2450.61 2460.97 784.6 2450.88 2456.49 1793.6
G-14 2902.98 2910.44 2933.74 541.2 2907.96 2919.13 1149.7 2902.98 2908.67 3473.8
G-15 3377.13 3408.68 3422.22 856.7 3381.12 3401.22 2007.1 3377.13 3392.05 5030.0
G-16 3864.52 3885.17 3898.93 1213.7 3873.89 3887.29 3777.5 3864.52 3876.37 7499.2
G-17 1504.53 1510.87 1516.40 270.0 1504.59 1508.14 537.3 1504.53 1506.09 1471.8
G-18 2584.71 2601.64 2607.96 455.7 2588.28 2593.54 1440.0 2584.71 2588.30 3604.8
G-19 3187.87 3205.69 3207.08 664.4 3192.01 3199.29 1790.0 3187.87 3191.99 4608.1
G-20 3816.89 3839.71 3847.94 972.3 3826.09 3834.80 2723.2 3816.89 3823.27 6486.3
Average 0.48 % 0.86 % 731.2 0.16 % 0.43 % 2085.1 0.01 % 0.21 % 5857.2
TotalAverage 0.39 % 0.83 % 454.1 0.13 % 0.36 % 1276.0 0.01 % 0.17 % 3617.4
Table B.17: Comparison of our heuristis on the homogenous instanes with new
outsoure osts.
B.2. Detailed test results 141
R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-H-01 1189.28 1190.90 1194.70 7.5 1189.28 1190.69 12.2 1189.28 1189.96 48.7
CE-H-02 1676.73 1676.73 1685.66 16.8 1676.73 1680.68 25.8 1676.73 1677.66 116.2
CE-H-03 1714.44 1732.17 1739.06 38.6 1716.18 1719.61 50.7 1714.44 1719.19 224.6
CE-H-04 2216.66 2220.75 2237.37 90.8 2221.82 2226.70 154.3 2216.66 2222.46 560.8
CE-H-05 2720.67 2738.90 2750.17 159.8 2729.34 2738.32 263.9 2721.72 2730.18 1208.1
CE-H-06 1167.81 1173.22 1174.83 7.0 1168.29 1169.50 13.0 1167.81 1168.06 53.7
CE-H-07 1945.28 1956.60 1963.40 18.0 1945.28 1954.24 29.2 1945.28 1955.11 134.3
CE-H-08 1881.24 1890.61 1900.02 31.1 1883.61 1887.29 62.7 1881.24 1885.15 277.6
CE-H-09 2248.22 2266.16 2281.09 86.8 2261.08 2266.24 150.7 2248.22 2254.21 719.5
CE-H-10 3043.12 3053.87 3070.88 154.1 3045.31 3058.24 307.0 3044.75 3050.71 1440.8
CE-H-11 2087.08 2087.67 2098.38 52.2 2087.43 2088.90 110.9 2087.08 2090.06 443.5
CE-H-12 1810.05 1813.47 1822.05 33.0 1810.56 1815.12 59.0 1810.05 1813.13 279.5
CE-H-13 2785.92 2791.48 2826.10 47.2 2791.48 2802.87 80.6 2791.26 2800.95 464.3
CE-H-14 1764.69 1767.39 1778.25 32.2 1764.69 1766.14 72.7 1764.69 1765.76 220.2
Average 0.38 % 0.91 % 55.4 0.12 % 0.36 % 99.5 0.02 % 0.23 % 442.3
G-H-01 11600.91 11617.17 11687.57 284.3 11608.17 11625.17 731.1 11600.91 11616.10 2280.8
G-H-02 16296.86 16304.96 16444.74 624.9 16296.86 16339.31 1258.0 16297.17 16350.30 5116.4
G-H-03 21192.11 21316.83 21370.25 978.7 21192.11 21226.30 2578.3 21198.02 21219.08 8866.8
G-H-04 27963.45 28043.39 28097.85 1296.1 27963.45 27983.59 3463.7 27963.45 27993.34 11015.6
G-H-05 12978.64 12978.64 13002.80 164.9 12978.64 12978.64 268.1 12978.64 12978.64 1380.4
G-H-06 18744.81 18785.11 18844.10 456.9 18744.81 18775.05 1099.8 18744.81 18764.69 4261.1
G-H-07 20014.52 20058.75 20182.30 741.7 20014.52 20036.97 1886.5 20014.52 20025.81 6477.2
G-H-08 23880.67 23975.58 24050.09 1287.5 23888.10 23953.45 2982.3 23880.67 23938.39 9554.3
G-H-09 1397.97 1417.24 1426.17 309.0 1399.27 1410.64 1139.7 1397.97 1401.84 2576.1
G-H-10 1586.71 1597.32 1601.70 407.5 1588.24 1595.56 1421.8 1586.71 1591.24 3268.0
G-H-11 2324.40 2360.26 2373.82 835.5 2340.72 2350.73 3577.2 2324.40 2340.80 7337.6
G-H-12 2613.29 2653.53 2666.66 882.3 2616.15 2630.18 5505.1 2613.29 2620.57 10575.8
G-H-13 2394.41 2420.39 2426.19 305.1 2395.42 2410.26 685.9 2394.41 2399.65 1986.0
G-H-14 2837.66 2881.24 2892.25 471.7 2847.41 2868.13 1533.7 2837.66 2851.31 3676.1
G-H-15 3285.27 3311.16 3319.57 659.9 3285.27 3297.73 2240.3 3288.63 3295.72 4561.0
G-H-16 3750.00 3758.22 3769.44 933.7 3750.00 3756.17 3406.9 3750.03 3755.35 6594.7
G-H-17 1425.48 1434.22 1440.64 259.1 1427.61 1429.10 612.2 1425.48 1427.18 1631.5
G-H-18 2519.91 2541.13 2547.82 474.2 2523.32 2527.72 967.6 2519.91 2522.79 3641.2
G-H-19 3055.15 3070.46 3087.22 684.5 3060.89 3069.05 1806.5 3055.15 3061.84 5478.8
G-H-20 3669.77 3690.25 3712.09 931.2 3684.28 3692.04 2616.3 3669.77 3680.01 8217.1
Average 0.66 % 1.08 % 649.4 0.12 % 0.42 % 1989.0 0.01 % 0.23 % 5424.8
TotalAverage 0.55 % 1.02 % 406.2 0.12 % 0.40 % 1213.5 0.01 % 0.23 % 3384.8
Table B.18: Comparison of our heuristis on the heterogenous instanes with new
outsoure osts.
142 Appendix B. Details, parameters and test results of hapter 3
R-TS LNS-Fast LNS-Slow
Instane BKS best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s) best avg CPU(s)
CE-01 524.61 524.61 524.61 9.1 524.61 524.61 9.2 524.61 524.61 22.9
CE-02 835.26 835.26 835.33 23.1 835.26 835.64 33.3 835.26 835.73 72.3
CE-03 826.14 828.56 830.39 42.8 826.14 827.68 70.9 826.14 827.98 194.9
CE-04 1028.42 1036.67 1044.53 101.6 1029.56 1040.04 255.9 1031.07 1036.37 629.2
CE-05 1291.29 1302.89 1312.65 228.6 1296.15 1307.31 470.3 1293.59 1303.11 1431.1
CE-11 1042.12 1042.12 1092.63 64.3 1042.12 1071.29 125.3 1042.12 1069.07 316.7
CE-12 819.56 819.56 819.56 33.1 819.56 819.56 38.1 819.56 819.56 107.2
Average 0.28 % 1.23 % 71.8 0.07 % 0.77 % 143.3 0.06 % 0.65 % 396.3
tai75a 1618.36 1620.47 1650.47 22.3 1618.36 1618.78 27.8 1618.36 1618.36 74.5
tai75b 1344.62 1363.69 1376.85 19.2 1344.64 1344.70 36.2 1344.62 1344.70 88.0
tai75 1291.01 1335.19 1370.17 23.6 1291.01 1297.42 38.9 1291.01 1291.01 93.0
tai75d 1365.42 1372.13 1392.31 20.3 1365.42 1369.81 35.8 1365.42 1365.42 79.7
tai100a 2041.34 2097.00 2105.62 36.3 2049.58 2073.82 94.3 2041.34 2057.85 268.7
tai100b 1939.90 1948.48 1968.55 43.8 1940.61 1944.33 68.3 1940.61 1940.70 205.0
tai100 1406.20 1472.52 1523.82 34.7 1415.29 1418.01 73.9 1406.86 1415.51 205.2
tai100d 1581.24 1606.24 1617.13 30.5 1596.97 1598.89 66.1 1592.88 1597.07 228.3
tai150a 3055.23 3096.01 3170.38 107.5 3056.41 3085.33 284.4 3056.85 3059.90 675.4
tai150b 2656.47 2843.75 2888.21 85.5 2732.52 2789.79 226.7 2732.25 2739.43 742.7
tai150 2341.84 2416.78 2493.59 79.7 2367.22 2405.11 267.9 2365.97 2400.65 616.7
tai150d 2645.39 2755.29 2783.79 71.8 2669.96 2686.74 271.1 2661.69 2668.44 668.0
tai385 24431.44 24914.46 25040.97 875.2 24730.62 24851.31 3687.1 24657.92 24718.72 8218.6
Average 2.51 % 4.19 % 111.6 0.63 % 1.28 % 398.3 0.48 % 0.80 % 935.7
TotalAverage 1.73 % 3.15 % 97.6 0.44 % 1.10 % 309.1 0.34 % 0.75 % 746.9
Table B.19: Comparison of our heuristis on the instanes without outsouring.
Appendix C
Detailed test results of hapter 4
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144 Appendix C. Detailed test results of hapter 4
Initialization Hall
Instane BFS Pries AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven
Orig
CE-01 1119.47 1964.00 1124.68 71.43 % 95.56 % 1066.31 1119.47 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-02 1814.52 3551.00 1814.52 100.00 % 100.00 % 1772.43 1814.53 50.00 % 95.83 %
CE-03 1919.05 4076.00 1930.74 83.33 % 97.78 % 1868.77 1932.51 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-04 2505.39 5869.00 2524.28 76.19 % 96.27 % 2514.25 2525.05 80.00 % 97.01 %
CE-05 3081.42 7742.00 3115.19 81.48 % 97.18 % 3121.29 3095.25 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-06 1207.47 2036.00 1216.09 71.43 % 95.56 % 1153.18 1207.47 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-07 2004.53 3737.00 2018.09 80.00 % 98.59 % 1961.15 2004.53 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-08 2052.05 4199.00 2052.05 100.00 % 100.00 % 2001.57 2064.45 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-09 2418.64 5989.00 2436.65 75.00 % 97.87 % 2433.69 2428.21 90.91 % 99.29 %
CE-10 3373.42 7985.00 3385.51 81.48 % 97.18 % 3409.09 3394.43 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-11 2330.94 8684.00 2377.85 80.00 % 97.22 % 2575.54 2368.38 68.75 % 95.41 %
CE-12 1952.86 4365.00 1966.73 62.50 % 96.84 % 2169.54 1966.73 62.50 % 96.84 %
CE-13 2858.83 8829.00 2866.98 62.50 % 94.55 % 3099.23 2891.06 62.50 % 94.55 %
CE-14 2213.02 4379.00 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 % 2410.59 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 %
Average 129.70 % 0.61 % 79.49 % 97.30 % 4.36 % 0.51 % 80.84 % 97.61 %
Half-Orig
CE-01 940.66 982.00 957.83 17.14 % 34.09 % 921.83 974.56 60.00 % 51.72 %
CE-02 1605.51 1775.50 1669.33 13.89 % 55.71 % 1615.62 1642.12 70.73 % 73.91 %
CE-03 1706.18 2038.00 1771.02 34.38 % 76.40 % 1663.92 1773.66 72.73 % 88.16 %
CE-04 2237.96 2934.50 2262.67 70.37 % 93.89 % 2252.46 2296.98 75.76 % 93.60 %
CE-05 2770.34 3871.00 2792.47 73.53 % 94.83 % 2811.44 2806.00 79.41 % 95.93 %
CE-06 985.66 1018.00 1018.00 17.14 % 34.09 % 974.67 1018.00 63.89 % 51.85 %
CE-07 1721.33 1868.50 1762.57 11.36 % 44.29 % 1735.67 1766.95 76.60 % 71.79 %
CE-08 1804.49 2099.50 1866.54 35.48 % 77.53 % 1763.54 1833.16 63.16 % 81.58 %
CE-09 2250.46 2994.50 2310.00 40.74 % 88.49 % 2265.60 2300.02 78.13 % 94.40 %
CE-10 3023.80 3992.50 3069.13 57.14 % 89.71 % 3067.29 3070.08 84.44 % 95.65 %
CE-11 2172.90 4342.00 2239.35 41.18 % 81.13 % 2417.02 2176.29 88.57 % 95.51 %
CE-12 1800.85 2182.50 1856.73 30.43 % 82.80 % 2008.22 1851.36 66.67 % 87.50 %
CE-13 2626.79 4414.50 2658.57 39.39 % 81.31 % 2869.15 2647.35 86.49 % 94.32 %
CE-14 1922.85 2189.50 1967.88 58.33 % 88.37 % 2102.25 2003.32 53.49 % 74.03 %
Average 13.87 % 2.46 % 38.61 % 73.05 % 3.92 % 2.35 % 72.86 % 82.14 %
New
CE-01 1082.37 1169.50 1135.38 25.00 % 73.91 % 1053.09 1134.86 23.53 % 71.74 %
CE-02 1764.02 2063.50 1808.27 7.14 % 82.43 % 1755.21 1823.21 28.57 % 85.92 %
CE-03 1779.45 2046.00 1853.73 14.29 % 81.44 % 1771.10 1828.04 25.00 % 84.21 %
CE-04 2290.51 2663.50 2379.87 19.35 % 82.64 % 2348.15 2340.23 34.48 % 86.43 %
CE-05 2778.02 3184.75 2873.09 15.38 % 76.96 % 2859.12 2867.88 50.00 % 87.57 %
CE-06 1202.26 1364.00 1245.38 20.00 % 83.33 % 1162.11 1239.55 20.00 % 83.33 %
CE-07 1983.37 2474.50 2030.80 16.67 % 93.24 % 1963.58 2022.61 33.33 % 94.52 %
CE-08 1948.95 2339.50 2013.73 14.29 % 81.44 % 1931.10 1992.20 25.00 % 84.21 %
CE-09 2310.51 2793.25 2384.40 11.11 % 83.67 % 2356.99 2365.67 32.00 % 88.03 %
CE-10 3147.93 3819.00 3255.78 20.00 % 83.25 % 3214.71 3202.54 42.86 % 89.13 %
CE-11 2203.91 2544.75 2261.99 17.07 % 69.91 % 2398.21 2291.01 59.18 % 78.02 %
CE-12 1894.10 2253.75 1922.22 4.35 % 77.78 % 2074.52 1976.83 44.00 % 84.27 %
CE-13 2857.77 3682.00 2906.27 18.75 % 88.89 % 3059.34 2917.33 42.86 % 92.98 %
CE-14 2083.85 2475.50 2121.99 11.54 % 76.29 % 2264.78 2192.32 36.00 % 82.42 %
Average 28.84 % 3.03 % 15.35 % 81.09 % 3.76 % 3.10 % 35.49 % 85.20 %
Table C.1: Detailed results of the estimation methods: Part 1.
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Baghuis Fleishmann
Instane BFS Pries EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven
Orig
CE-01 1119.47 1964.00 1155.16 1151.43 55.56 % 91.11 % 972.93 1133.68 71.43 % 95.56 %
CE-02 1814.52 3551.00 1754.05 1868.50 71.43 % 97.14 % 1612.81 1814.53 50.00 % 95.83 %
CE-03 1919.05 4076.00 1956.79 1969.38 78.57 % 96.63 % 1683.50 1930.45 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-04 2505.39 5869.00 2548.59 2559.71 66.67 % 94.03 % 2282.73 2522.87 80.00 % 97.01 %
CE-05 3081.42 7742.00 3028.69 3138.83 76.67 % 96.02 % 2845.73 3100.52 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-06 1207.47 2036.00 1241.27 1228.46 62.50 % 93.33 % 1059.93 1222.68 71.43 % 95.56 %
CE-07 2004.53 3737.00 1949.47 2101.59 50.00 % 94.37 % 1801.52 2004.53 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-08 2052.05 4199.00 2083.65 2099.01 84.62 % 97.75 % 1811.40 2054.20 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-09 2418.64 5989.00 2448.59 2460.55 76.92 % 97.86 % 2199.23 2432.71 90.91 % 99.29 %
CE-10 3373.42 7985.00 3359.52 3496.84 77.42 % 96.00 % 3133.53 3394.83 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-11 2330.94 8684.00 1929.73 2413.26 70.59 % 95.37 % 2369.02 2332.43 73.33 % 96.33 %
CE-12 1952.86 4365.00 1806.28 2007.21 45.45 % 93.68 % 1955.47 1966.73 62.50 % 96.84 %
CE-13 2858.83 8829.00 2448.30 2888.51 64.71 % 94.50 % 2897.97 2891.06 62.50 % 94.55 %
CE-14 2213.02 4379.00 2082.99 2278.98 83.33 % 96.47 % 2200.13 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 %
Average 129.70 % 4.69 % 2.65 % 68.89 % 95.30 % 7.64 % 0.56 % 78.28 % 97.20 %
Half-Orig
CE-01 940.66 982.00 940.61 982.00 75.00 % 50.00 % 830.33 978.90 58.33 % 48.28 %
CE-02 1605.51 1775.50 1577.03 1671.53 62.79 % 66.67 % 1470.89 1636.13 72.97 % 79.17 %
CE-03 1706.18 2038.00 1717.45 1756.67 66.67 % 80.56 % 1488.46 1736.72 57.58 % 82.72 %
CE-04 2237.96 2934.50 2236.85 2307.57 60.00 % 87.30 % 2026.06 2246.90 74.19 % 93.70 %
CE-05 2770.34 3871.00 2678.19 2850.63 65.85 % 91.86 % 2537.42 2790.77 72.73 % 94.86 %
CE-06 985.66 1018.00 986.21 1018.00 76.92 % 55.00 % 884.99 998.64 55.56 % 46.67 %
CE-07 1721.33 1868.50 1701.48 1783.19 80.00 % 71.43 % 1595.98 1764.36 69.57 % 67.44 %
CE-08 1804.49 2099.50 1816.45 1856.38 58.14 % 76.00 % 1588.91 1840.72 60.53 % 80.52 %
CE-09 2250.46 2994.50 2253.35 2316.07 60.00 % 87.30 % 2038.56 2259.83 74.19 % 93.70 %
CE-10 3023.80 3992.50 2940.97 3087.55 66.67 % 89.70 % 2798.92 3045.88 82.61 % 95.03 %
CE-11 2172.90 4342.00 1749.89 2208.85 91.89 % 96.51 % 2242.91 2218.11 77.78 % 91.30 %
CE-12 1800.85 2182.50 1641.46 1852.12 50.00 % 83.72 % 1800.17 1809.34 76.92 % 92.50 %
CE-13 2626.79 4414.50 2199.33 2660.35 86.49 % 94.32 % 2693.73 2661.43 82.35 % 93.48 %
CE-14 1922.85 2189.50 1773.76 1963.29 66.67 % 87.50 % 1894.48 1985.93 57.89 % 79.49 %
Average 13.87 % 4.49 % 2.87 % 69.08 % 79.85 % 7.45 % 1.64 % 69.51 % 81.35 %
New
CE-01 1082.37 1169.50 1114.50 1127.33 44.44 % 60.53 % 952.56 1133.89 23.53 % 71.74 %
CE-02 1764.02 2063.50 1738.45 1821.64 40.00 % 86.96 % 1590.29 1781.10 31.25 % 84.29 %
CE-03 1779.45 2046.00 1822.94 1853.21 41.38 % 80.68 % 1575.03 1829.09 25.00 % 84.21 %
CE-04 2290.51 2663.50 2356.66 2391.49 43.90 % 82.58 % 2104.98 2345.04 39.29 % 87.77 %
CE-05 2778.02 3184.75 2769.76 2859.23 57.41 % 86.31 % 2571.70 2851.34 51.11 % 87.50 %
CE-06 1202.26 1364.00 1241.93 1297.08 37.50 % 77.27 % 1062.18 1245.36 18.18 % 81.25 %
CE-07 1983.37 2474.50 1957.17 2041.72 50.00 % 94.37 % 1799.22 2005.41 60.00 % 97.22 %
CE-08 1948.95 2339.50 2000.75 2006.35 50.00 % 86.36 % 1735.03 1992.19 25.00 % 84.21 %
CE-09 2310.51 2793.25 2371.39 2355.46 53.33 % 89.55 % 2114.30 2353.67 28.00 % 87.41 %
CE-10 3147.93 3819.00 3148.71 3234.48 61.54 % 91.43 % 2926.59 3222.40 47.06 % 90.16 %
CE-11 2203.91 2544.75 1901.63 2289.12 20.45 % 68.47 % 2141.38 2274.49 54.00 % 75.27 %
CE-12 1894.10 2253.75 1743.71 1994.66 24.00 % 79.79 % 1841.58 1961.81 37.93 % 79.78 %
CE-13 2857.77 3682.00 2507.60 2922.39 16.67 % 87.18 % 2828.46 2917.94 50.00 % 93.81 %
CE-14 2083.85 2475.50 1961.03 2193.41 28.57 % 78.26 % 2035.24 2155.48 39.29 % 80.90 %
Average 28.84 % 4.27 % 3.86 % 40.66 % 82.12 % 7.52 % 2.64 % 37.83 % 84.68 %
Table C.2: Detailed results of the estimation methods: Part 2.
146 Appendix C. Detailed test results of hapter 4
Goudvis Huijink
Instane BFS Pries EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven
Orig
CE-01 1119.47 1964.00 1189.68 1119.47 100.00 % 100.00 % 983.04 1130.90 57.14 % 93.48 %
CE-02 1814.52 3551.00 1898.65 1814.52 100.00 % 100.00 % 1680.52 1814.53 50.00 % 95.83 %
CE-03 1919.05 4076.00 2071.61 1943.05 60.00 % 93.41 % 1737.97 1930.45 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-04 2505.39 5869.00 2608.98 2526.31 76.19 % 96.27 % 2315.16 2523.43 80.00 % 97.01 %
CE-05 3081.42 7742.00 3175.71 3108.72 78.57 % 96.61 % 2898.67 3098.23 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-06 1207.47 2036.00 1276.56 1207.47 100.00 % 100.00 % 1069.91 1217.90 57.14 % 93.48 %
CE-07 2004.53 3737.00 2087.91 2015.05 50.00 % 95.83 % 1869.23 2004.53 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-08 2052.05 4199.00 2211.55 2079.81 71.43 % 95.56 % 1870.77 2066.51 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-09 2418.64 5989.00 2529.45 2427.22 75.00 % 97.87 % 2232.14 2428.21 90.91 % 99.29 %
CE-10 3373.42 7985.00 3468.86 3397.94 78.57 % 96.61 % 3186.47 3389.61 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-11 2330.94 8684.00 2335.67 2332.43 73.33 % 96.33 % 2252.01 2363.34 62.50 % 94.55 %
CE-12 1952.86 4365.00 2009.75 1970.56 62.50 % 96.84 % 1908.88 1969.29 62.50 % 96.84 %
CE-13 2858.83 8829.00 2864.06 2871.13 73.33 % 96.33 % 2777.41 2878.00 66.67 % 95.45 %
CE-14 2213.02 4379.00 2250.92 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 % 2155.29 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 %
Average 129.70 % 4.01 % 0.53 % 77.60 % 97.10 % 6.70 % 0.60 % 74.57 % 96.68 %
Half-Orig
CE-01 940.66 982.00 927.88 968.89 76.92 % 55.00 % 839.58 973.77 62.86 % 53.57 %
CE-02 1605.51 1775.50 1609.83 1662.83 75.56 % 73.17 % 1503.72 1639.39 75.00 % 77.78 %
CE-03 1706.18 2038.00 1784.90 1773.48 61.70 % 74.65 % 1530.86 1731.33 63.16 % 81.58 %
CE-04 2237.96 2934.50 2284.70 2306.11 52.94 % 80.49 % 2053.03 2260.08 74.19 % 93.70 %
CE-05 2770.34 3871.00 2839.66 2815.72 62.50 % 89.35 % 2590.57 2795.46 72.73 % 94.86 %
CE-06 985.66 1018.00 972.38 1013.39 76.92 % 55.00 % 894.95 1018.00 62.86 % 53.57 %
CE-07 1721.33 1868.50 1713.53 1790.95 79.25 % 66.67 % 1624.80 1775.58 75.51 % 68.42 %
CE-08 1804.49 2099.50 1869.52 1859.45 59.57 % 73.61 % 1627.34 1832.81 66.67 % 84.21 %
CE-09 2250.46 2994.50 2305.20 2299.34 65.00 % 88.71 % 2066.66 2272.58 70.97 % 92.97 %
CE-10 3023.80 3992.50 3079.71 3076.94 65.52 % 87.58 % 2846.18 3056.64 69.39 % 90.91 %
CE-11 2172.90 4342.00 2178.94 2186.50 86.11 % 94.38 % 2125.61 2209.51 81.08 % 92.22 %
CE-12 1800.85 2182.50 1831.35 1860.16 57.14 % 81.25 % 1746.47 1827.52 56.67 % 84.34 %
CE-13 2626.79 4414.50 2631.24 2640.00 88.57 % 95.51 % 2564.33 2648.95 91.18 % 96.63 %
CE-14 1922.85 2189.50 1917.50 1981.29 52.38 % 74.36 % 1846.58 2012.64 55.00 % 76.92 %
Average 28.68 % 1.64 % 2.61 % 68.58 % 77.84 % 6.59 % 1.98 % 69.80 % 81.55 %
New
CE-01 1082.37 1169.50 1130.87 1166.77 46.43 % 59.46 % 936.95 1101.03 43.75 % 79.07 %
CE-02 1764.02 2063.50 1832.57 1838.66 45.83 % 79.69 % 1594.87 1775.40 46.67 % 88.24 %
CE-03 1779.45 2046.00 1875.39 1875.27 32.56 % 66.28 % 1576.65 1796.92 40.00 % 86.96 %
CE-04 2290.51 2663.50 2353.26 2389.51 34.88 % 79.26 % 2082.84 2324.30 46.43 % 89.05 %
CE-05 2778.02 3184.75 2816.59 2887.52 49.25 % 79.52 % 2560.64 2833.84 48.94 % 86.36 %
CE-06 1202.26 1364.00 1272.15 1288.59 26.32 % 68.89 % 1049.83 1214.03 66.67 % 93.18 %
CE-07 1983.37 2474.50 2067.93 1998.23 44.44 % 92.96 % 1816.83 1989.62 80.00 % 98.59 %
CE-08 1948.95 2339.50 2074.36 2039.92 34.38 % 76.40 % 1740.00 1959.83 42.11 % 88.04 %
CE-09 2310.51 2793.25 2383.07 2407.07 36.59 % 80.74 % 2093.07 2339.87 30.77 % 87.32 %
CE-10 3147.93 3819.00 3209.47 3239.35 45.45 % 86.59 % 2917.88 3176.24 44.44 % 89.07 %
CE-11 2203.91 2544.75 2145.32 2270.55 63.83 % 81.11 % 2073.37 2240.42 65.22 % 82.22 %
CE-12 1894.10 2253.75 1898.97 1982.44 36.67 % 78.65 % 1798.46 1959.15 36.67 % 78.65 %
CE-13 2857.77 3682.00 2815.44 2888.20 50.00 % 93.81 % 2722.22 2893.75 50.00 % 93.81 %
CE-14 2083.85 2475.50 2092.72 2178.19 36.67 % 78.65 % 1991.71 2152.40 36.67 % 78.65 %
Average 18.11 % 3.17 % 4.19 % 41.66 % 78.71 % 8.57 % 1.46 % 48.45 % 87.09 %
Table C.3: Detailed results of the estimation methods: Part 3.
147
BaghuisAdj Huijink10
Instane BFS Pries EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven EstCosts AVNS-Fast Outsoured Driven
Orig
CE-01 1119.47 1964.00 1150.53 1133.57 62.50 % 93.33 % 1025.34 1133.68 71.43 % 95.56 %
CE-02 1814.52 3551.00 1741.53 1814.52 100.00 % 100.00 % 1698.88 1814.53 50.00 % 95.83 %
CE-03 1919.05 4076.00 1936.82 1941.12 71.43 % 95.56 % 1786.81 1932.59 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-04 2505.39 5869.00 2524.22 2538.82 77.27 % 96.24 % 2370.33 2521.26 80.00 % 97.01 %
CE-05 3081.42 7742.00 2999.77 3115.33 89.29 % 98.28 % 2954.19 3097.50 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-06 1207.47 2036.00 1238.90 1212.68 71.43 % 95.56 % 1112.34 1222.68 71.43 % 95.56 %
CE-07 2004.53 3737.00 1931.53 2006.52 50.00 % 95.83 % 1887.59 2004.53 100.00 % 100.00 %
CE-08 2052.05 4199.00 2073.94 2075.02 91.67 % 98.88 % 1919.71 2061.18 83.33 % 97.78 %
CE-09 2418.64 5989.00 2429.68 2428.40 75.00 % 97.87 % 2288.84 2432.71 90.91 % 99.29 %
CE-10 3373.42 7985.00 3283.49 3392.62 81.48 % 97.18 % 3241.99 3389.16 81.48 % 97.18 %
CE-11 2330.94 8684.00 1911.26 2368.38 68.75 % 95.41 % 2310.57 2406.23 62.50 % 94.55 %
CE-12 1952.86 4365.00 1766.23 1966.73 62.50 % 96.84 % 1954.12 1969.29 62.50 % 96.84 %
CE-13 2858.83 8829.00 2435.87 2866.98 62.50 % 94.55 % 2841.98 2867.09 73.33 % 96.33 %
CE-14 2213.02 4379.00 2047.53 2216.47 87.50 % 97.67 % 2200.30 2215.38 87.50 % 97.67 %
Average 129.70 % 5.10 % 0.73 % 75.09 % 96.66 % 4.48 % 0.74 % 77.09 % 97.04 %
Half-Orig
CE-01 940.66 982.00 940.52 982.00 70.00 % 0.00 % 862.13 973.77 62.86 % 53.57 %
CE-02 1605.51 1775.50 1577.11 1666.76 66.67 % 66.67 % 1518.62 1648.23 73.17 % 75.56 %
CE-03 1706.18 2038.00 1716.19 1746.53 63.41 % 79.73 % 1578.50 1741.14 69.44 % 85.33 %
CE-04 2237.96 2934.50 2235.82 2277.45 64.86 % 89.68 % 2105.05 2259.61 74.19 % 93.70 %
CE-05 2770.34 3871.00 2678.71 2827.59 58.70 % 88.95 % 2644.55 2800.43 73.68 % 94.15 %
CE-06 985.66 1018.00 986.09 1018.00 70.00 % 0.00 % 915.81 1018.00 58.33 % 48.28 %
CE-07 1721.33 1868.50 1700.78 1777.69 78.00 % 69.44 % 1636.86 1783.36 73.47 % 66.67 %
CE-08 1804.49 2099.50 1817.19 1843.82 60.98 % 78.67 % 1674.72 1842.31 62.16 % 81.82 %
CE-09 2250.46 2994.50 2251.61 2286.14 72.22 % 91.94 % 2118.48 2263.35 70.97 % 92.97 %
CE-10 3023.80 3992.50 2941.75 3076.76 66.00 % 89.76 % 2899.33 3048.30 78.26 % 93.87 %
CE-11 2172.90 4342.00 1746.27 2191.60 86.49 % 94.32 % 2166.13 2185.01 91.43 % 96.59 %
CE-12 1800.85 2182.50 1639.76 1825.37 50.00 % 85.06 % 1793.93 1816.68 65.52 % 87.65 %
CE-13 2626.79 4414.50 2199.75 2638.51 88.57 % 95.51 % 2613.75 2649.95 91.18 % 96.63 %
CE-14 1922.85 2189.50 1773.06 1954.92 68.97 % 88.75 % 1887.19 1986.66 55.00 % 76.92 %
Average 28.68 % 4.51 % 2.20 % 68.92 % 72.75 % 4.57 % 1.88 % 71.40 % 81.69 %
New
CE-01 1082.37 1169.50 1113.29 1128.57 43.75 % 50.00 % 962.84 1106.54 43.75 % 79.07 %
CE-02 1764.02 2063.50 1734.98 1776.36 35.29 % 84.06 % 1615.00 1775.79 46.67 % 88.24 %
CE-03 1779.45 2046.00 1821.37 1823.81 44.00 % 84.27 % 1616.76 1804.84 40.00 % 86.96 %
CE-04 2290.51 2663.50 2352.62 2347.59 56.76 % 87.60 % 2134.65 2327.84 46.43 % 89.05 %
CE-05 2778.02 3184.75 2760.90 2868.86 49.09 % 83.72 % 2603.86 2827.63 58.70 % 88.95 %
CE-06 1202.26 1364.00 1238.89 1243.49 50.00 % 86.36 % 1075.71 1222.57 50.00 % 88.89 %
CE-07 1983.37 2474.50 1945.35 1999.26 50.00 % 95.83 % 1836.66 1989.62 80.00 % 98.59 %
CE-08 1948.95 2339.50 1996.76 1971.97 42.86 % 86.81 % 1780.55 1968.96 35.00 % 86.02 %
CE-09 2310.51 2793.25 2363.80 2349.42 51.85 % 90.44 % 2149.90 2343.09 46.43 % 89.05 %
CE-10 3147.93 3819.00 3134.14 3179.81 71.43 % 94.25 % 2964.68 3192.77 51.43 % 90.61 %
CE-11 2203.91 2544.75 1894.21 2247.97 72.00 % 83.33 % 2109.25 2247.92 61.70 % 80.22 %
CE-12 1894.10 2253.75 1732.63 1941.05 21.74 % 81.05 % 1835.06 1956.19 36.67 % 78.65 %
CE-13 2857.77 3682.00 2494.31 2881.48 18.75 % 88.89 % 2777.53 2893.71 50.00 % 93.81 %
CE-14 2083.85 2475.50 1950.43 2158.20 25.93 % 78.49 % 2028.56 2150.69 36.67 % 78.65 %
Average 18.11 % 4.43 % 2.16 % 45.25 % 83.94 % 6.71 % 1.67 % 48.82 % 86.91 %
Table C.4: Detailed results of the estimation methods: Part 4.
Instane BKS Hall Baghuis Fleishmann Goudvis Huijink BaghuisAdj Huijink10
tai75a 1618.36 2283.30 1233.85 1391.48 1972.47 1445.40 1233.85 1492.15
tai75b 1344.62 1935.84 811.56 1089.94 1719.40 1221.65 811.56 1227.32
tai75 1291.01 1904.10 1111.16 1085.35 1869.97 1152.34 1111.16 1148.82
tai75d 1365.42 1968.27 814.04 1153.21 1577.30 1164.53 814.04 1186.78
tai100a 2041.34 2827.44 1457.27 1761.47 2515.63 1803.59 1457.27 1813.32
tai100b 1939.90 2751.77 inf 1702.40 2446.35 1706.41 1595.35 1730.10
tai100 1406.20 2160.55 975.97 1208.68 1874.73 1270.20 975.97 1278.18
tai100d 1581.24 2267.74 1334.10 1319.69 2338.90 1365.23 1334.10 1399.77
tai150a 3055.23 4440.73 1709.39 2772.18 3403.51 2833.03 1709.39 2898.74
tai150b 2656.47 4191.58 inf 2538.21 2965.47 2422.47 1452.88 2476.92
tai150 2341.84 4143.87 1247.18 2173.43 2648.74 2045.10 1247.18 2067.61
tai150d 2645.39 4061.46 1639.17 2330.79 3207.47 2311.52 1639.17 2354.64
tai385a 24431.44 33258.20 inf 22280.88 33599.67 22218.66 15443.18 22203.17
Avg 47.99 32.14 12.51 25.82 10.98 32.40 9.76
Table C.5: Detailed results of the estimation methods: Part 3.

Appendix D
Parameters and test results of
Chapter 5
D.1 Parameters of LNS-Faster
The LNS-Faster has the same moves as the LNS-Fast, with the following exeptions.
First, the LNS-Faster has only one move of the reate, destroy and tabu searh.
Seond, the following parameters of the tabu searh are dierent.
Min Max NoImpr
Heuristi LB UB LB UB LB UB
After a move 25 50 200 300 20 40
Tabu searh move 50 100 400 600 40 80
Table D.1: The parameters for the tabu searh.
Finally, the parameters for the LNS-Faster are presented in Table D.2.
Heuristi Min Max NoImpr
LNS-Faster 0 306 51
Table D.2: The parameters for LNS-Faster.
D.2 Detailed test results of the Kriging model
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Table D.3: Costs without outsouring.
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Company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 sum
Day 1 4730.15 7539.29 4221.98 2745.62 3761.8 6075.37 8247 4230.64 2137.83 43689.68
Day 2 4518.08 7825.71 4144.43 3226.43 4028.74 5454.59 8550.15 4105.08 2534.68 44387.89
Day 3 4000.03 6288.47 4324.54 2998.08 3469.99 6634.79 7212.85 4375.76 2631.95 41936.46
Day 4 4554.56 7189.73 4866.67 3558.57 3857.92 5097.1 7466.07 4159.57 2226.12 42976.31
Day 5 5297.11 6612.56 4101.39 2927.54 3790.22 5450.63 7453.19 4955.03 2954.13 43541.8
Day 6 3853.16 6571.27 4093.44 2946.59 4164.22 6062.12 7607.09 4205.44 2607.08 42110.41
Day 7 4130.9 7465.59 4450.6 3156.44 3650.83 5985.52 7350.1 4308.86 2781.29 43280.13
Day 8 4438.85 7110.99 4192.72 3379.76 3671.78 5010.96 7334.23 4419.48 2675.04 42233.81
Day 9 3755.79 8238.82 4551.79 3368.46 4039.63 6198.94 6997.63 4064.78 2646.38 43862.22
Day 10 4310.58 7412.83 4400.14 2899.49 3922.37 4620.61 7150.13 4582.46 2837.9 42136.51
avg 4358.921 7225.526 4334.77 3120.698 3835.75 5659.063 7536.844 4340.71 2603.24 430155.22
Table D.4: Costs without outsouring.

Appendix E
Details of Chapter 7
E.1 Proof of Theorem 7.2.8
Theorem 7.2.8. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let vE,c be the orresponding bankrupty
game. Then,
σ(E, c) = pcn(vE,c).
Proof: In this proof, σ(E, c) is abbreviated to σ and vE,c is abbreviated to v.
Furthermore, sine σ and the per apita nuleolus both depend ontinuously on the
estate E, we assume that
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) 6= E.
In order to apply Proposition 6.3.4, we will do the following:
Part I: Dene τ , and for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, dene appropriate relevant olletions
Dr and show that Dr ⊂ F(D̄r−1).
Part II: Show that the sequene D1, ...,Dτ satises ondition (A) of Proposition
6.3.4, i.e., D̄r =
⋃r
ℓ=1Dℓ is balaned for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and F(D̄τ) = ∅.
Part III: Show that the sequene D1, ...,Dτ satises ondition (B) of Proposition
6.3.4, i.e., for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all S ∈ Dr, it holds that
excP (v, S, σ) = max
T∈F(D̄r−1)
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in whih α and β are determined by
∑
ℓ∈N min{α, δℓ(c)} = E and
E −∑ℓ∈N δℓ(c) =
∑
ℓ∈N max{0, cℓ − δℓ(c)− β}, respetively. For notational onve-














δi(c) if i < t,









Additionally, dene Sr := {1, ..., ar(c)−1}∪{r} for eah r ∈ {1, ..., t−1} and dene
Dr = {Sr, N\{r}} for all r ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}.
Furthermore, if t < n and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E, then, dene Sr := {1, ..., m − 1} ∪ {r}
for eah r ∈ {t, ..., n}, where m is dened by







Suh an m exists beause v({1, ..., at(c)− 1} ∪ {t}) = 0 (see Lemma E.1.1 after this
proof, where it is used that t < n).
Moreover, if t < n, dene
D(E,c) =
{
{St, ..., Sn} if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E,
{N\{t}, ..., N\{n}} if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
For all r < t, we have
H(D̄r) = {S : S ⊂ {1, ..., r}} ∪ {N\S : S ⊂ {1, ..., r}}.
Moreover, if t < n, we have
H(D̄t) = 2N
and if t = n, we have
H(D̄t−1) = 2N ,
so we dene τ := τ(E, c) := min{t, n− 1}.
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This gives that F(D̄r−1) = {S : 1 ≤ |S ∩ {r, ..., n}| ≤ n − r} for all r ≤ τ whih
implies that Dr ⊂ F(D̄r−1) for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}.
Part II: By onstrution, we have that F(D̄τ ) = ∅. It remains to prove that D̄r
is balaned for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}. The balanedness proof is split into two ases
depending on whether t = 1 or not.
Case 1: If t = 1, then
D1 =
{
{{1}, ..., {n}} if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E,
{N\{1}, ..., N\{n}} if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.





for all i∈N to dene a balaned map if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c)<E.
Case 2: Assume t > 1 and let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}. Take ε > 0 suiently small. Again,
this part is split into two ases. First, we show that D̄r is balaned for all r < t.
Then, we show that D̄t is balaned.
Subase 2a: Let t > 1, assume r < t and let
















ρ(S) = 0 else.
Sine all ρ-values exept ρ(N\{1}) and ρ({1}) are in the order of ε, both ρ(N\{1})
and ρ({1}) are stritly positive. Note that ρ({1}) = ρ(N\{1}) = 1 in ase r = 1.
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= 1. (E.4)
Let i ≤ r. Then,
∑
S:S∋i
























in whih equation (E.5) follows from the fat that
ρ(Si)− ρ(N\{i}) = −
∑r
k=i+1 1{i≤a(k)−1}ρ(Sk) for all i ≤ r (S1 = {1} and 1 ∈ Sk for




whih ompletes the proof that this ρ forms a balaned map for the ase r < t.
Subase 2b: Let t > 1, assume that r = t. Sine r ≤ τ = min{t, n− 1}, we have
t = τ . Again, this part is split into two, depending on whether
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E or
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
Subase 2bi: Let t > 1, r = t = τ and assume
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E. Then,
ρ(Si) = 2ε for all i ∈ {2, ..., t− 1},










for all i ∈ {2, ..., t− 1},














ρ(S) = 0 else.
Sine all ρ-values exept ρ(N\{1}) and ρ({1}) are in the order of ε, both ρ(N\{1})
and ρ({1}) are stritly positive.
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Let i ≥ t. Then,
∑
S:S∋i




















Let i < t. Then,
∑
S:S∋i





































ρ(N\{k}) + ρ(N\{1}) + ε
= (1− ε) + ε
= 1.
Again, (E.7) follows from the fat that







ρ(S)eS = eN , whih ompletes Case 2bi.
Subase 2bii: Let t > 1, r = t = τ , and assume
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E. Then,
D̄t = D̄t−1 ∪ B, where B = {N\{1}, ..., N\{n}}. Sine B is balaned (see Case
1) and D̄t−1 is balaned (see Subase 2a), we have that D̄t is balaned.
Part II: For all ases it is shown that D̄r is balaned for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}.
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Part III: The proof is split into two parts. In the rst part (Part IIIA), we provide
an upper bound for the per apita exesses of oalitions in F(D̄r−1). In the seond
part (Part IIIB), it is shown that the oalitions in S ∈ Dr are equal to this upper
bound.
First, note that S ∈ F(D̄r−1) implies that there exists at least one j ≥ r suh that
j ∈ S.
Part IIIA: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and let S ∈ F(D̄r−1). The proof is split into two
ases, depending on whether v(S) = 0 or v(S) > 0.
Case 1: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and let S ∈ F(D̄r−1). Assume that v(S) = 0 and dene
s = min{|S|, r}. Again there are two ases, depending on whether δr(c) ≤ σr or
δr(c) > σr.
Subase 1i: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, S ∈ F(D̄r−1) and let v(S) = 0. Assume that
δr(c) ≤ σr. We have









































To larify, at (E.8) the following is used: If r > s, then, we rst remove the r − s
players whih reeive the most. Then, we replae the remaining players with players
1, ..., s− 1 and r, whih is possible sine there is a player j ∈ S suh that j ≥ r. At
(E.9), it is used that δr(c) ≤ σr, whih implies that δℓ(c) ≤ σℓ for all ℓ ∈ {1, ..., r}.
Finally, (E.10) follows from (7.2).
To onlude this subase: for all S ∈ F(D̄r−1) with v(S) = 0 and δr(c) ≤ σr, we
have that excP (v, S, σ) ≤ δr(c)−cr
n−1
.
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Subase 1ii: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, let S ∈ F(D̄r−1), and let v(S) = 0. Assume that
δr(c) > σr. This implies due to the denition of the lights rule, Denition 7.2.1,
that
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ > E and r ≥ t. Then, sine r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, the denition of τ and r ≥ t
we have that r = t. Furthermore, we have
excP (v, S, σ) ≤ 0−
∑s−1



















To larify, (E.11) follows from Subase 1i until (E.8). At (E.12) we use (E.2)
and at (E.13) we use (E.3) together with the fat that v(S) = 0 implies that
v({1, ..., s− 1} ∪ {r}) = 0.
To onlude this subase: if δt(c) > σt (and hene
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ > E), we have for all






Subase 1: From Subase 1i and Subase 1ii, we obtain that for all
r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all S ∈ F(D̄r−1) with v(S) = 0,














if r = t and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E,
δt(c)−ct
n−1
if r = t and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
Subase 2: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, let S ∈ F(D̄r−1), assume that v(S) > 0 and let
k ∈ {r, ..., n}\S. We have






















E − ck − (E − σk)
|S|
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≤ σk − ck
n− 1
≤ σr − cr
n− 1 . (E.15)
To larify, (E.14) uses the fat that σi ≤ ci for all i ∈ N . Inequality (E.15) follows
from the fat that r ≤ k together with the fat that ci−1 − σi−1 ≤ ci − σi for all
i ∈ {2, ..., n} (Lemma 7.2.7).
To onlude this subase: For all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all S ∈ F(D̄r−1) with v(S) > 0,
we have, due to (E.2), that









if r < t,
α−cr
n−1
if r = t and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E,
−β
n−1
if r = t and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
Part IIIA: We have from Subase 1 and Subase 2 that for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and
all S ∈ F(D̄r−1), it holds that














































if r = t,
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) > E and v(S) = 0,
α− ct
n− 1 if r = t,
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) > E and v(S) > 0,
δt − ct
n− 1 if r = t,
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) < E and v(S) = 0,
−β
n− 1 if r = t,
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) < E and v(S) > 0.













r = t and
∑

































To larify, (E.16) uses (E.3), whih also uses Lemma E.1.1, and (E.17) uses (7.3).
Finally, at (E.18), we use (E.1).
Furthermore, for the ase r = t and
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E we have by (E.1) that
−β ≥ δt(c)−ct whih implies that δt−ctn−1 ≤
−β
n−1
. Hene, we obtain for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}
and all S ∈ F(D̄r−1) the following:








































Part IIIB: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}. The proof is split into two ases, depending on
whether r < t or not.
Subase 1: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and assume that r < t. Then, Dr = {Sr, N\{r}} and
we have for Sr, that
excP (v, Sr, σ) =
0−
∑ar(c)−1





































To larify, at (E.20), (E.21), and (E.22), we use Lemma E.1.1, (E.2), and (7.3),
respetively.
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For N\{r}, we have








n− 1 . (E.24)
To larify, at (E.23) we use Lemma E.1.2 and at (E.24) we use (E.2).
To onlude this subase: excP (v, Sr, σ) = exc
P (v,N\{r}, σ) = δr(c)−cr
n−1
.
Subase 2: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and assume that r = t. There are two ases, depend-
ing on whether
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E or
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
Subase 2i: Let r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, let r = t, and assume that
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E. Then,
Dt = {St, ..., Sn} and, by (E.3) and the onstrution of St, we have that v(St) = 0
and























To larify: (E.25), (E.26) and (E.27), follow from (E.19), the fat that v(Sj) ≥ 0,
and the denition of Sj , respetively.






for all T ∈ Dt.
Subase 2ii: Let r = t and assume that
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E. Then,
Dt = {N\{t}, ..., N\{n}} and for all j ≥ t, we have
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=




n− 1 . (E.29)
To larify, at (E.28), we use Lemma E.1.2 and at (E.29), we use r = t together with
(E.2).
To onlude this subase: excP (v, T, σ) = −β
n−1
for all T ∈ Dt.
Part IIIB: From Subase 1, Subase 2i, and Subase 2ii, we obtain for all
r ∈ {1, ..., τ} and all S ∈ Dr, that


















n− 1 if r < t,
−∑m−1ℓ=1 δℓ(c)− α
m










Part III: From Part IIIA, espeially (E.19), and from Part IIIB, espeially
(E.30), we obtain for all r ∈ {1, ..., τ}, all S ∈ F(D̄r−1), and all T ∈ Dr,







































Hene, by Proposition 6.3.4, we obtain σ(E, c) = pcn(vE,c). 
Lemma E.1.1 Let (E, c) ∈ BRN be a problem and let t(E, c) as dened in (E.1).
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it holds that
vE,c({1, . . . , ai(c)− 1} ∪ {i}) = 0.
Proof: For notational onveniene, we abbreviate t(E, c) to t. Let k = n − 1 if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E, and let k = t− 1 if
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E. Proving that
vE,c({1, ..., ai(c) − 1} ∪ {i}) = 0 for i = k implies that it holds for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
The worth of the oalition is given by














i=k+1 ci ≤ 0 is suient.









ci − (n− k)(ck − δk(c)). (E.31)
If
∑














δi(c) + cn − cn−1 + δn−1(c), (E.32)
where (E.32) follows from Lemma 7.2.7.
If
∑



























ci − (n− t + 1)(ct−1 − δt−1(c)), (E.33)
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where (E.33) follows from (E.1).
Now, we will prove that E −∑k−1i=ak(c) ci −
∑n







































































((n− k + 1)ak(c)
n + ak(c)− 1
+ (k − n)
)
ck +













(ak(c) + (k − n)(n− 1)







To larify, at (E.34), (E.35), and (E.36), we have used (E.31), (7.3), and the fat
that ak(c) ≤ k < n, respetively. 

















{1, . . . , n(E, c)− 1} if
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) < E and t(E, c) = n,
{1, . . . , n} if
∑
ℓ∈N
δℓ(c) < E and t(E, c) < n,
it holds that
E − ci ≥ 0
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Proof: For notational onveniene, we abbreviate t(E, c) to t. Note that prov-
ing E ≥ ci for i = t − 1 (or i = n − 1 or i = n) implies that it holds for all
i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} (or i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} or i ∈ N). The proof is split into two ases,
depending on whether
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) > E or
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E.
Case 1: Assume
∑










By (7.2), we have that
δt−1(c) ≥
t− 1
n + t− 1− 1ct−1 −
n− 1












n + t− 2
n− 1 δt−1(c). (E.38)
Now, we will prove that E − ct−1 ≥ 0:































ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E. Again, this ase is split into two parts, depending
whether t = n or t < n.
Case 2a: We have
∑
ℓ∈N δℓ(c) < E and assume that t = n. Then,



























To larify, at (E.42) we use Lemma 7.2.3 and at (E.43) we use (7.2).
Case 2b: We have
∑
































δj(c) + 2δn−1(c) + cn − cn−1.
To larify, at (E.44) we use (E.1) together with the fat that ci−1 − σi−1 ≤ ci − σi
for all i ∈ {2, ..., n} (Lemma 7.2.7). Using this, we have









δj(c) + 2δn−1(c)− cn−1
≥ 0. (E.45)
To larify, at (E.45) we use Case 2a. 

Glossary
Abbreviations of routing problems
CPTP Capaitated protable tour problem
TOP Team orienteering problem
VRP Vehile routing problem
VRPO Vehile routing problem with order outsouring
VRPPC Vehile routing problem with private eet and
ommon arrier
Order harateristis
{0, 1, ..., n} The set of orders, where 0 denotes the depot.
pi Outsoure osts for order i.
qi Demand of order i.
dij The distane from the loation of order i to the
loation of order j.
Truk (route) harateristis
m The number of available truks.
Q The apaity of a truk.
F The xed osts of a truk.
v The additional osts per unit distane of a truk.




Moves in Chapter 3
driven routes A route with less delivery osts than outsoure
osts.
andidate routes A route with more delivery osts than outsoure
osts.
delivered orders Orders that are in driven routes.
outsoured orders Orders that are in andidate routes or not in any
route.
insertion osts The additional distane osts for delivering an
order in a route.
protable insertion A variant of the lassial insertion method whih
takes the outsoure osts into aount.
prot (of an order) Outsoure osts minus the insertion osts divided
by the demand.
1-shift Moves one order from one route to another one.
1-swap Swithes two orders from dierent routes.
tabu Forbids a move.
remove-and-insert
move
Randomly outsoures delivered orders and
randomly delivers outsoured orders.
yli move Cylily moves orders from one route to another
one.
shifting proedure Repairs a solution by using protable insertion
whih also allows insertions from delivered routes.
reate move Creates a route with one outsoured order.
Followed by the shifting proedure to ll the new
route with orders.
destroy move Outsoures all orders in a route.
split move Splits a driven route into two. Followed by the
shifting proedure in order to ll these routes.
bomb move Ruins a solution by outsouring orders with the
loation losest to the enter. Followed by the
shifting proedure.
reseeding Ruins a solution by outsouring parts of routes.
Followed by the shifting proedure.
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Abbreviations of the heuristis
AVNS adaptable variable neighborhood searh (Stenger,
Vigo, Enz, and Shwind (2013))
AVNS-RN adaptable variable neighborhood searh-random
neighborhood ordering (Stenger, Shneider, and
Goeke (2013))
GA geneti algorithm (Kratia et al. (2012))
LNS-Fast (and
Slow)
large neighborhood searh-Fast (Slow) (Huijink,
Kant, and Peeters (2014))
MS-ILS multistart iterative loal searh (Vidal et al.
(2015))
MS-LS multistart loal-improvement (Vidal et al.
(2015))





TS(25) tabu searh (Cté and Potvin (2009))
TS tabu searh (Potvin and Naud (2011))
TS+ tabu searh with ejetion hains (Potvin and
Naud (2011))
UHGS unied hybrid geneti searh (Vidal et al. (2015))
Symbols used in Chapter 4
EstCostsi Estimated delivery osts of order i.
Fi Estimated xed osts of order i.
Si Estimated stem osts of order i.
IOi Estimated inter-order osts of order i.
si Sore of order i.
π(i) Rank of order i.
Costs The true osts of an estimation.
BKSCosts The osts of the best known solution.
Both The set of orders that are outsoured (delivered)
by both the estimation and the best known
solution.
Either The set of orders that are outsoured (delivered)
by either the estimation or the best known
solution.
EstCost The estimated osts of the estimation.
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Symbols used in Chapter 5
N Set of ompanies
pij(.) Priing mehanism for ompany i for an order
that has a loation in the region of ompany j.
p(.) The vetor whih ontains all priing
mehanisms.
ip The fee for outsouring an order.
ζj Unit inter-depot osts from the hub to ompany j
or the other way around.
mi Number of routes on an inter-depot line.
Symbols used in Chapters 6-8
N N = {1, ..., n} a nite set of players.
v (N, v) a transferable utility game.
TUN The set of all transferable utility games with
player set N .
excP (v, S, x) The per-apita exess of oalition S for alloation






(N,E, c) A bankrupty problem with player set N , estate
E and laims c.
BRN The set of all bankrupty problems with player
set N .
CEA(E, c) A bankrupty rule whih assigns the estate as
equal as possible.
CEL(E, c) A bankrupty rule whih assigns the estate suh
that the losses are as equal as possible.
vE,c The bankrupty game,
vE,c(S) = max{0, E −
∑
i∈N\S ci}.
σ(E, c) and δ(c) The lights rule, see Denition 7.2.1 on 88.
ai(c) See Equation 7.3 on page 92.
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Regionale vervoersbedrijven hebben vaak een depot of uitvalsbasis diht bij de
klanten die pakketten bezorgd willen hebben. Door deze ligging hoeven de hauf-
feurs niet ver te rijden om de pakketten op te halen. Helaas geldt dit niet voor het
aeveren van de pakketten, aangezien de aeveradressen vaak verspreid zijn over
het hele land (en soms zelfs erbuiten liggen). Voor de pakketten die een aeveradres
ver weg hebben, moeten de haueurs ver rijden om er alleen al bij in de buurt te
komen. Vaak is het ook nog eens zo dat er geen aeveradres van een ander pakket
in de buurt ligt. Dit resulteert in hoge kosten waardoor het bedrijf geen rendabele
24-uurs levering kan garanderen. Wat kan een bedrijf doen om de kosten omlaag te
krijgen van de pakketten die ver weg geleverd moeten worden?
De oplossing waar ik onderzoek naar heb gedaan is samenwerking met andere
vervoersbedrijven, de zogeheten `onullega's'. Er zijn vershillende manieren van
samenwerken. Welke het beste is, hangt af van de eisen van het bedrijf aangezien
elke vorm zijn eigen voor- en nadelen heeft. Drie vormen worden behandeld in
Hoofdstuk 2. Twee daarvan, de entrale planning en het veilingmehanisme, hebben
als nadeel dat niet bekend is hoe de winst verdeeld moet worden en dat er meer
informatie gedeeld wordt dan de meeste bedrijven willen. Een samenwerking die
deze twee nadelen niet heeft, is het vormen van een alliantie zoals TransMission,
Netwerk Benelux, Teamtrans en Distri-XL doen. Een ander groot voordeel van
het alliantieverband is de ombinatie van onafhankelijkheid ten opzihte van de
uit te besteden orders en de garantie dat de uitbestede orders ook eht afgenomen
worden. Deze allianties bestaan uit vershillende regionale vervoersbedrijven, elk
met een eigen regio. Doordat ze allemaal hetzelfde probleem hebben, namelijk dat
het bezorgen van de pakketten ver weg relatief duur is, willen ze de pakketten
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uitbesteden naar elkaar. Om dit mogelijk te maken, spreken ze een prijsmehanisme
af dat voor elk pakket de kosten aangeeft dat het bedrijf moet betalen aan het
bedrijf dat het pakket gaat bezorgen. Het bepalen van het prijsmehanisme wordt
behandeld in Hoofdstuk 5. In dit hoofdstuk reëer ik een nieuwe dataset. Op deze
dataset bepaal ik het prijsmehanisme dat de totale kosten van de alliantie traht
te minimaliseren.
Gegeven de kosten voor het uitbesteden, moet elk bedrijf bepalen welke pakketten
het uitbesteedt. Er zijn grofweg drie manieren om te bepalen welke pakketten het
bedrijf het beste kan uitbesteden. De eerste manier is om alle mogelijkheden op
een slimme manier af te gaan. Helaas is dat onmogelijk als er een realistish aantal
pakketten is. De tweede manier is door zogenoemde heuristieken te gebruiken. De
heuristieken die ik hiervoor heb ontwikkeld, worden behandeld in Hoofdstuk 3. Deze
nieuwe heuristieken blijken beter te zijn dan de heuristieken in de literatuur. De
laatste manier is door middel van simpele rekenregels, bijvoorbeeld, door de kosten
van het bezorgen te shatten en deze af te zetten tegen de uitbestedingskosten. De
simpele rekenregels die ik heb ontwikkeld worden behandeld in Hoofdstuk 4. De
nieuwe shattingen presteren het beste op zowel de oude als nieuwe datasets.
In deze alliantiesamenwerking wordt de winst automatish verdeeld. Bij de twee
andere manieren (entrale planning en veilingmehanisme) is een van de problemen
hoe de kosten, of de extra winst, te verdelen. Een methode die de waarde van een
bedrijf meet en aan de hand hiervan de winst verdeelt, is oöperatieve speltheorie.
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden de vershillende manieren waarop de winst verdeeld kan
worden voor onder andere transportbedrijven behandeld. Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt
het uratorenprobleem. In dit probleem wil een urator de gedupeerden van een
failliet bedrijf shadeloos stellen, maar er is niet genoeg geld voor iedereen. De
vraag is: hoeveel krijgt elke gedupeerde? In dit hoofdstuk ontwikkel ik een nieuwe
verdeelregel die samenvalt met de per apita nuleolus van het bijbehorende spel.
Een nieuw alloatiemehanisme voor een algemeen oöperatief spel op basis van
proportionaliteit wordt behandeld in Hoofdstuk 8.
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